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Abstract 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT IN LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 
PORTS AND MARINE TERMINALS SUPPLY CHAINS 
 
Mohamed BRIOUIG 
B.Sc., M.Sc. 
 
 
Due to its environmental attributes, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a clean 
fossil fuel source of energy has witnessed a steady increase in demand 
worldwide over the last decade. This increase is mainly attributed to higher 
demand from the power generation sector as well as from domestic and 
industrial usages .This growing role of LNG among competing energy sources 
has raised concerns over the safety and security of the LNG chain of 
production, transport and distribution and its related infrastructure. Within this 
context, LNG ports and marine terminals, being strategically located at the 
midstream of the LNG Supply Chain (SC), are further exposed to safety and 
security risks and represent credible targets for international terrorism. Ensuring 
uninterrupted, robust and resilient LNG SC requires first, adequate 
management of safety and security risks in LNG ports and marine terminals. 
While each discipline of risk, be it safety or security, has received significant 
attention both in theory and practice, less attention was given to the 
management of interfaces and shared impacts among LNG Ports safety and 
security risks which led to the existence of gaps in the risk management (RM) 
systems of LNG ports and may represent a major source of risk and disruption 
to LNG ports. This research addresses such gaps which are poorly addressed 
in the current literature and proposes a holistic and integrated approach to the 
issues of LNG ports safety and security risks assessment and management.   It 
also aims to model safety and security RM from a SC perspective and 
examines the relationships and shared impacts among LNG ports safety and 
security risks in the present context of increased LNG demand worldwide in the 
post 9/11 terrorism era.  
   
iv 
 
A unique combination of multiple methods within port and maritime SCs, 
including a Delphi survey, quantitative survey, Soft Systems Methodology 
(SSM) and a focus group expert consultation, is applied to reformulate the 
prevailing RM approach marked by dichotomy and a disciplinary silo and to 
propose a more enhanced and holistic approach to safety and security RM. The 
results of the study confirm that an integrated and holistic approach to the issue 
of RM in LNG ports and marine terminals is necessary to cost-effectively 
address safety and security risks and ensure reliable and resilient LNG SCs. 
Furthermore, a practical framework, in the form of a conceptual model, for LNG 
ports risks and emergencies management is proposed which integrates all 
facets of safety and security risks and emergencies management, including risk 
prevention, mitigation, emergency planning and response and port business 
continuity.  The proposed conceptual model shows how the proposed RM 
approach can be practically applied in the context of LNG ports in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as in any LNG port worldwide 
which lacks an integrated approach to risks and emergencies management.    
 
Key Words Safety, Security, Risk Management, Emergency Planning & Response, LNG 
Supply Chains, integrated approach, all-hazards approach, Port Business Continuity 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ports are complex hubs of multiple stakeholders, organisations and flows 
fulfilling complementary, competing and highly integrated functions and roles, 
making them active members within international maritime logistics and SC 
systems. Ports and marine terminals handling dangerous and highly flammable 
substances, such as liquified gases are exposed to further complexity and risks 
which require special diligence in their planning and operation. Furthermore, 
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US., the possibility of security threats 
against LNG ports infrastructure, marine terminal facilities and LNG tankers has 
been considered a credible risk scenario which LNG ports and related LNG SC 
members have to consider seriously for due mitigation and response. During 
the last decade, LNG has become a high growth market commodity, due mainly 
to its limited environmental footprint.  Demand for natural gas is expected to 
eclipse oil by 2030, while demand for LNG specifically will increase 10% per 
annum through 2015 (Theodoropoulos 2009, p. 144). Hence, the frequency of 
LNG shipments through ports has increased tremendously and raised concern 
over their safe and secure operations, especially with consequencial scarcity in 
skilled technical manpower. Moreover, since the 9/11 terrorist events, the 
process of managing risks in ports and maritime SCs, has undergone a 
paradigm shift both in scope and scale due to the following reasons: 
1. Ports are strategically located at the mid-stream of the LNG value chain 
(VC) and represent the only node within the maritime SC bringing together 
multiple logistics, port and maritime related organisations and stakeholders, 
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functions, roles, processes and flows. Therefore, LNG ports are attractive 
targets to terrorist groups and need diligent RM planning, mitigation and 
response as well as appropriate contingency planning.  
2. The nature of security risks has shifted from local and limited impact acts of 
stowaways, drug smuggling, cargo theft etc. to more global and widespread 
impact attacks from global terrorism. Thus, low frequency high consequence 
events,such as large scale security incidents, can no longer be neglected 
and need to be integrated within the routine LNG SC risk portfolio. 
3. In practical terms, taking into consideration the LNG SC process in 
addressing LNG SC security means necessarily integrating the safety 
procedures and practices as well, which constitute an important part of LNG 
operating systems of production, storage, transport and distribution. 
Therefore, LNG maritime and port security should be analysed and 
addressed in conjunction with and taking due account of safety measures 
and practices and from the broader SC perspective. In this respect, safety 
measures and safeguards are, and shall be considered the first line of 
defence for security incidents. As such, these technical safety safeguards 
shall be integrated within the overall security risk assessment (RA) and 
management system.  
4. Despite LNG’s 40+years proven safety record of production and shipping 
with few accidents, LNG SCs still remain under both safety and security 
threats due first to the increased volumes of LNG being shipped worldwide, 
which increase the potential and likelihood of maritime and port accidents, 
and secondly due to the widespread threat of terrorism. Although the 
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industry is justifiably proud of its extraordinary safe history, Meyer et al, 
(2007) argue that  
‘Only one serious LNG incident, however, could severely undermine this 
near-perfect record and likely redefine the RM calculus for most 
stakeholders’    
This further attests to the ultimate importance of approaching the issues of LNG 
ports SC safety and security risks from a holistic perspective and highlights the 
need for a comprehensive and coordinated RA and management framework to 
effectively address safety, security and related environmental threats in a cost 
effective manner.  
1.2  WHY STUDY RM IN LNG PORTS? 
As asserted by Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001), seaports are key 
constituents in international SCs and their pre-eminent role in international 
distribution is unlikely to be challenged. LNG ports are located at the mid-
stream of the LNG VC, therefore playing a pivotal role in the storage and flow of 
LNG cargoes to world markets. Any safety or security incident within the port 
areas may have detrimental effects on the whole LNG SC with cascading 
impacts on LNG exporting and importing countries and their industrial and 
energy based sectors. It is generally agreed that constantly available and 
affordable energy supplies are vital to maintaining and enhancing quality of life 
and promoting economic growth. 
Ensuring uninterrupted, robust and resilient LNG SC requires first, adequate 
management of safety and security risks in LNG ports and marine terminals. 
While each discipline of risk, be it safety or security, has actually received 
significant attention both in theory and practice, less attention was given to the 
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interfaces and shared impacts between safety and security risks in LNG ports 
SCs.  This led to the existence of gaps in RM which does not promote a cost 
effective RM in LNG ports SCs and may constitute a source of disruption or 
delays in the LNG ports activities. This research intends to address such gaps 
which are poorly addressed in the current literature and proposes a holistic and 
integrated approach to the issues of safety and security risks assessment and 
management in LNG ports.    
 
The authors’ interest in the subject started earlier in his career as a logistics and 
port professional and continued throughout his professional career in various 
seaports. This practical interest turned into a practical subject of enquiry when 
the author was serving as on-scene commander for maritime search and rescue 
(SAR) services. Recent involvement of the author in the planning and 
management of industrial seaports along with the development of recent safety 
and security standards through the international maritime community, especially 
security frameworks, has increased his interest in the research subject. LNG 
ports have recently received high attention in terms of safety and security 
regulations; however the implementation of international and domestic safety 
and security standards is done in isolation and with less coordination which may 
create difficulties to the safety and security systems of LNG ports and may 
ultimately represent a risk of disruption to the international LNG SC. Moreover, 
uncoordinated management of safety and security risks may not allow cost 
effective RM and prevent efficient emergency planning and port business 
continuity.  
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1.3 RESEARCH AIM, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
The interfaces and shared impacts among safety and security risks in LNG 
ports and marine terminals represent a vital area of research which has not 
been sufficiently investigated and which urgently requires in-depth research 
both at theoretical and practical levels. The discipline of HSE RM has received 
wide attention by researchers and practitioners, meanwhile, security in general 
and terrorism risks in particular, especially during the post 9/11 era have also 
generated a large literature and the promulgation of international regulations in 
a wide effort to address terrorism related risks.  However, less attention has 
been given to the relationship, interfaces and shared impacts between port 
safety and security risks both at theoretical and practical levels.  
Such areas of research offer exciting possibilities for the development of an 
integrated approach to the relationships, interfaces and shared impacts among 
safety and security risks assessment and management in LNG ports. The 
present research aims to model safety and security RM, from a SC perspective 
and within the framework of an integrated and holistic RM approach, addressing 
the interfaces between safety and security risks. Such an approach shall take 
advantage of the strategic leadership role played by the port authority, to 
coordinate and integrate the role that the LNG port community can play within a 
participative approach.       
The scope of this research extends to the RM of port SCs handling LNG. The 
focus of the study is on the management of safety and security risks with a 
special emphasis on security risks stemming from global terrorism and 
organised crime due to their significant and widespread impact as well as to the 
lack of historical data and experiences of terrorism related incidents in the LNG 
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industry which can guide appropriate coordinated security RA and 
management. Moreover, recent experience shows that management of safety 
and security risks are conducted in relative isolation and with insufficient 
coordination, especially within LNG ports and marine terminals known to be 
complex and critical areas of interest for multiple LNG stakeholders. This 
requires further coordination and cooperation in the safe and secure storage, 
handling and transport of LNG to world markets. It should be noted, however, 
that although safety and security risks are different in terms of their respective 
risk factors and related RA methods, they are still interrelated, interfaced and 
have shared impacts. Therefore, their assessment and management should be 
best integrated and coordinated within the framework of an all-hazard approach. 
Process-wise, the study extends its scope to the LNG port SC from the LNG 
storage facility, often localised within the port promises, to the LNG tanker 
alongside the jetty and the surrounding maritime and shore-based port 
environments. Thus geographically the LNG port SC encompasses both the 
onshore and offshore port components. 
Following the considerations set forth in the above section and based on a 
detailed descriptive analysis of the international LNG SC as well as the 
extensive literature review of safety and security risks assessment and 
management methods and approaches, the following research questions are 
generated: 
1. What are the interfaces and shared impacts in the management of safety 
and security risks in LNG ports and marine terminals? 
   
7 
 
2. What impact does uncoordinated and isolated management of risks have 
on the efficiency of overall RM in LNG ports and marine terminals? 
3. How are safety and security risks managed in LNG port SCs? 
4. How can safety and security risks be best managed from an integrative and 
holistic perspective within the LNG port management system? 
The following objectives are developed from the research questions set to 
direct and focus the research: 
1. To analyse the LNG SC, its main components, flows and processes with 
particular emphasis on the strategic role of ports and marine terminals in the 
LNG SC including tangible and non-tangible flows and processes. 
2. To evaluate current international maritime and port safety and security 
regulatory frameworks and characterise them from a logistics and SC 
perspective.  
3. To analyse the relationship between port SC safety, security and quality; 
mainly in terms of assessment and management methodologies and 
approaches.  
4. To identify relationships and interfaces among safety and security risks 
managements in LNG ports and discuss their possible mutual and shared 
impacts.  
5. To propose and test a standard high level conceptual model ensuring 
integrated LNG port SC RM and enabling coordinated mitigation plans, 
contingency measures and port business continuity strategies.  
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1.4  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
1.4.1 Structure of the thesis and research design 
After introducing the subject in chapter one and providing its scope and 
methodology, the research report continues with a presentation and analysis of 
the LNG VC in chapter two, its components and characteristics as well as the 
role of ports and marine terminal organisations as critical nodes within the 
global LNG SC.  Chapter two provides detailed information on the port and 
shipping components of the LNG VC as well as the main characteristics of 
international LNG markets. Initial identification of risk factors is undertaken 
during this stage stemming from possible unintentional threats translated by 
recent high LNG market growth which testifies to the scarcity of skilled work 
force throughout the LNG value chain activities, especially in the maritime and 
shipping node. Meyer et al. (2007) and Griffin (2012) argue that noticeable 
increase in LNG production and export worldwide is not actually supported by a 
corresponding increase in skilled resources in the LNG VC activities, especially 
in shipping and maritime activities. Such a pressing need for skilled labour 
impacts on the expansion plans of LNG projects and forces the industry to use 
a less experienced workforce which in turn may constitute a source of risk. 
Other risk factors, related to LNG maritime and port infrastructure are also 
identified including intentional and unintentional sources.   
An extensive literature review is undertaken to help generate and refine the 
research problem. Chapter three reviews literature pertaining to LNG ports and 
maritime safety and security risks assessment and management. The focus is 
mainly on literature addressing relationships, interfaces and shared impacts 
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between safety and security risks, risk factors and the RM approaches actually 
applied in LNG ports SCs worldwide. Detailed presentation and descriptive 
analysis of the entire LNG VC and the LNG port SC in chapter two, as well as 
the literature review in chapter three, refines the scope of the research problem 
and related research questions. 
Such qualitative analyses reveal a research gap in the literature related mainly 
to the scarcity of studies addressing the relationship between safety and 
security in ports in general and in ports and marine terminals handling LNG, in 
particular. Very little literature has discussed theoretical and practical interfaces 
among safety and security risks and even less has addressed the management 
frameworks or methodologies for such interfaces. Moreover, even when they 
do, they address the issue from a port facility risk point of view and rarely 
analyse the issue from a SC perspective. The present study intends to bridge 
those gaps by studying safety and security interfaces and shared impacts from 
a SC perspective and proposes an integrated RA and management framework 
capable of providing robust and resilient LNG port SCs, to ensure uninterrupted 
LNG supplies to world markets. 
To characterise the role of ports and marine terminals within the international 
LNG SC, a review of the main LNG SC characteristics as well as the most 
known RA and management theories and frameworks is undertaken. The 
empirical analysis draws on the experience of the world leading LNG ports in 
the Arabian Gulf region, due to their strategic importance, as major LNG 
exporting hubs, and their strategic role in the international LNG SC. 
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The legal and historical part of the enquiry is critically discussed in chapter four 
and includes an extensive review of: 
 International maritime and port safety legal frameworks, including the 
international agreement for the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS), the 
Collision Regulations (COLREG), the Standard for Training, Certification 
and Watch-keeping for seafarers (STCW),…etc. Other international 
standards, more specifically addressing LNG shipping and ports, are 
reviewed and evaluated such as the International Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk, 
(IGC Code). Other less global safety standards with regional and national 
coverage are also reviewed; including the EU led standards, the UK HSE 
and the USA LNG Coast Guard safety regulations. 
 International legal security frameworks developed by the international 
maritime community as a response to terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks are also reviewed and discussed. In this respect, 
multilaterally endorsed regulatory measures include the International 
Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code, the IMO/ILO code of practice on 
security in ports and more recently the Framework of Standards to 
Secure and Facilitate Global Trade known as the WCO Framework. 
Other less global security packages yet of wider application may be 
considered and reviewed as deemed relevant to the LNG SC including 
industry led rules, regulations and practices governing the setting and 
operation of LNG facilities, both onshore and offshore; an analysis of the 
combination of technical and legal practices, and their ability to withstand 
the new risks and threats portfolio posed by global terrorism. 
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Chapter five appraises the main safety and security RA and management 
methods and approaches used across world LNG ports. The focus is on RA 
methodologies developed to cater for safety and security risks from a holistic 
and integrated perspective. Various approaches are presented and 
benchmarked against the ‘all-hazards approach’ introduced recently by the U.S 
Coast guards.  
Chapter six outlines and justifies the research methodology used to address the 
research problem and provides an answer to the research questions. It also 
discusses the philosophical foundation of the research.  
In chapter seven, an empirical study undertaken to generate primary source 
data is reported. This includes detailed qualitative Delphi study which is run in 
two rounds, as well as a quantitative survey. The Delphi study results are tested 
and validated through a quantitative study using factor analysis and other 
statistical techniques. This quantitative enquiry is based on an online survey 
conducted among a relatively large sample of LNG risk professionals. The 
Delphi findings are used as hypotheses to be further cross checked and tested 
quantitatively through factor analysis and other statistical techniques. The 
outcome of the quantitative study forms the basis for the high level LNG RM 
conceptual model proposed in chapter eight.  
Chapter eight begins with a summary of the main findings of the quantitative 
study and introduces the use of a Systems Thinking Approach (STA), more 
specifically the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), to build the conceptual model 
for LNG ports SC RM.  This model is developed on the basis of Checkland& 
Scholes (1990) and Checkland (1999) SSM process. The choice of SSM is 
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justified because it provides the most appropriate analytical framework to deal 
with complex management problems such as those posed by this research. The 
proposed conceptual model is further tested and validated through a focus 
group discussion with a panel of LNG port managers and RM specialists.  
Chapter 9 discusses the main findings of the study and its implications on 
theoretical and practical levels. 
Chapter 10 summarises and concludes the study by highlighting its contribution 
and limitations. It also provides recommendations for future research. 
1.4.2 Research methods 
Table 1.1 provides a summary of research methods deployed to collect primary 
and secondary data and to direct the provision of appropriate answers to the 
research questions. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of Research Design and methods 
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1.5 MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
 
At the theoretical level, this study highlights a more holistic approach to the 
issue of RM in energy ports in general and LNG ports and marine terminals in 
particular. It differs from existing approaches and practices of RM which favour 
dichotomy and a disciplinary silo approach. It argues that safety and security 
professionals should leave behind existing traditional beliefs and a practice 
through which they assess and manage risks in isolation and without 
considering interplays and shared impacts between safety and security. They 
require a new understanding through which safety and security risks and their 
control options and strategies (RCOs) are looked at holistically from a systems 
perspective and then evaluated collaboratively to yield synergized and cost 
effective safety and security RM. Furthermore, the RM process in LNG ports will 
require re-engineering so that work flow, processes and procedures are 
organised around outcomes and not isolated tasks. As stated by Greswell 
(1998), the principles of re-engineering consist of organising around outcomes 
not tasks. 
 
Therefore the study highlights the advantages of applying integrated, holistic 
and coordinated approach to RM in LNG ports, in contrast with the prevailing 
approach of isolated management of safety and security risks and emergency 
response. This study sheds light on the necessity of applying a unified and 
coordinated RM approach to risks in LNG ports which shall deliver efficient and 
cost effective safety and security risks management system as an integral part 
of the port management system. 
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At the practical level, this research investigates a vital real-world problem faced 
by ports managers and RM specialists in industrial ports in the Arabian Gulf and 
MENA region. A panel of managers from those ports was consulted during all 
stages of this research and their expert opinions were considered and 
integrated as primary source data in the analysis of the research subject. During 
all stages of the enquiry, both port managers and safety and security 
professionals consulted, either during formal interviews/ questionnaires or 
during informal discussions, have testified to the practical nature of the research 
problem and the usefulness of addressing it in a more pragmatic and practical 
way taking into consideration the complexity of the port system and its strategic 
importance within the international LNG SC.  
This research succeeds in shedding light on the gaps of relevant RM theories 
and approaches. Further it contributes at a practical level to the debate among 
ports managers and RM specialists on the necessity of applying an-all hazards 
approach to all sources of risks.  Furthermore, the study proposes an effective 
integration among the port RM system and the emergency response system 
within the overall port management system for optimal, cost effective and 
resilient port SC and port business continuity.          
1.6  ORIGINALITY 
This research is original in its approach since it sets out to question the validity 
and usefulness of established theories on RM which tend to favour dichotomy 
and isolated management of safety and security in ports instead of an 
integrated and holistic approach to RM. It also claims an extended role of the 
port community in the management of risks within the port SC by proposing a 
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re-structuring of the LNG ports RM system, integrating safety, security and 
possibly environmental risks management and emergency planning and 
response. The research is an amalgamation of some established principles, viz. 
organisational theory and port safety and security RM, which sets out to form 
one conceptual model of the port RM system as an integral part of the overall 
port management system. 
Such an integrative model has the merit of presenting a unified and focused 
management of LNG port risks in connection with emergency response and 
more importantly consolidating the bases for port business continuity.  
Figure 1.1 Port RM and emergency gaps bridged by current research 
 
Source: The author 
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Figure1.2 Comparison between previous studies and current study 
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In doing so, the proposed approach testifies to the resilience of the whole LNG 
SC. This research can be considered as an investigation into established 
theories which resulted in the finding of research gaps with the aim of bridging 
such gaps and producing a conceptual model proposing how a holistic and 
unified approach to risk and emergency management in LNG ports can be 
achieved within the framework of a comprehensive and participative approach. 
The claim of originality is summarised in Figure 1.2. 
The proposed model introduces a practical framework for integrated LNG ports 
risks and emergencies management. Such framework is applicable in the 
context of the LNG ports of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as 
well as to any LNG port worldwide which lacks integrated approach to risks and 
emergencies management.    
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CHAPTER 2 THE LNG SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As defined by Globe Business Publishing Ltd (2006), LNG SC is a 
process continuum, by which natural gas is produced, transformed into 
LNG, and transported from where it is produced to where it is needed 
and consumed.  
LNG currently represents the most exciting aspect of the international gas 
landscape (Griffin, 2012). Though the overall percentage of gas transported as 
LNG is less than 10% of global gas trade, it is growing rapidly, involving an 
increasing number of buyers and sellers. The past two decades have seen 
phenomenal growth in the LNG trade, which is expected to continue unabated 
this decade. LNG is simply an alternative method to transport methane from the 
producer to the consumer. Methane (C1H4) gas is cooled to –161.5° C (–260° 
F), converting its gaseous state into an easily transportable liquid whose volume 
is approximately 600 times less than the equivalent volume of methane gas. 
Thus 600 ft3 of methane gas will shrink to a volume of around 1 ft3 of clear and 
odourless LNG. It is usually stored and moved at cold temperatures and at low 
pressure. Gas converted to LNG can be transported by ship over long distances 
where pipelines are neither economic nor feasible. At the receiving terminal, 
liquid methane is offloaded from the ship and heated, allowing its physical 
phase to return from liquid to gas. This gas is then distributed to gas consumers 
by pipeline in the same manner as natural gas produced from a local gas field.  
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The LNG process is more complex than pipeline transportation. The “LNG 
chain” shown below, consists of discrete sections: upstream, midstream 
liquefaction plant, shipping, regasification, and finally, gas distribution. LNG 
technology is not new; the first commercial LNG facility was built in 1941 in 
Cleveland-USA as a peak shaving facility. Unfortunately, this plant was closed 
in 1944 after a gas leak and explosion accident. According to Natgas.info 
(2011), the decision to commercialise a gas field by either LNG or direct 
pipeline is related to the distance to the market from the gas reservoir and to the 
availability of a port or marine terminal for the export of LNG by ships.  
Natgas.info (2011) asserted that an industry commonly known rule states that 
LNG could be a viable option versus pipeline transport when the following 
characteristics are present:  
 The gas market is more than 2,000 km from the field.  
 The gas field contains at least 3 tcf to 5 tcf of recoverable gas  
 Gas production costs are less than $1/ MMBtu, delivered to the 
liquefaction plant.  
 The gas contains minimal other impurities, such as CO2 or sulphur.  
 A marine port where a liquefaction plant could be built is relatively close 
to the field.  
 The political situation in the country supports large-scale, long-term 
investments.  
 The market price in the importing country is sufficiently high to support 
the entire chain and provide a competitive return to the gas exporting 
company and host country.  
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 A pipeline alternative would require crossing uninvolved third-party 
countries and the buyer is concerned about security of supply.  
2.2. OVERVIEW OF THE LNG VALUE CHAIN (VC) 
The LNG VC consists of a number of different operations which are 
highly integrated, interdependent upon one another and capital 
intensive.  
Figure 2.1Steps of a typical LNG value chain 
 
Source: (CEE, 2012) 
Major stages in the LNG VC, excluding pipeline operations, are: 
2.2.1 Exploration and extraction 
Exploration and extraction of natural gas from underneath the earth’s 
crust called reservoirs. It is then produced and delivered to separation 
and gas treatment plants. Most, but not all, natural gas is extracted 
during oil production. Associated and non-associated gas is the 
terminology used to differentiate between the two types of gases 
depending on whether gas is found associated with oil or not.  
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2.2.2 Liquefaction and storage 
During this stage, natural gas is converted into a liquid state by cooling 
it to -161°C. Liquefaction reduces the natural gas volume by 
approximately 600 times, making it economically viable to be shipped 
between continents. Liquefaction also provides the opportunity to store 
natural gas for use during high demand in cold seasons (LNG peak 
shaving storage). 
2.2.3 Transportation 
LNG is shipped in special purpose vessels (LNG tankers) through ports 
and marine terminals which can be either shore based infrastructures or 
offshore structures (single point mooring or offshore platforms). LNG 
export/ receiving ports are central nodes in the LNG VC and play a 
crucial role in moving LNG to international markets. In fact, LNG 
shipping provided the main motivation for transforming natural gas from 
a local to a global commodity, traded internationally. 
2.2.4 Storage and re-gasification 
This is an important step in the LNG VC through which LNG unloaded from 
tanker is re-directed, through pipelines, for storage and re-gasification. 
Due to the interdependency of its components, the structure of the LNG 
process can be defined as a chain. This has upstream functions 
represented by natural gas production (Extraction, treatment, pipeline 
transport to liquefaction facilities and liquefaction to produce LNG). In 
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the centre of the VC are the midstream functions of LNG selling and 
shipping where LNG ports, marine terminals and tankers play a 
consistent role in the whole VC by enabling LNG to be an energy 
commodity traded internationally. Finally, at the bottom of the chain, the 
downstream functions are located and concern LNG regasification and 
storage, pipeline distribution to end user and consumer, either domestic 
or industrial. In the case of domestic usage, retail distribution is assured 
to end users.   
Figure 2.2 Composition of physical infrastructure of a typical LNG VC 
 
 Source: Adapted from Globe Business Publishing Ltd (2006) 
 
Building an entire LNG VC is expensive since it is compulsory to invest huge 
CAPEX cost all along the VC components. Nowadays, it is a general practice 
that major world gas producers invest in all LNG VC components, mainly to 
ensure control over the whole process.  
   
24 
 
Dubois-Denis (2004) estimated typical CAPEX requirement for two 
integrated LNG VCs as follow: 
Figure 2.3 CAPEX figures for typical integrated LNG VCs 
 
Source: Dubois-Denis (2004, p.2) 
Gas is an energy source with a bright future. Just in the space of three 
decades, natural gas, previously reserved for most noble of industrial uses, 
has become popular for a number of different uses including, but not limited 
to, power generation and household energy. The gradual decline in natural 
gas reserves in the OECD countries combined with a constant growing 
demand for more environmentally friendly fuels when added to a wide range 
of key technological breakthroughs have opened up a huge number of 
transport and hence selling options for natural gas worldwide. At the end of 
1990, industry observers predicted that demand for gas would grow at 
about 3% per year, and the most recent forecasts put growth at about 2% 
annually up to 2020, compared with 1.3% for oil. It is expected that gas will 
overtake oil by 2020 (Birol 2006). Furthermore, gas is expected to gain 
market share in the overall energy mix. Over the last ten years, power 
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generation has become the driving force behind global growth in gas 
demand. Gas is feeding 25% of the world power generation plants 
(Theodoropoulos 2009). 
Table 2.1 World LNG major consumers 
 
Adapted from Theodoropoulos (2009, p. 145) 
Major gas importers include most OECD countries and South Asia accounting 
for 50% of world consumption, the other 50% is shared by countries listed in the 
table above. 
Actually, there is no truly global gas market as it is the case for oil, but three 
separate markets- North American, Western Europe and Asia, with different 
growth rates. The North American market leads the others. Market growth is 
mainly driven by two elements: 
1. Environmental concerns, as many industrialised countries are trying to shift to 
natural gas to minimise the consequences of climate change. 
2. Demand growth. This is encouraged by gas availability. Up to now demand 
has not kept pace with discoveries in recent years. Other factors also play a role 
in gas demand such as weather conditions, economic growth and fuel 
competition. 
Country % of world LNG Consumption 
USA 
Russia 
UK 
Canada 
Germany 
Iran 
 
23% 
15% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
Total 50 % 
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From the supply side, world gas reserves were estimated at 177.4Tm³, 
representing an average reserve life of about 65 years at the 2007-08 world 
consumption levels. Gas reserves are concentrated in three main countries, 
called the gas trio: Russia (27%), Iran (15%) and Qatar (13%), comprising more 
than 50% of the world’s reserves. However, 20 countries make up 80% of the 
world’s gas, while in oil only 10 countries control 80% of oil (Theodoropoulos 
2009). 
MENA region will lead supplies of natural gas for many decades to come. The 
region’s production of natural gas is projected to grow even more rapidly than 
that of oil, trebling over the projection period to 1210 bcm in 2030. The biggest 
volume increases in the region occur in Qatar, Iran, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. 
The bulk of this increase will be exported as LNG. Demand for the regions’ gas 
will be driven by strong global demand and decreasing output in many other gas 
producing regions (Birol 2006). 
LNG exports are expected to grow at faster pace than other energy sources and 
many regions in the world will be more reliant on LNG imports including western 
and southern Europe and Asia. This has the potential to put further pressure on 
the LNG SC to provide safe and secure shipments and prevent supply 
disruptions due to catastrophic events.  
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Figure 2.4 World natural gas and LNG trade movements in 2007 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BP (2007) 
 
2.3. LNG PORTS AND MARINE TERMINALS 
A port is commonly defined as a facility at the edge of an ocean, river or 
lake; purposely made and equipped to facilitate reception of ships and 
transfer of cargo and persons to and from them (Ronza 2007). 
Critical to the functioning of a seaport is the existence of sufficient water 
depth at its channels and berths; to be sheltered enough to provide 
protection for ships from winds and waves; and to have direct access to 
inter-modal transportation.  
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 Figure 2.5 The Gate Terminal in the Netherlands 
 
Source: (Huisman, 2007) 
In fact, a modern port system goes beyond being a geographical point 
where several modes of transport meet to fulfil logistical and economic 
purposes. Ports are complex hubs fulfiling various functions and 
activities within the intermodal transport SC. As such, ports are 
characterised by: 
 Being the link between sea transport and land modes of transport, 
including  road, rail, mechanized conveying systems and pipelines. 
 Various stakeholders and authorities meet at the port and interact to 
perform various logistics and SC activities, related to the transport of 
goods and mobility of passengers. 
 Ports are subject to many types of flows and processes including 
tangible flows of goods, passengers and money;  and non tangible 
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flows such as information, wire transfers, and immaterial transfers of 
financial payments (Bichou et al. 2007) 
 Ports are subject to various logistical and economic value adding 
activities: Transport, warehousing, stripping, packaging, storage, 
loading and unloading of goods. Sometimes manufacturing, 
transformation and storage of different types of goods are made 
within the port geographical limit or within the immediate port 
hinterland for logistical and/or transhipment convenience. Example: 
LNG liquefaction and regasification plants (Fig.2.5). 
The maritime and port industry involved in the logistics and SC of LNG 
has a double risk undertaking: one represented by LNG as an 
intrinsically high risk commodity and the other stems from the nature of 
modern ports as complex and risky business environments, due to the 
existence of multiple stakeholders, logistics processes and multitude 
flow types, commodities handled, relationships and services. 
Ports are strategic nodes within the LNG logistics and SC. This is the 
case of LNG export/import terminals and regasification facilities. They 
both serve a single chain of operations from the gas well and 
processing plant to the final consumer. It is not possible actually to 
conceive an LNG project without the maritime and port component. The 
port and maritime transportation make LNG projects economically 
viable, allowing safe and cost effective transport of large quantities of 
LNG from producing and exporting regions to distant importing 
countries worldwide. 
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In general, the party owning the liquefaction project has to plan and 
construct the LNG export terminal facilities including the export 
Jetty(ies), the loading arms and pipeline system and the necessary 
storage facilities at or near the port/ marine terminal. On the other hand, 
the LNG importing party has to construct and equip the LNG import 
complex, including the marine import terminal, as well as the storage, 
regasification plant and the gas distribution system.  
Recently, most LNG projects are established through large public/ 
private partnership, under exploration and production sharing 
agreements (EPSA), where critical SC infrastructure are owned variably 
by the partners along the SC. Therefore, an import and regasification 
terminal in an importing country is partly owned by the LNG exporting 
party. Examples include the South Hook terminal in UK and the Adriatic 
import terminal in Italy.  
2.4 LNG SHIPPING 
The transportation of LNG is intrinsically linked to the sales and 
purchase agreement (SPA). Each LNG project is structured with 
contractual commitments which stipulate the way LNG will be shipped 
from the seller to the buyer and the party to have responsibility over the 
shipping function. 
Generally, LNG is shipped either on an ex-ship basis or on a FOB 
basis. In the first case, the seller is responsible for shipping the product 
to the customer, whereas in case of FOB contract, the buyer assumes 
responsibility for the LNG transport. In either case, the LNG project 
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always contains contractual commitment regulating how the sale and 
purchase of LNG is structured and who takes responsibility over the 
shipping component of the overall chain (Theodoropoulos, 2009). 
In practice, the shipping function is assumed either by the seller or the 
buyer, whichever owns the LNG ships. Alternatively, the party which 
has the responsibility for shipping LNG may contract out this function to 
an independent LNG ship owner under a separate charter party 
agreement. The case of several LNG projects in the MENA region 
reveals that the shipping function is established as a specialised entity 
serving the LNG project. Most LNG extraction and liquefaction projects 
in Algeria, Qatar and Yemen have their own shipping companies which 
own their tankers or alternatively charter them under long term charter 
party agreements. 
LNG projects tend to establish their own shipping entities for a number 
of reasons: first, as stated earlier, LNG projects are capital intensive 
chains of infrastructure which cannot afford disruption or delay; 
therefore LNG project owners need to get full control of the 
transportation node to ensure its reliability in performing its function 
properly and timely. Second, LNG tankers are very expensive pieces of 
equipment and critical to the success of the LNG SC, therefore, full 
control over this node is preferred to ensure cost effective and efficient 
delivery of LNG to distant customers.   
LNG ships operate a “virtual” pipeline in a sense that they continually transport 
LNG from producing countries to consumers without interruption. As a ship is 
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being loaded, a sister ship may be discharging its cargo, and the remaining 
members of the fleet are either en route to the buyer’s regasification facility or 
on the way back to the LNG export terminal to pick up new cargo. The LNG 
tanker fleet is assimilated here to a pipeline which delivers LNG without 
interruption from producing to consuming regions.  However, as the LNG spot 
market increases, ships are loading LNG from different terminals and 
discharging their cargoes wherever the prices are best at the time.  
2.4.1 LNG tankers 
LNG is transported in large, specially designed ships. These are 
doubled hulled and have a capacity of 210k to 266k m³. LNG tankers 
are fitted with a special cargo containment system inside the inner hull 
to maintain LNG at atmospheric pressure and at required temperature 
of -160 C° (Theodoropoulos, 2009). 
Three main technologies exist for the design and construction of LNG 
tankers, two of which are predominant in current LNG fleet: Spherical 
moss design (52% of the existing fleet) and membrane design (46%). 
Figure 2.6 Photo illustrating a membrane LNG tanker 
 
Source: (CH.IV International, 2006) 
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Membrane tanks are composed of a layer of metal (primary barrier) 
insulation, another liquid-proof layer, and an extra layer of insulation. 
Those several layers are then attached to the walls of the externally 
framed hold (Fig.2.6) 
Figure 2.7 Spherical moss tankers 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (CH.IV International, 2006) 
 
Figure 2.8 Tank Section of a Spherical moss tanker 
 
Source:  (CEE, 2012) 
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The alternative to a membrane tank is a self-supporting tank. The most 
well-known is the Moss-designed spherical tank that many people 
equate with the appearance of an LNG carrier (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). 
The covered insulation surrounding the sphere can channel any 
leakage to a drip tray located under the sphere's "south pole" (CH.IV 
International, 2006). 
2.4.2 Size and capacity of emerging LNG carrier designs 
Many new LNG carriers are being designed to carry as much as 
265,000 m³ of LNG. The new 215,000 m³ membrane carriers are often 
referred to as Q-flex designs, and the 265,000 m³ membrane carriers 
are often referred to as Q-max designs.  
Table 2.2 Emerging LNG carrier size and capacity 
 
Class 
MEMBRANE DESIGNS 
145,000m 155,000m 215,000m 265,000m 
Tanks 4 4 5 5 
Length(m) 283 288 288 345 
Width(m) 44 44 50 55 
draft(m) 11.4 11.5 12 12 
 
Class 
MOSS DESIGNS 
138,000m 145,000m 200,000m 255,000m 
Tanks(m) 5 4 5 5 
Length(m) 287 290 315 345 
Width(m) 46 49 50 55 
draft(m) 11 11.4 12 12.5 
Source: (Poten and Partners, 2006) 
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Table 2.2 provides an overview of the general size and dimensions of 
current and emerging LNG carriers for both membrane and Moss-type 
cargo tank configurations. 
Figure 2.9 Q-Max and Q-Flex Tankers at their home port in Ras-Laffan 
 
Source: (Qatar Gas Operating Company Ltd, 2009) 
 
From the data presented in the table above, a couple of key points should be 
noted. One is that the new larger LNG carrier designs are becoming longer and 
wider, not necessarily deeper. Because of channel depth limitations in many 
ports, the new ships (Fig.2.9) are designed to have similar drafts as current 
LNG carriers. Also, the volume of LNG per cargo tank is increasing from 
nominally 30,000 – 40,000 m³ for the current fleet of carriers to as much as 
53,000 m³ for the larger LNG carriers. This means that spill rates and spill 
volumes from the new LNG carriers could be larger which increase the safety 
and security risks of such carriers. 
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LNG ships have been in service for 40 years and their size and designs were 
very much standardised. As stated earlier, until 2002, the size of plant 
production and shipment of LNG was based on geography and SPAs. 
Geography dictated the market in terms of source of supply and customers’ 
demand. 
In short, the symbiotic relationship between the SPA, the plant size, the 
proximity to the market and the conventionally accepted design and size of the 
ship, resulted in a very logical and tight set of drivers that was ripe for a catalyst 
to bring a new order. 
In the early nineties, Qatar, with its vast reserves of non-associated natural gas, 
entered the market when Qatar-Gas signed SPAs with a total of eight Japanese 
power companies to supply six MTPA of LNG for 25 years. The gas was to be 
supplied from Qatar- Gas first three LNG trains that each had a design capacity 
of 2 MTPA. 
These agreements were established in a similar way to that in which the 
industry had established itself elsewhere and so ship capacities in the order of 
135,000 m³ where built to match the plant capacities of 2-3 MTPA per 
liquefaction train and SPA requirements. A fleet of 10 LNG tankers were 
commissioned in the “conventional” size of 135,000 m³ using five spherical 
aluminium tanks to contain the cargo.  
For further details on this, a full history of LNG tankers is given in Appendix 1.  
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2.5 THE WORLD LNG MARKET 
Traditionally, the LNG industry has been highly structured, tied to long term 
contracts.  Due to the vast cost of building the facilities, finance was only 
available if banks could see long term guarantees of a project’s viability in 
place. The SC was characterized by fixed contracts with destination clauses to 
prevent cargoes being diverted into markets other than those stipulated. In the 
early 1990s, the LNG world trade was firmly divided between the Atlantic Basin 
and Asia Pacific markets. There was minimal trade between these two regions, 
and consequently little or no market or price interaction (Thompson, 2009). 
Specific import terminals serviced specific contracts, with the shipping capacity 
contracted for specific routes, meaning that vessel supply and demand were 
normally very closely matched, with few vessels spare for short term or spot 
operations.  
However, with debottlenecking and the expansion of liquefaction plants 
in exporting countries, more surplus volume was offered which either 
effectively rolled into long-term contracts and sold to the same buyers 
or flowed into the alternative markets. As a result of the latter a short-
term market started to emerge and regionalisation of the industry began 
to break down. Other drivers favouring the short-term market include:  
• Flexibility of supply: if long-term buyers cannot absorb the contracted 
volume, with more flexible contract terms (i.e. no destination restriction 
clause), the sellers can divert the cargo to alternative buyers in order to 
arbitrage prices between the markets;  
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• Quick response to gas demand: if natural events affect buyers such as 
a sudden increase in seasonal demand, they can search for gas from 
alternative supplies.  
 
With the growth of the short-term trade, a new global and competitive 
gas market is in the making. But the long-term market is still important 
and working well since no supplier has yet undertaken to build a new 
facility on a speculative basis without a long-term agreement (Wang & 
Notteboom, 2011) 
 
2.5.1 Drivers for demand of natural gas and LNG 
Both the consumption of natural gas and demand for LNG have been increasing 
in recent years due to a number of factors: 
 Global economic growth and energy demand are increasing. 
 Natural gas is a cleaner burning fuel than coal and oil, encouraging an 
increase in power plants that run on natural gas.  
 Natural gas is widely applicable as a fuel source for power generation, 
industry and commerce.  
 The consumer trend is to greater diversity of fuel sources.  
 The natural gas market is undergoing deregulation in several key markets.  
 LNG prices have dropped as the cost of liquefaction and regasification has 
declined. This is due to improved technology, efficiency gains and more 
competition.  
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 LNG vessel construction costs have declined, resulting in lower shipping 
costs.  
 Domestic gas production in many areas is insufficient to meet rising energy 
demand. 
2.5.2 A growing global market 
According to Teekay LNG Partners LP (2011), the LNG market is expected to 
develop as follows: 
 Total demand for natural gas is projected to increase from 3,149 bcm in 
2008 to 4,535 bcm in 2035. This is a 44% increase over the period at an 
average annual growth rate of 1.4%.  
 84% of the increase in global gas use in the period to 2035 is expected to 
come from non-OECD regions. Demand in China is expected to grow by 
5.9% p.a., more than any other region, driven by booming demand in the 
power, residential and industrial sectors. Demand in the Middle East, non-
OECD Asia (in particular India) and Latin America is also expected to grow 
rapidly over the forecast period. 
 Despite much less rapid economic growth, North America and Europe still 
account for 12% of the expected growth in world gas consumption to 2035. 
In many cases, gas continues to be the favoured choice over coal and oil for 
environmental reasons, especially in power generation. In Europe, carbon 
penalties help gas to compete against more carbon-intensive coal in the 
power sector and heavy industry.  
 Inter-regional natural gas trade is projected to increase from 670 bcm in 
2008 to 1,187 bcm in 2035. This is a 77% increase over the period at an 
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annual average rate of 2.1%. Trade rises much faster than demand due to 
the pronounced geographical mismatch between regions of production and 
consumption.  
 The volume of LNG trade is projected to increase from 210 bcm in 2008 to 
500 bcm in 2035. The share of LNG in total natural gas trade versus 
pipelines is projected to grow steadily from 31% in 2008 to 42% in 2035.  
 Japan, Korea and India are the biggest Asian importers. In 2009 these 
countries received about 55 per cent of total global LNG trade. Spain, 
France and the US are the Atlantic Basin's biggest importers closely 
followed by the UK. China is currently the world’s ninth largest LNG importer 
and is expected to become a major buyer of LNG in the future.  
 Qatar, Malaysia and Indonesia are the biggest producers accounting for 
44% of all LNG exports in 2009. Other major producers include Nigeria, 
Algeria, Australia and Trinidad & Tobago.  
 The pattern of global LNG trade is expected to change in the future. Up to 
now LNG trade has been concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region with gas 
sourced from Asia and the Middle East. Although this market will continue to 
expand, LNG demand from the Atlantic basin is also expected to increase.  
 As of June 2010 global liquefaction capacity totalled 360 bcm per year. An 
additional 77 bcm per year is under construction while a further 500 bcm per 
year is currently in the planning stage. Australia, Nigeria, Iran and Russia 
account for 77% of the planned new production capacity, though not all of 
these projects are expected to come online due to political and economic 
barriers. 
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The global LNG fleet is growing rapidly to meet increasing demand. As of 
November 2013 there were 364 LNG vessels in service with a further 104 
vessels on order (Lloyds List Intelligence, 2013). 
2.6  RISK MANAGEMENT, EMERGENCY AND PORT BUSINESS   
CONTINUITY 
 
2.6.1 Risk management 
The concept of risk has always been comprehended as associated with loss. 
The traditional approach views risk as burden to avoid or transfer. Accidental 
loss of property, income, life, health and/or liability toward others covers all 
facets of everyday life. Risk varies depending on the outcome of these events, 
the more severe are the consequences of events, and the higher is the amount 
of risk.  A hazard is a physical situation or condition with the potential to cause 
harm (Trbojevic and Carr 2000). Risk, on the other hand, is the likelihood of 
harm defined in terms of combination of the likelihood of hazard occurrence and 
the severity of the consequences should it occur. The relationship between 
hazard and risk must be treated very cautiously. Risk may be proportional to the 
hazard under certain conditions.  
The discipline investigating ways and procedures to control and mitigate the 
consequences of threats and incidents is called RM. Effective RM is the one 
that succeeds in aborting, reducing the likelihood or exacerbating the severity of 
the outcomes of events.  
Although modern RM recognises the possible negative consequences of risks, 
it takes a positive attitude towards them. First, it views risks as manageable 
events and takes all necessary measures to better respond to threats and turn 
   
42 
 
them into opportunities. In this respect, RM looks at risks as opportunities rather 
than threats. Seizing them to create higher value and strengthen one’s own 
position in the market is a risk managers’ target. This approach marks a 
significant shift from the traditional thinking of risk as something to be avoided 
and if possible transferred, to the proactive approach of RM. 
2.6.1.1. RM in the maritime and port industry 
 
The maritime and port industry has a long history of risk prevention and 
management. Since its inception, IMO as the UN specialised maritime agency, 
long has had as main agenda “Safe, Secure and Efficient Shipping on Clean 
Oceans”. This reminds us of the strategic importance of RM in a rapidly 
changing maritime industry. However, it is noticeable that much of the maritime 
safety policy worldwide has been developed in the aftermath of serious 
accidents, such as Exxon Valdez, Estonia, Erika and Prestige. The majority of 
current international maritime standards have been enacted following a reactive 
approach, often as ad-hoc response to serious accidents.  
Industry circles have questioned the wisdom of such a reactive approach and 
requested a new safety culture based on anticipation and prevention (Kontovas 
et. al. 2007-2). Recently, the international shipping industry has begun to move 
towards a proactive approach through the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) as 
a systematic methodological framework for assessing maritime safety risks 
(Kontovas et al. 2007-1). Attempts are made to generalise such an approach to 
port safety. 
As stated earlier, the maritime and port industry involved in the logistics and SC 
of LNG is exposed to further risks stemming from LNG as an intrinsically high 
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risk HazMat as well as from the nature of modern ports as complex and risky 
business environments. 
2.6.1.2. LNG properties and potential hazards 
Within the natural gas industry, the LNG VC of extraction, production, 
transportation and distribution is subject to various types of hazards. 
Considering the vast array of risks associated with the LNG SC, this review will 
only consider operational and environmental risks and hazards related to LNG 
marine terminals and LNG carriers within port facilities. Operational risks are 
related to safety whereas security-type risks are considered environmental 
ones, as a result of external factors to port logistics and maritime SCs. Since 
LNG is increasingly becoming a strategic commodity to the world economy and 
due to its hazardous chemical attributes, LNG risks and hazards, mainly safety 
and security-types, have much potential impact on people, property and the 
environment. Although the LNG industry has enjoyed a good safety record 
during the past forty years, this has not been without incidents. Communities 
and the industry alike are still concerned about the safety and security of LNG 
transportation systems. In the US for example, since the trend has been to build 
more infrastructure to support LNG imports, Walker et al. (2003) pointed out 
that “especially in the wake of the terrible events of September 11, 2001, 
government and citizens are apprehensive about the potential risks transporting 
large quantities of LNG by ship through our coastal waters and into our ports”. 
Therefore, worldwide concerns do not only stem from LNG safety hazards as a 
consequence of deliberate human errors and natural disasters, but more 
importantly from intentionally caused spills and releases such as terrorism.    
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Table 2.3 List of some major LNG port accidents  
Year Incident location LNG facility 
involved 
Injuries/ fatalities Material damage Cause 
1944 Ohio/ Cleveland, 
USA 
Storage tanks at the 
port 
128 deaths Yes Tank failure 
1965 Canvey Island, UK LNG transfer from 
ship to terminal 
Yes, 1 seriously 
burned 
Yes  
1965 Tanker Methane 
Princess at Port 
Methane Princess No Yes Disconnecting after discharge  
1974 Tanker 
Massachussetts at 
Terminal 
Ship loading at 
Terminal 
No Yes Valve leakage, deck fracture 
1977 Arzew, Algeria LNG storage facility 
within the port area 
Yes, 1 fatality Yes, estimated at 
1 M$ 
LNG releases from storage facility 
causing fire and explosion. 
1977 Tanker LNG 
Aquarius at 
Terminal  
Ship loading at 
Terminal 
No No Tank overfilled 
1979 Columbia Gas LNG 
Terminal- Cove 
Point- Maryland, 
USA 
LNG receiving 
Terminal 
Yes, 1 fatality Yes, estimated at 
9M$ 
Explosion occurred within the 
Terminal electrical substation 
causing fire and explosion. One 
operator killed and another 
seriously injured plus major material 
damage. 
1979 Mostefa Ben 
Boulaid Ship at 
Terminal, Algeria  
Ship unloading at 
Terminal 
No Yes Valve leakage, deck fracture 
1979 Tanker Pollenger at 
Terminal  
Ship unloading at 
Terminal 
No Yes Valve leakage, Tank cover Plate 
fracture 
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1980 Tanker Tauraus at 
Port 
Ship at the port area No Yes Ship Stranded.  Ballast tanks all 
flooded and listing. Extensive 
bottom damage. 
1985 Tanker Gradinia at 
Port 
Ship at the port area No Yes Disconnecting after discharge  
1985 Tanker Isabella at 
Port 
Ship unloading at 
Terminal  
No Yes Cargo valve failure. Cargo 
overflows. Deck fractures. 
1989 Tanker Tellier at 
Port 
Ship unloading at 
Terminal 
No Yes Broke moorings, Hull and deck 
fractures. 
2004 Skikda, Algeria Skikda LNG 
liquefaction plant 
and export Terminal 
Yes, 27 fatalities Yes, 54 M$ LNG Plant explosion which 
damaged also the LNG terminal, 
electrical substation and nearby 
community homes and buildings. 
2010 Withnell Bay LNG 
facility, Australia 
Sip loading at  
Terminal 
No Yes The ship suffered cryogenic burns 
due to leakage of 2000 t0 4000 
litres of LNG 
2010 Montoir de 
Bretagne Terminal, 
France 
Ship unloading at 
Terminal 
No Yes LNG passed into the gas take-off 
line during discharge. Damage to 
Ship manifold and its feed lines 
2011 Yung An LNG 
Terminal, Taiwan 
Ship unloading at 
Terminal 
No N/A Suspected leak. Unloading 
operations suspended and ship 
taken off the berth. Discharge 
operations resumed after 
rectification of problems. 
2011 Pyeongtaek LNG 
Terminal, South- 
Korea 
Ship unloading at 
Terminal 
No Yes The ship disconnected from the 
berth after a minor leak detected. 
Damage to Unloading arms was 
recorded. 
Source: (CEE, 2012) 
Table 2.3 Continued 
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Table 2.3 provides a list of some past LNG Port accidents listed chronologically. 
Such list is not exhaustive and provides only some accidents that occurred 
within the port area, either within LNG storage tank farms or at terminals during 
ship to shore loading/unloading operations. This history, although showing 
relatively less consequences from such accidents, demonstrates that hazards 
and risks associated with the LNG VC are real and should be dealt with 
constantly in a comprehensive and systematic way.  
This is why the process of risk identification and management in LNG SC is 
critical to the industry, to people working and communities living, close to LNG 
facilities. To assess the extent and likelihood of LNG hazards, it is important to 
understand LNG properties and the conditions required for related hazards to 
happen.  
LNG Properties 
LNG is the liquid form of natural gas, produced as a result of liquefaction 
process at normal atmospheric pressure. It is a clear, non-corrosive, non-toxic, 
cryogenic and odourless liquid.  
Even though LNG is not a toxic substance, it may cause asphyxiation due to 
insufficient amount of oxygen when a concentration of gas is developed in a 
confined and closed area. LNG physical composition shows methane as the 
main component.  
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Figure 2.10 Typical composition of LNG 
 
Source: CEE (2007, p.17) 
Generally methane fuel constitutes between 92 to 99% of LNG, depending on 
its origin (CEE 2007). Other components of LNG are heavier hydrocarbon 
materials such as ethane, propane, butane and nitrogen. The liquefaction 
process of natural gas requires prior removal of the non-methane components, 
such as water, carbon dioxide, butane, pentane and heavier components from 
the initially extracted natural gas to prevent forming solids during the cooling 
process. LNG is less dense than water, thus if spilled on water, it floats on top 
and vaporises rapidly (CEE, 2007). 
LNG hazards 
According to CEE (2012), LNG hazards originate from natural gas physical 
properties including: 
Explosion: An explosion usually happens when a substance changes its 
chemical state, mainly when ignited or uncontrollably released from a 
pressurised state. For a release to happen, there must be a structural failure or 
puncture to the LNG tank or containment container. An explosion may happen 
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only in case of uncontrolled release, which comes into contact with a source of 
ignition. Moreover, since LNG is stored at normal atmospheric pressure (not 
pressurised), a structural failure of the storage tanks will not create immediate 
explosion (CEE, 2012). 
Vapour Clouds: In case of uncontrolled release, LNG forms a fog or a vapour 
cloud above the released liquid, as LNG is heavier than air. When gas warms 
up to the atmospheric temperature, it mixes with the surrounding air and begins 
to disperse. The LNG fog will only ignite if it encounters a source of ignition 
while concentrated within its flammability range. The flammability range is the 
concentration of methane into the air which makes it ready to burn. Flammability 
range is between 5 and 15%. Above or below this concentration, LNG will not 
ignite even in the presence of an ignition source (CEE, 2012).    
Freezing Liquid: In case of accidental release, LNG cryogenic liquid can come 
into direct contact with people and freeze the point of contact, damaging the 
skin tissue. Primary containment of LNG tanks mostly prevents such 
uncontrolled release. Also, facility personnel are required to wear gloves and 
protective masks when entering potentially hazardous area. Moreover, initial 
facility design takes into consideration safety distances, so as to make sure the 
spill risk is contained with the facility boundary (CEE, 2012). 
Rapid Phase Transition (RPT): A large release of LNG makes methane liquid 
vaporise too quickly causing RPT. The RPT phenomenon consists of a rapid 
change of state from a liquid to a vapour with an associated release of energy 
of explosive proportions. A large RPT carries the risk of severe structural 
damage to port facilities and LNG vessels. LNG is not a water pollutant, it is 
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insoluble in water, has very low toxicity to marine organisms and it vaporises 
quickly in water. However an explosion in the marine environment caused by 
RPT could result in lethal effects to marine organisms in the immediate vicinity 
of the explosion (Walker et al. 2003). 
Asphyxiation: In high concentration, LNG can act as an asphyxiant by diluting 
the oxygen concentration bellow that necessary level to sustain life. (CEE, 
2012). 
Other LNG hazards include rollover which is caused by loading multiple 
densities of LNG cargoes within a single tank at one time. These different cargo 
classes do not mix at first and may cause excess pressure on the tank systems 
and cause cracks and structural failure to the tank. Another LNG hazard is 
sloshing which is a violent motion of the fluid associated with ship tanks being 
partially filled with LNG, especially in harsh marine environment. This can 
mostly materialise in offshore LNG terminals, where LNG tankers are not 
sufficiently protected from waves and currents as is the case in onshore 
terminals (CEE, 2012). 
LNG hazards in Ports and Marine Terminals 
2.6.1.3. Safety considerations in LNG terminal operations 
LNG SC safety has been achieved mostly through implementation of 
sound technical and operational advancements and strict enforcement 
of international standards. Such standards have been developed by 
both the LNG industry and international specialised bodies. Multiple 
layers of protection are applied in LNG facilities, including LNG marine 
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terminals. These protection layers are coupled with the industry 
standard procedures which form a robust protection for employees and 
nearby communities, infrastructure facilities and the surrounding 
environment.  
Figure 2.11 LNG critical safety conditions 
 
Source: CEE ( 2012, p.9) 
 
Four (4) safety requirements are observed in LNG infrastructure, 
including LNG Export/ Import Terminals (CEE, 2012). These are mainly: 
 Primary containment.  
This is the first and most important safety requirement for LNG by which 
safe storage and isolation of LNG is ensured through the use of 
appropriate material for the construction of LNG tank storage and 
facilities, both onshore and on board tankers.  
Safe handling and use of LNG requires thorough knowledge of this 
substance and its physical properties and an understanding of its 
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behaviour at cryogenic temperature. Material used for storage tanks, 
piping and other equipment which come into contact with LNG is critical. 
Materials suitable for cryogenic service and providing protection against 
material failure are mainly high nickel content steel, stainless steel, 
aluminium and pre-stressed concrete.  
Onshore storage tanks: They have several engineering design features 
but are generally constructed as double-walled structures (a tank within 
a tank with insulation in between the walls) which must withstand the 
hydrostatic load of the LNG.  
LNG Vessel Tanks: Similar engineering design safety requirements 
apply to LNG ships. Existing LNG ship cargo containment systems are 
constructed according to one of the following three designs: 
 Spherical moss design    
 Membrane design     
 Structural prismatic design   
 Secondary Containment provides assurance of full containment in 
case of LNG spill. Every LNG storage system onshore or on board 
tankers includes a dam impoundment surrounding a single 
containment tank in order to contain any leakage in the event of tank 
failure. The advantage of such a system is to allow any uncontrolled 
LNG release to be isolated and controlled. 
 Safeguards systems: This provides an additional level of safety 
whereby minimizing the frequency and size of LNG releases both 
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onshore and offshore. LNG industry uses extensive safety systems 
to detect LNG releases, such as: 
 Gas detectors,  
 Ultraviolet or infrared fire detectors, 
 Smoke or combustion product detectors, 
 LNG level, low temperature and vapour pressure detectors, 
 Emergency shutdown systems (ESD) 
 Close Circuit TVC (CCTV) systems to monitor all critical locations 
of LNG facilities. 
Furthermore, LNG transfer lines are designed and constructed to prevent and 
mitigate LNG release. A leak from a transfer line of an LNG facility is unlikely to 
occur due to design requirements for equipment, such as the use of suitable 
material for construction and rigorous periodic testing of LNG piping systems. 
Also, Detectors for fire and vapour gas along with fire fighting systems are 
automatically activated to ensure rapid dispersion and containment of gas 
vapours and fire hazards. Emergency shutdown procedure is automatically 
activated in case of sensor alarm due to accidental leakage. 
 Finally, LNG facilities designs are required by regulations to observe 
Separation distances from any surrounding urban or industrial facilities. 
Safety zones are also required around LNG tankers (CEE, 2012). 
The multiple layers of protection described above create four critical safety 
conditions, all of which are integrated with a combination of industry standards 
and regulatory compliance (Fig.2.11).  
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2.6.2 Emergency management 
With all efforts in preventing and mitigating incidents and accidents, it is not 
possible to detect and avoid every threat. Therefore emergency situations are 
and always have been part of today’s reality and do occur.  
Emergency management in ports is an important component of port daily 
business and should be integrated within the port management model. Its 
objective is to defend the port against incidents or accidents by providing timely 
response to a security attack or a safety accident and minimising the impact of 
such events on port operations and port critical infrastructure. Pinto & Talley 
(2006) provided a description of the incident cycle of a port. They explained 
that, for example, the security of a port consists of prevention, detection, 
response and recovery phases.  They also noted that there have been 
significant improvements in the prevention and detection phases, but little 
investigation of the response and recovery phases of a port’s security incident 
cycle (Pinto & Talley, 2006). 
Emergency management and response includes the response and recovery 
phases of an incident (ex post incident). They are lengthy tasks which require 
mobilisation and cooperation of several public and private entities which should 
put together resources and expertise to mitigate and respond to emergencies 
when they strike. However, as asserted by Coppolla (2007), ‘when disasters 
strike, there may be little or no time to make any additional arrangement, to 
learn any new skills, or to acquire needed supplies’. That is why disaster 
preparedness is a paramount step which normally precedes response actions 
and should be given the necessary resources and time to be effective.      
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According to Coppola, (2007, p.209): 
‘the goals of disaster preparedness are knowing what to do in a 
disasters’ aftermath, knowing how to do it, and being equipped with the 
right tools to do it effectively’ 
Emergency/ disaster preparedness is a lengthy process which may take years 
before attaining satisfactory levels and maintaining such levels normally require 
on-going efforts. Meanwhile, preparedness minimises the effects of disasters 
when they occur through effective precautions taken which ensure timely and 
efficient planning and delivery of response and relief actions. Emergency 
preparedness and response is delivered through a cooperative effort between 
public and private organisations and individuals. The public component includes 
administration, emergency management, public health, law enforcement 
authorities and other agencies. The role of these government entities is 
normally organised and conducted through the creation of specialised 
emergency committees, such as those dealing with maritime and port 
emergencies. Emergency committees carry out their functions through the 
creation and application of an emergency management plan (EMP) which is 
further re-enforced by training, exercises and drills.   Government preparedness 
actions can be grouped into five categories: Planning, exercise, training, 
equipment, and statutory authority (Coppola, 2007).    
     
2.6.2.1. Planning 
Government entities are required to lead emergency planning and response. 
They need to know well in advance of a disaster or emergency what they have 
to do and how they should do it in case of a disaster. In the event of an 
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emergency, each government jurisdictional level will be expected to know its 
role, how to perform each task and function within the scope of that role and 
what equipment they need. Therefore,   planning for disaster response is crucial 
in disaster preparedness and mostly done through the preparation and 
validation of a National Emergency Management Plan (NEMP). This plan is 
widely recognised as the most comprehensive methodology used for 
emergency planning and response. NEMP is a master document which can 
accommodate a wide variety of disasters response actions in a community or 
national infrastructure (Cities, regions, states, ports, airports…etc.) and define 
the roles and responsibilities of each government entity and how they should 
cooperate to deliver effective response and recovery tasks and actions. The 
following information is normally detailed in a NEMP: 
 
 People and agencies to be involved in a response to hazardous events 
(Disasters); 
 Responsibilities and actions of such people and agencies and where 
and when they will be called upon; 
 Catalogue of equipment and facilities required and available inside and 
outside the jurisdiction. 
 How citizens and infrastructure will be protected in the event of a 
disaster.   
 
An effective emergency plan shall include the following components: 
 Hazards and risks analysis; 
 The basic plan; 
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 Functional annexes 
 Hazard-specific annexes 
Hazards and risks analysis is usually conducted prior to the creation of 
emergency management plans, since different risks have different 
consequences which require response mechanisms and actions specific to 
each consequence. Accommodating a wide variety of consequences should be 
considered in the context of limited available resources and normally refer to the 
community/ country risk acceptance level. This particular issue of risk 
acceptance constitutes an important link between RM and emergency 
management as functions that should be considered in continuum. This will be 
discussed later in the coming chapters. 
The basic plan is the main body of the emergency management plan document 
that describes the emergency operations within a community or country. It 
generally includes an introduction of the main stakeholders and public agencies 
involved in emergency response and their responsibilities. It also introduces and 
explains various concepts and policies and delineates statutory authority.      
The basic plan is often supplemented by functional annexes that provide much 
detail on the operational needs of specific response mechanisms. These 
annexes cover detailed information on who does what in fulfilling the different 
functions in an emergency response and for different disaster types.  
Hazard-specific annexes cover detailed risk information for individual hazards 
including the population most likely to be affected; the geographic range of such 
hazards and, if possible, the season or time span the disaster can strike.   
2.6.2.2. Exercise 
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A major part of emergency preparedness and response effort, as defined by 
emergency management plans, is a programme of exercises. Exercises allow 
those involved in emergency response to practice their roles and responsibilities 
prior to the actual occurrence of an event of emergency or disaster. The 
outcomes from such exercises are numerous: first, exercises prepare 
organisations, individuals and stakeholders to carry out their disaster response 
duties in a stress free environment.  Second, it serves as a valuable 
preparedness tool allowing individuals and stakeholders to meet and know each 
other before actual disaster occur. Finally, exercises help find problems in 
emergency management plans, test their suitability and allow for adequate 
rectification actions to those plans prior to their effective implementation during 
emergency situations.   Exercises are often tailored to the needs of the 
community, country or specific critical infrastructure (such as ports), and have 
four major components: Drills, table top exercise, functional exercise and full 
scale exercise.  
A drill is a controlled method by which a single disaster function is practiced 
(exp. evacuation). A table top exercise is designed to allow emergency 
management to practice full activation of an emergency response plan; a 
functional exercise tests overall disaster management capability to respond to 
an event and finally, a full-scale exercise is ‘a scenario-based exercise that 
seeks to create an atmosphere closely mimicking an actual disaster’ (Coppola, 
2007).    
In this exercise all players are required to act in real time and using the required 
equipment and procedures as in real life incident and as defined by the 
emergency management plan.      
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2.6.2.3. Training 
It represents the third component to government preparedness. Training is 
paramount in disaster preparedness since public authorities and disaster 
response teams are only effective when they are trained to perform their tasks. 
Furthermore, training is essential to the very safety of the response teams since 
without training, response officials may put themselves This may further strain 
response resources which will then divert part of responder’s efforts to 
unnecessarily in dangerous situations, especially in particular specialized 
response, rescue their peers. 
2.6.2.4. Equipment 
Tools and equipment for disaster response, rescue and recovery have 
tremendously assisted in the effectiveness of disaster response and recovery 
and in the protection of the lives of responders themselves. Number of 
equipment is available for disaster response which are developed and made 
available for different purposes: 
o Fire suppression equipment 
o Rescue equipment 
o Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
o Disaster medical care 
o Communication systems 
o Public warning and alert systems 
o Other emergency and disaster response equipment. 
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The above is just a sample list of groups of equipment under which hundreds of 
specialized emergency response tools and equipment exist and which have 
made life  saving and disaster response and recovery much easier and more 
efficient. 
2.6.2.5. Statutory authority 
Emergency preparedness cannot be complete without designation of a statutory 
authority which shall be invested with the responsibility of managing the whole 
emergency response actions and be able to take decisions during emergency 
time. This is an important requirement since government emergency response 
involves a diverse range of government officials and agencies as well as private 
volunteers. It also involves a large expenditure of funds and suspension of 
normal activities for private entities and public authorities. The designation of a 
statutory authority is crucial in order for appropriate crisis management to be 
carried out, including emergency response, rescue and relief actions in a 
disaster’s aftermath. 
Statutory authorities set up the lines of control and succession and provide the 
necessary power of authority to specific government authorities which are 
invested with the responsibility to take specific actions in case of emergency, as 
per the emergency management plan (EMP).       
 
2.6.3 Port recovery and port business continuity 
 
Both safety and security incidents may have the same consequences, 
especially when such incidents involve HazMat. However, most specialists tend 
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to consider that security incidents may usually yield larger consequences in 
terms of fatalities and economical damage. What actually matters for a port in 
an incident aftermath are the response actions which should be efficient enough 
to minimise the consequences of such incident. Most importantly, and due to its 
strategic importance, ports need to recover in a limited period of time and return 
back to operation, although it may be just partial in the early stage of recovery.  
 
As asserted by Pinto & Talley (2006), port recovery phase begins when marine 
terminals and waterways that were shut down, as a result of an incident, are 
open again to operation, even on a limited basis. The recovery phase ends 
when such port facilities are back to normal operation.       
In most post incident cases, emergency authorities are under pressure from 
port users and stakeholders once port facilities are declared safe from terrorist 
attacks, fire accidents or explosions. In this case, emergency authorities and 
law enforcement agencies are requested to finish their investigations ASAP and 
remove any obstructions from the port’s channels and terminals to move 
forward and declare the port open for normal operations. In the U.S, since there 
has not been a recorded major security incident, the study of port accidents is 
used to provide useful information in the prevention of potential U.S. port 
security incidents (Pinto & Talley, 2006). This again attests to the relationship 
between port safety and security incidents which call for comprehensive RM 
which enables better information sharing and further cooperation along all 
phases of the port incident cycle: prevention, detection, response and recovery.  
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2.7  CONCLUSION 
The global LNG industry is in a state of flux. Despite recent recession and 
abrupt competition from alternative sources like shale gas, the industry is 
poised to grow strongly in the long term. The clean fuel has transformed itself 
from a regionally traded fuel to a globally traded energy source. Low price, 
environmental friendliness and declining construction costs of LNG have 
resulted in a large number of countries and companies investing in LNG. This 
growth in demand is further fuelled by Asian and European countries, which 
have been converting their oil fuelled power plants to gas fired plants. 
Discussing the strategic planning issues to be considered in the LNG business, 
Chen (1998) pointed out that the last five years have seen changes in the 
industry, and it seems there have been more changes in the past three or four 
years than in the entire previous history of LNG. Advances in technology have 
considerably reduced the cost of construction of an LNG plant, trading of LNG 
on the stock exchange has led to the development of a spot market, new ships 
are being built catering to no specific market and under no contractual 
obligations, the Japanese, Asian and European markets have been liberalised 
and there are more sellers and buyers on the market which is becoming 
increasingly competitive. These changes are revolutionising the way in which 
the LNG business is being conducted today.  
From a RM perspective, as the LNG market further expands, the number and 
capacity of LNG tankers and terminals is subsequently increasing. Therefore 
the number and frequency of LNG tanker voyages between producing and 
consuming regions is expected to further increase, adding more risks to the 
   
62 
 
actual safety, security and environmental risks profile of LNG terminals and 
ships. This requires a comprehensive and integrated RM approach which can 
deal with these types of risks in a cost effective and efficient manner. 
From the above, the following remarks can be made:  
 LNG safety mitigation measures and safeguards constitute the fist line of 
defence against security risks.  
 Safety and security interfaces and mutual impacts exist and need to be 
adequately addressed at each level of the RM, emergency response and 
port business continuity processes. 
 Integrated safety and security risks management shall ensure synergetic, 
efficient and coordinated safety and security risk control strategies. 
 Coordination and information sharing shall be extended during emergency 
planning and response phases to ensure swift and efficient emergency 
response and quick port recovery to bring it back to normal operations, 
thereby minimising the consequences of port incidents, be they safety or 
security related.  
This overview confirms the LNG maritime and port industry’s need for a 
systematic RM framework based on a comprehensive, holistic and integrated 
approach to risks and vulnerabilities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SAFETY AND SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
IN LNG PORTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to review recent literature on RM in ports and 
marine terminals handling LNG. The scope of the risk encompasses both safety 
and security risks, as related to LNG ports. Apart from commercial business 
related risks, safety and security types of risk are of paramount importance to 
the LNG industry and to its critical VC infrastructure. As asserted by Walker et 
al. (2003, p.1), LNG maritime security is now added to the years of dialogue 
related to the safe transport of LNG, “We are now in an environment where 
intentionally caused spills and releases must be factored into existing 
prevention, preparedness and consequence management planning.”   
The World Economic Forum (WEF) annual reports from 2008 to 2011 have 
emphasized energy security (LNG included) and its critical global infrastructure 
as one of top global risks (WEF 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).  
Therefore, since LNG is considered a hazardous material (HazMat), LNG 
maritime and port security should be analysed and addressed in connection 
with safety measures and practices.  
Literature on port safety risks will be presented in section two, followed by a 
review and discussion of literature pertaining to port security risks in section 
three.  Lessons to be learnt from the quality movement, especially the Total 
Quality Management (TQM) framework will be discussed in section four, and 
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finally, the chapter concludes with an account of the interfaces and shared 
impacts among LNG ports safety and security risks in section 5.   
 
3.2  LNG PORT SAFETY RISKS 
Literature on LNG ports and terminals safety risks, for instance ( Walker et al. 
(2003), Sandia (2004), Ditali & Fiore (2008), CEE (2006), CEE (2012), Nwaoha 
et al. (2011, 2013)) have stated the excellent safety record of LNG vessels, with 
few accidents, during its entire history.  
The few specific studies on LNG port safety such as Walker et al. (2003) have 
attempted to provide a comprehensive review of LNG/ LPG maritime and port 
networks safety in terms of built-in safeguards contained in LNG regulations, 
standards and industry practices.  They provided a clear approach to LNG RM. 
For them, “the risks associated with LNG and LPG are the possibility and 
probability that an uncontrolled release of either product will result in injury, 
market disadvantage, or destruction, such as loss of life, property destruction, 
and adverse impact on the viability of the market should an accident occur.... 
Since 9/11, the possibility of terrorist action against these facilities and vessels 
could result in a high number of fatalities and an interruption to the energy SC, 
is also a significant concern.” Walker et al. (2003, p.1) 
Throughout the analysis, Walker et al. (2003) demonstrated an intergated RM 
approach, combining both LNG safety and security threats. For them, LNG 
safety and security can be addressed effectively through various regulatory and 
non-regulatory techniques including: 
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 “Risk communication messages to define clearly liquefied gas properties 
and hazards, safety, and environmental issues and the industry safety track 
record; 
 Risk mitigation for vessels construction, human factors and training; 
 Risk mitigation for terminals and jetties-siting and design, weather, traffic 
control, safe monitoring, transfer contingencies, safe distances, training, 
review of operating practices and procedures; and 
 Port security and response plans for vessels of high concern.” 
Walker et al. (2003) noted, also, that while the LNG industry has a strong safety 
record coupled with stringent construction codes for vessels and terminals, it is 
very difficult to predict exactly what would happen if there was a major 
uncontrolled release of LNG on water. Tests with LNG have shown that the 
rapid phase transition (RPT)  would be a serious concern if there was such a 
release. That is why the authors recommend the use of effective contingency 
planning which aims at maintaining a state of readiness and timely appropriate 
procedures to mitigate emergency situations. For Walker et al. (2003, p.2) 
“sound contingency planning, in addition to RM programs, stakeholder outreach 
and port security plan, must incorporate the interests, expertise, and experience 
of the industry in LNG projects.” 
Since loss of containment and subsequent LNG spills are the most feared 
hazard scenarios in LNG operations, two pioneering works in LNG spill 
modelling include Fay (1969) and Fannelop and Waldman (1972) which were 
summarized and reported by Brebbia (2001). Fay (2003-1) presented a 
complete model for predicting the dynamics of spills from LNG and oil product 
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tankers. The model uses fluid mechanics principles and physical properties of 
LNG and oil spills on water. Both physical models and software programmes 
are used as RA tools to explain, evaluate, compute and assess the extent and 
impact of hydrocarbon spills on ocean environment as well as on people and 
infrastructure. 
The UH IELE (2003) and CEE (2003, 2006, 2012) reports focused mainly on 
the U.S LNG sector.They discussed safety and security aspects of LNG through 
an overview of its main physical properties, the safety record of LNG facilities 
and ships, the impact of LNG operations on the environment as well as 
regulations and agencies concerned with LNG safety and environmental 
protection. The reports concluded that LNG has been and can continue to be 
used safely as long as industry standards, regulations, design and technology 
are maintained to the highest level and continuously improved, taking 
advantage of the long accumulated industry experience and the advances in 
science and technology. 
 The UH IELE report refered to a 1998 study carried out by the New York State 
Energy Planning Board.  Major finding of this referenced study was: “LNG is as 
safe as other available conventional fuels and over the past two decades it has 
had an excellent safety record. Since 1980, there have been seven plant or 
ocean tanker accidents worldwide and four vehicle-related accidents in the  
U. S. with no fatalities, which compares favourably with the safety record of 
facilities for competing fuels” (New York Energy Planning Board (1998, 9-1). 
In view of the above conclusions, the UH IELE concluded that “risks and 
hazards associated with LNG and LNG industrial facilities are manageable. 
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These conclusions also show that LNG industry safety practices contribute 
toward reduced potential for catastrophic events such as might be associated 
with acts of terrorism” The UH IELE (2003, p.43). 
This UH IELE (2003) conclusion is conform to Walker et al. (2003) and 
demonstrates the relationships between LNG safety measures and practice and 
security mitigation measures in LNG facilities. 
One of the studies which focused on LNG shipping hazards and risks but 
included LNG port facilities as related to ship location is Pitblado et al. (2004). 
This study  tried to develop a range of well conceived failure cases from 
accident or terrorism causes in order to predict hazard zones for LNG import 
terminals. He stated that the LNG marine transport component appears to have 
more vulnerability to threats than the LNG terminal itself which has robust LNG 
tanks and secure boundaries.  Pitblado et al. (2004) carried out a formal HAZID 
with the participation of a group of experts from classification societies, industry 
and risk specialists to identify precursor events that could lead to credible loss 
of containment events. These were converted into maximum credible hole 
sizes.  
For Pitblado et al. (2004), consequence assessment is valuable for decision 
making, particularly for locations beyond the hazard ranges predicted. For 
critical locations within hazard ranges, a more detailed risk analysis, that takes 
account not only of the consequence but also of the safeguards and explicitly 
assesses the likelihood of events, would be most appropriate. The scope of the 
shipping activity covers port entry, port transit, manoeuvring and jetty activities. 
Maximum credible accidental release case for 750mm hole as well as for non 
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accidental release case of 1500mm hole are presented in Tables 1 and 2 
(Appendix3).  
ABS Consulting (2004) performed a study for the account of the US. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The goal is to identify appropriate 
consequence analysis methods for estimating flammable vapor and thermal 
radiation hazard distances for potential LNG vessel cargo releases during 
transit and while at berth. While the objective of the study might be similar to 
that of Pitblado et al. (2004), the scope of the FERC study is limited to 
accidental releases and to consequence assessment methodologies modelling 
the consequences pertaining to LNG spills on water. Regarding the 
methodologies used, Pitblado et al. (2004) deployed a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques while ABS Consulting (2004) relied 
solely on quantitative techniques. 
Both ABS Consulting (2004) and Pitblado et al. (2004) concluded that the 
recommended consequence assessment methods can provide only rough 
estimates of the magnitude of effects for incidents involving large LNG releases 
on water, due to the variability in actual incident circumstances as well as 
uncertainty inherent in the methods used. 
The SANDIA (2004) report discussed both safety and security threat 
implications steming from extensive LNG spill over water. The report considers 
three types of reference accidents at sea: accidental collision with a small 
vessel, accidental collision with a large vessel and grounding. For the three 
cases, the report expected a breach of 5-10 m² limited to one container for the 
second case, with an actual spill area of 0.5-1 m². In most cases, the spilled 
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LNG will burn in a pool fire about 150 m in diameter (1 m² breach): thermal 
hazards will extend to approximately 250 m and 750 m. In some cases, LNG 
will evaporate from the pool and disperse as a vapour cloud, extending beyond 
1600 m  in about 20 min., under stable atmospheric condition and 2 m/s wind 
velocity. SANDIA (2004) also investigates several intentional LNG cargo tank 
damage scenarios, including sabotage, insider threats, and external attacks. 
The same conclusion was confirmed by the report prepared by the U.S. 
National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM, 2005). The security part 
of this study-report will be discussed later as part of the section on LNG port 
security.  
Based on the findings of the SANDIA Report, Bubbico et al. (2009) made a 
preliminary risk analysis for LNG tankers approaching a marine terminal. The 
study was based on the case of LNG ships approaching Panigaglia LNG 
terminal in Italy. Considering the information reported by the SANDIA study 
which indicated that the required velocity to cause a breach of LNG cargo tank 
during 90° collision with a large vessel is 6 to7 knots,  Bubbico et al. (2009) 
concluded that accidental collision of an LNG tanker with a small or large 
vessel, cannot be excluded due to the congestion of the harbour. Nevertheless, 
due to the low ship velocity when approaching the terminal, it is unrealistic that 
a collision will occur at the speed of 6-7 knots required to open a breach in the 
cargo. Grounding cannot be excluded as well but generally does not result in 
LNG cargo breaches, especially at low speed. 
For Bubbico et al. (2009), the only plausible scenario for an accidental breach of 
an LNG vessel tanks is an intentional action against the tanker; such a case 
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was investigated further using the consequence analysis technique. This will be 
discussed  in the next section dealing with security risks.  
CH-IV International (2006) provided a comprehensive chronological summary 
followed by a historical analysis of LNG accidents. The study, which is a 
comprehensive report on the safety history of international LNG operations, 
demonstrated the outstanding safety record of LNG production and 
transportation chain. Almost the totality of accidents occuring in LNG exports, 
regasification plants and LNG tankers worldwide are reported and analysed.  
Among other findings, the study reported that most of the accidents which 
happened on land did not involve LNG directly, but are rather attributed to the 
formation of explosive atmospheres in enclosed spaces as a result of bad 
maintenance or to problems unrelated to the dangerous properties of LNG.  
Generally, the study reported five major incidents in onshore facilities (including 
export/receiving marine terminals) directly attributable to the LNG process 
which resulted in one or more fatalities: Skikda, Algeria-2004; P.T. Badak- 
Bontang, Indonesia, 1983; Cove Point Maryland, 1979; Arzew, Algeria, 1977; 
and Cleveland, Ohio, 1944. There was two other LNG incidents, Portland 1968 
and Staten Island 1973, involving death, but these are considered by the report 
as “Construction accidents” since no LNG was present. CH-IV International 
(2006) noted also that in all LNG tanker voyages and associated cargo 
loading/unloading operations at terminals, no fatality has ever been recorded for 
any crew member of LNG ships or member of the general public as a result of 
LNG incident. Among LNG import and export terminal personnel, only one 
death can be reported. A worker in the LNG export facility at Arzew-Algeria was 
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killed during a ship loading operation due to a failure of a large-diameter valve. 
This caused the worker to be sprayed with LNG, coming into contact with the 
extremely cold LNG liquid.  
The above studies (CEE, UH IELE, SANDIA, CH-IV International and NASFM) 
were published in an effort to inform and guide the public debate around the 
advantages and disadvantages of LNG imports to the USA, in light of the public 
opposition to permiting new LNG plants and receiving terminals due to their 
high risk profile.  All of them reported the excellent safety record of the industry 
and warned about the threat represented by intentional acts of terrorism. 
Another interesting study undertaken under the SAFEDOR Project and co-
funded by the EU is Vanem et al (2008). The study carried out a high–level risk 
assessement of LNG carrier operations, including operations at LNG terminal-
berths. One of the aims was to encourage innovative ship design for cleaner 
and safer maritime transport under the IMO’s FSA methodology. To that end, 
concepts for risk–based regulatory framework are developed to assist in the 
development of novel design concepts based on risk analyses.  This study, 
which concerns LNG Carrier Operations, is step 2 of the SAFEDOR project 
which undertook generic FSA studies on various vessel types. 
As a results of this study, Collision was found to be the highest source of risk. 
This result concides with the conclusions of Darbra and Casal (2004) which 
analysed historical accidents in seaports. For Vanem et al. (2008), both 
individual and societal risk levels associated with LNG shipping operations lie 
within the ALARP region. This means that further risk reduction can be required 
only if cost effective RCOs are identified. 
   
72 
 
Due to their particularities (congestion, confined waterways, existence of 
diverse fleet and cargo movements..etc),  ports and marine terminals are 
perfect areas where such accident types can happen including collision and 
grounding in the port channel or while at berth, fire and explosion at the terminal 
as well as all types of incidents due to loading and unloading operations (valve 
failure, hose failure or loading arms failure). However, the study stated that 
“spillage events during loading or unloading of cargo while in port are generally 
assumed to be of small scale, where only a limited number of crew are exposed 
to risks of injuries or death. Fatal accidents are only deemed likely for crew 
members directly exposed to the cryogenic LNG” (Vanem et al. 2008).The 
resulting risk model is illustrated in the figure below, which is an example of 
event trees used. 
Figure 3.1 Risk Model for spill events during loading/ unloading
 
    Source:  Vanem et al. (2008, p. 1336) 
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Vanem et al. (2008) concluded that despite the uncertainties associated with 
this model, the overall LNG carriers risk is found to be in the ALARP area. 
Three generic accident scenarios are together responsible for about 90% of the 
total risk related to LNG carriers, i.e. collision, grounding and contact. All three 
scenarios describe a situation where an LNG vessel is damaged due to an 
external impact from an external floating object (another vessel, the sea floor, 
submerged object, the jetty or any other structure). Upon closer investigation of 
the risk models associated with these scenarios, four sub-models are found to 
be in need of further risk reduction: the accident frequency model, the cargo 
leakage frequency model, the survivability model and the evacuation model. As 
a result, the study recommends that further effort should focus on measures 
related to the following areas: 
 Navigational safety 
 Manoeuvrability 
 Collision avoidance 
 Cargo protection 
 Damage stability 
 Evacuation arrangements 
Despite its uncertainties and broad results, this high-level risk analysis remains 
an interesting example of the application of FSA to LNG shipping and port 
safety. Another interesting study which applied Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA) framework to LNG carrier systems’ safety is Nwaoha, et al. (2011) which 
investigated the safety/ risk level of an LNG carrier system through the 
application of fuzzy evidential reasoning (FER) method to uncertaintly treatment 
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of its failure modes, given the high level of uncertainties in the historical failure 
data of LNG carriers (Nwaoha et al. , 2011). 
The study provided risk level estimations for LNG tanker containment system 
and developed risk control options (RCOs) to mitigate such risks. Prioritization 
of the best RCO is used to improve the safety level of the system (Nwaoha et 
al. , 2011). 
Although the study did not include the possible failure modes of LNG carrier at 
the port (navigation in port channels, loading/ unloading at terminal...etc), some 
of the generic risks obtained could also apply to LNG ship at port or while along 
side the jetty . Based on the above study, Nwaoha et al. (2013) developed a 
new risk analysis framework combining fuzzy evidential reasining (FER), risk 
matrix and fault tree analysis (FTA) techniques to investigate risks and provide 
a new risk ranking methodology for hazards of LNG carrier operations and their 
fundamental causes. The approach taken in this study is considered proactive 
since it does not rely solely on historical data and go further in identifing new 
hazards that have not yet materialised.  One important contribution of the study 
is the proritization of LNG carrier operations risks which idetified the top risk 
event for due mitigation. The risk matrix under this study identified twenty six 
hazards of LNG carrier operations from which two are found to be in the ‘very 
high risk’ area. Other hazards associated with LNG ship operations are in the 
‘high risk’, ‘moderate risk’ and ‘low risk’ areas in the same risk matrix table 
(Nwaoha et al., 2013).  
The study result indicates that an LNG spill from the transfer arms has a higher 
risk level than failure of the ships’ containment system (Nwaoha et al., 2013). 
   
75 
 
This result is obtained using the FER method to further prioritise the hazards of 
the same score which are, in this case, the two hazards under the ‘ very high 
risk’ category. This result is interesting not only for ranking hazards but also for 
the prioritisation of the RCOs in the risk management phase.  
It is noticed that research on LNG risks in general has been more active in the 
last decade due mainly to the increasing demand for LNG as an alternative 
clean energy source and to the subsequent drastic increase in the frequency of 
LNG shipments per year which raised conerns over the safety and reliability of 
LNG tankers and terminals alike. 
Another remark is that more and more research started very recently to 
consider safety and security risks assessment and management from a holistic 
and integrative approach (Walker et al. (2003), Sandia (2004), Pitblado et al. 
(2004), Ditali & Fiore (2008), CEE (2012), Nwaoha et al. (2011, 2013), Vanem 
et al. (2008), Bubbico et al. (2009)).  
Pitblado et al. (2004), Sandia (2004), CH-IV International (2006), Bubbico et al. 
(2009) and CEE (2006, 2012) concluded that LNG safety is assured through a 
combination of safety standards, regulations, technological advances and high 
level industry practice and experience. For them, the only plausible threat to the 
LNG VC is the intentional hazard represented by global terrorism. Also, the few 
available literature on LNG safety has focused on LNG shipping with partial 
analysis of related LNG port safety. Therefore, further research effort is needed 
in connection with LNG ports and marine terminals safety. However, other 
studies such as Walker et.al, (2003), Vanem et al. (2008) and Nwaoha et al. 
(2011, 2013) demonstrated a more integrated safety and security RM approach.  
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3.3  LNG PORT SECURITY RISKS 
Most safety studies that addressed LNG hazards and risks tried to demonstrate 
how those hazards, even if they have happened before and may still happen in 
the future, have little chance of occuring and if they do occur, will have less 
widespread effects due to industry safeguards contained in LNG infrastructure 
siting, regulations, standards, technological advances and industry operational 
safety practice. 
The majority of those studies have shown that for such hazards to occur, there 
must be severe conditions, producing huge intensity of energy in order to 
penetrate the multiple layers of containment and exclusion zones to produce 
high consequence incidents, which would probably correspond to acts of 
terrorism.  
As asserted by Walker et al. (2003, p.1), LNG maritime security is now added to 
the years of dialogue related to safe transport of LNG, “We are now in an 
environment where intentionally caused spills and releases must be factored 
into existing prevention, preparedness and consequence management 
planning.”   
Since LNG is considered a HazMat, LNG maritime and port security should be 
analysed and addressed in due consideration of safety measures and practice. 
For Walker et al. (2003), security risk is defined as a function of consequence, 
vulnerability, and threat. Consequence is a measure of the severity of results 
after a targeted system or infrastructure is attacked. Vulnerability is a measure 
of how well a site is physically protected and the threat is a measure of the 
probability of a site or infrastructure being targeted by a  person or a group. 
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Walker, et al. (2003) recommend that security RA in the LNG maritime and port 
industries be based on a careful analysis of the process where LNG or LPG is 
produced, shipped and then transfered to downstream users. Also, such 
analysis needs to consider those parts of the process that will yield most 
casualties and provide the best photo opportunity for terrorists. 
It is clear that this approach provides a wider dimension to RA and 
management by adopting a logistics and SC perspective to the issues of LNG 
safety and security, with an emphasis on security based threats and 
vulnerabilities due to their far reaching consequences on the whole LNG VC. 
Furthermore, contrary to LNG accidental releases and since LNG is perceived 
as high consequence material, risk scenarios pertaining to intentional terrorist 
acts would most likely include the ignition source necessary to cause fire and 
explosion in case of massive LNG release, which is the most feared breach 
scenario.  
For the above reasons, risk mitigation should focus mostly on reducing 
consequence and vulnerability rather than reducing threat because security 
threat is a measure of the unknown and law enforcement entities have limited 
control over them (Walker et al. 2003). Pushing further, control over security 
threats means making fundamental changes to the way the industry conducts 
business at existing facilities or vessels, which could adversely impact the 
economics and profitability of the entire VC (Walker et al. 2003). 
In this respect, security risk mitigation strategies usually target system 
vulnerabilities and plan to reduce them as much as it is practically possible, 
through an increase in physical security hardware, people and processes. 
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Security improvements should be site-specific because effective security RA 
should be based on facility location, characteristics, and related internal and 
external environment. Furthermore, an indepth security defence planning and 
strategy should be flexible and continuously reviewed and updated to cope with 
the change in threat profile in the surounding environment.  
Practically, taking into consideration the LNG SC process means necessarily 
integrating the safety procedures and practice which are an important part of 
the LNG production, storage, transport and distribution processes. By adopting 
such an approach, safety and security RAs should not be dissociated and have 
to be performed in connection with each other, with the safety safeguards being 
in place at first instance.  
Walker et al. (2003) provided a comprehensive RM approach combining a 
thorough analysis of both safety and security risks, however this study has not 
discussed the methodology(ies) for security RA and management as well as no 
indication of the role to be played by each member of the maritime and port SC 
in this collaborative effort. 
The CEE (2003) in its report on LNG security noted the industry’s excellent 
safety record over the past 40 years. The safe and environmentally sound 
operation of these facilities and their protection from terrorist activities or other 
incidents are a concern and responsibility shared by operators as well as 
federal, state and local authorities across the U.S. Onshore LNG facilities are 
industrial sites and, as such, are subject to all rules, regulations and 
environmental standards imposed by the various jurisdictions. The CEE 
approached security RM of LNG terminal facilities as a right combination of 
   
79 
 
regulations, standards and technologies which have to be implemented 
adequately to yield the optimum possible security protection to these strategic 
facilities. 
Although this study provided valuable insight regarding LNG safety and security 
hazards management and acknowledged the link between safety and security, 
it did not provide any methodology for RM. Also, its approach was confined to 
the facility-security perspective.. 
Fay (2003) investigated a possible scenario of a boat bomb attack on a tanker’s 
combustible liquid cargo, which would certainly escape from  cargo holds 
punctured by the force of a resulting explosion. He stated that the fire that would 
ensue from a boat bomb attack on a tanker would be of unprecedented size and 
intensity. However, no one can tell exactly the magnitude of this phenomenon 
since no relevant industrial experience exists with fire of this scale, from which 
to project measures for securing public safety. To overcome the lack of such 
experience, scientific understanding gained from laboratory and physical 
experiments of much smaller scale is used to predict the characteristics of real 
world hydrocarbon fires. 
The author developed a mathematical model for the spills and fires from liquid 
fuel marine tankers which is based upon scientific papers published in peer-
reviewed journals. He then applied such a model to the case of tankers 
delivering liquid fuel cargoes (LNG and Oil products) to Boston harbour. 
The results of this research in terms of spill volume, fire duration, pool area and 
thermal radiation zone are presented in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Physical parameters of tanker spills 
Tanker spill parameters LNG Gasoline 
Spill Volume (m³) 
Fire duration (Min.) 
Maximum pool area (10⁴ m²) 
Maximum pool radius (m) 
Average heat release rate (TW) 
Distance to average heat flux of 5 
KW/m² (Km) 
 
14,300 
3.3 
18 
340 
1.5 
1.1 
1140 
5.1 
8.0 
230 
0.12 
0.9 
Source: Fay (2003) 
The main conclusions of this research are: 
 The resulting liquid cargo pool fires from both LNG and oil tankers, due to a 
boat bomb attack, are unprecedented in scale. There is no possibility of 
lessening the fires effects, much less extinguishing them during  the short 
time of burnout. 
 At any point along the inner harbour route of the tanker to the berth, severe 
pool fire thermal radiation, capable of killing people and burning building, 
can be experienced along the waterfront and well inland. 
However, such results cannot be verified through experimental data and 
therefore, it is very difficult to confirm them on a scientific basis since, initially, 
the model inputs are based on assumptions made by litterature.  
Fay used a methodology classified as consequence method. This particular 
method was investigated further by ABS Consulting which asserted that such 
methods can provide only rough estimates of the magnitude of effects for 
incidents involving large LNG releases on water.  This is typically the case with 
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consequence assessments which cannot provide precise estimates of effects 
due to uncertainty in the method itself.  
ABS Consulting (2004) identified three issues regarding consequence 
assessment methods: 
 No release models are available that take into account the true structure of 
an LNG carrier, in particular the multiple barriers existing in modern LNG 
tankers represented by the tanker’s double hulls and the cargo thanks.  
 No pool spreads are available to account for wave action or currents. 
 The scarcity of experimental data necessary to validate models involving 
large LNG spills on water. (ABS Consulting 2004) 
Another consequence assessment study was performed by Pitblado et al. 
(2004) for the account of DNV. The objective was to review the range of 
potential LNG marine spillage events from collision, grounding, operational 
error, and terrorism. Therefore the scope of the study covered both safety and 
security risks. 
The methodology employed involved a review of published literature and 
operational experience with LNG carriers and LNG experimental trials. A hazard 
identification study (HAZID) was carried out using a group of industry and risk 
specialists to identify precursor events that could lead to credible loss of 
containment. These were converted into credible hole sizes. At a refinment 
stage, Sandia Labroaratories were consulted to refine hole sizes due to terrorist 
events. Finally, the PHAST software model was used to predict maximum 
hazard distances from maximum credible Hole sizes. 
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Hazard zones that were presented in the study are well bellow many values 
predicted by most LNG spill studies. Hazard zones include benefits associated 
with the current vessel designs and safe operations procedures adopted by 
operators, port authorities and the Coast Guard. 
However, similar to Fay and ABS Consulting, Pitblado et al. (2004) 
aknowledged the existence of uncertainties associated with any consequence 
study. It should be noted that these modelling issues concern both accidental 
and intentional LNG releases. 
Parfomak and Flynn (2005) in their report to the US Congress on LNG terminals 
security, stated that LNG infrastructure attractiveness to terrorists has been the 
subject of debate since Sept.11, 2001. Many experts believe that, like LNG 
safety,  concerns about security threats to LNG facilities may be overstated and 
should not impede LNG imports into the U.S. However, the U.S. Department of 
Homweland Security, DHS (2009) believes that risks associated with LNG 
shipments are real, and they can never be entirely eliminated. The same 
conclusion has been asserted by the Sandia report which concluded that a 
range of potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers could be considered 
“credible and possible” and that the consequences from  such attacks could be 
“severe” (SANDIA 2004). 
Most hazard analyses for LNG terminals and shipping actually depend on 
computer models to approximate the effects of hypothetical accidents and 
incidents. U.S. Federal siting standards specifically require computer modelling 
of thermal radiation and flammable vapor cloud exclusion zones (49 C.F.R.§§ 
193.2057, 2059). Such models are necessary because there have been no 
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major LNG incident of the type envisioned in LNG safety and security research 
and because historical LNG experiments have been limited in scale and scope. 
However, LNG hazard models simulate complex physical phenomena and are 
inherently uncertain, relying on calculations made on assumptions. 
Similarily, SANDIA (2004) reported such limitations in existing data and models 
for analysing LNG spills over water. However, it concluded that such analytical 
tools can be used to identify and mitigate hazards. 
In the U.S., the FERC also remarked that unlike LNG safety, historical 
experience provides little guidance in estimating the probability of a terrorist 
attack on an LNG tanker or shore-based facilities (GAO 2007). A former 
Director of Central Intelligence belives that a terrorist attack on LNG facilities is 
unlikely because it may not produce a great impact compared to other targets. 
However, he could not tell how this would not yield big impact and which targets 
he is refering to as comparison (GAO 2007). 
The U.S. Coast Guard has also expressed concern about the increase in the 
security costs from growing U.S. LNG imports and subsequently requested 
additional resources to secure future LNG deliveries. Addressing this funding 
issue, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires private and public sector cost-
sharing for LNG tanker security. Accordingly, FERC requires new LNG terminal 
operators to pay the cost of any additional security or safety measures needed 
for their facilities. The FERC also recommended that LNG operators provide 
additional staff to supplement the coast guard and local government security 
forces. Additionally, FERC will not approve any facility security plan unless the 
LNG operator has a security arrangement with the local government and the 
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Coast Guard pertaining to the provision of adequate security resources 
supporting the facility security plan (Parfomak and Flynn 2005). 
Bajpai and Gupta (2007) recognised the threats to oil and gas infrastructure 
represented by  international terrorism. they noted that the biggest difference in 
performing RA following the 9/11 terrorist attacks is that high consequence-low 
frequency events cannot be neglected, and therefore the risk from intentional 
acts are considered both real and credible. 
The approach of this study tries to reduce both frequency and consequences 
from terrorist attack.  Although it highlighted the lack of exhaustive database on 
historical terrorist attacks on oil and gas facilities on the international arena, 
Bajpai and Gupta (2007) used a record of 90 incidents worldwide from Karmon 
(2002) concerning pipelines, oil and gas facilities and on personnel involved in 
the discovery, construction and exploitation of these resources for the period 
1980-2000. 
For Bajpai and Gupta (2007), security RA can be carried out qualitatively 
through the following methods: 
 Threat analysis (TA) 
 Vulnerability analysis (VA) 
 Security risk table  
TA is a study of all sources and types of threats and their likelihood (history of 
security incidents in and around the facility, intentions and motovations of 
adversaries, their capabilities, etc). To illustrate the TA, the authors provided a 
list of potential threats to oil and gas facilities and their transportation systems 
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(oil tankers, pipelines, etc), as well as a historical table showing the number of 
security incidents per region and per country, occured during 1980-2002, which 
was extracted from (Karmon 2002). 
VA involves identifying weaknesses in a system which can be exploited by 
adversaries. It identifies ways in which the credible threats selected in the TA 
could be realised. Since terrorists employ novel ways of attack, it is essential to 
be creative and imaginative in VA. The team that conducts VA should comprise 
of people from maintenance, production, management, safety, security, 
intelligence and law enforcement.  
 Bubbico et al. (2009) conducted a preliminary risk analysis of LNG carrier 
approaching the Italian terminal of Panigaglia. As stated earlier in section 3.1, 
since the required velocity to cause a breach of LNG cargo tank during 90° 
collision with a large vessel is 6 to 7 knots,  Bubbico et al. (2009) concluded that 
accidental collision of an LNG tanker with a small or large vessel cannot be 
excluded due to port congestion. Nevertheless, the low ship velocity when 
approaching the terminal makes such a collision unrealistic at 6-7 knots speed 
to open a breach in the cargo. Grounding cannot be excluded as well but 
generally does not result in LNG cargo breaches, especially at low speed. 
Therefore for Bubbico et al. (2009), the only plausible scenario for a severe 
breach of an LNG tanker’s tanks  is an intentional action against the tanker; 
such a case was investigated further using the consequence analysis 
technique. 
It should be noted that the possible final events and the impact zones calculated 
for the study case with a ‘‘basic’’ consequence software, such as ALOHA, 
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appear in substantial agreement with previous results from SANDIA (2004) and 
Fay (2003) based on more refined models, and well within the spread of 
experimental and calculated data available in the literature. 
The consequence analysis showed that no, or very marginal, involvement of the 
resident population has to be expected due mainly to the location of the LNG 
terminal which is relatively far away from the population’s residence areas. On 
the other hand, material as well as economic losses may occur, if the outer 
breakwater is damaged and/or the west passage is partially obstructed. 
Noting the scarcity of studies on port security risk assessment (RA) which can 
provide solutions to enhance the quality of security assessments, Yang et al. 
(2014) proposes a quantitative security risk analysis using fuzzy evidential 
reasoning (FER) approach. This approach is applied to quantify port facility 
security risks and to conduct the cost benefit analysis for the evaluation of 
RCOs. The study’s aim is to ensure that the Ports facility security Plans 
(PFSPs) under the ISPS security regime ‘are rational to the risks faced by ports 
and can be cost-effectively implemented by operators’ Yang et al. (2014). 
Given that rational risk analysis is difficult to achieve with often uncertain and 
incomplete qualitative data, the authors suggest standardizing the way expert 
opinion is used to complement the lack of objective security failure data. The 
FER approach is introduced in this perspective and provides a novel approach 
in quantitative Port Facility Security Risk Assessment (PFSA) which has the 
prospect of proactively enhancing the security of ports and maritime terminals. 
Due to its generic nature, this methodology can be applied to ports and marine 
terminals handling LNG. On a larger scale, Berle et al. (2013) analysed 
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vulnerability in the LNG maritime transportation systems using a formal 
vulnerability assessment approach (FVA). The study is an attempt to adapt FSA 
to maritime SC security. It can be considered both as a continuation and 
innovation in the global supply chain RM research domain initiated by the work 
of Manuj and Mentzer (2008), and the earlier contribution of Cranfield university  
to the field of supply chain RM (Cranfield, 2003). 
3.4  LNG PORT RISK MANAGEMENT AND QUALITY 
As stated earlier, freight transportation shifted its security focus from controlling 
theft and reducing contraband and stowaways before the 9/11 to fighting global 
terrorism. Lee and Wolfe (2003) asserted that terrorism has definitely 
transformed perceptions of security accross the SC. After Sept. 1, 2001, the 
highest-order definition of freight security changed from theft-proof to 
tamperproof. In this context, both government and the public at large are 
concerned with the potential of a terrorist attack against the maritime and port 
segment of  SC. the private sector as well is concerned about the costs of 
assuring security, and the possible disruptions associated with potential terrorist 
acts. Government and industry have both responded with proposals to create 
more confidence in the SC. However, some proposed measures, such as 
increased information sharing among SC partners, heightened inspection and 
scrutiny of goods,  can add cost, delays, and uncertainties in the SC. 
Furthermore, SC distruption from security breaches can be disastrous. It is very 
difficult to quantify the full direct, indirect cost, casualties, congestion and 
disruption to business from a temporary port closure following a terrorist attack 
(Lee and Whang 2005). 
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The private sector, especially SC professionals, are faced with a dilemma of 
how to improve security without jeopardising SC effectiveness. Lee and Wolfe 
(2003) explained that the answer may lie in the principles of the quality 
movement. For them, the quality movement of the 1970s and 1980s provides 
an instructive model for public and private business leaders as they develop a 
response to SC security challenge. The total quality principle teachings assert 
that decreasing production defects is possible without increasing costs. 
Therefore, strategies that both prevent and mitigate security breaches can be 
implemented while still delivering cost effective SC. The quality movement 
started with the recognition that defects can be very costly to a company. This 
provided a strong motivation for industry to become engaged in Total Quality 
Management (TQM), a process whereby the entire organisation,  its suppliers 
and in some cases, costomers have to work closely together in order to improve 
quality. Similarly, companies need to recognise the importance and significant 
cost of security issues and to engage all stakeholders in driving out security 
breaches. 
The first lesson from the quality movement is that quality should not rely on final 
product inspection since inspection does not improve quality, furthermore, 
inspection and screening is expensive and subject to errors. Therefore, in-
process control to ensure that the process is functioning and under control is 
much better than final product inspection. According to Lee and Whang (2005), 
a process that is out-of-control will produce many more non conforming items. 
Identifying the causes of non-conformities in the system and restoring it to its in-
control state and in a timely fashion will always improve quality. Secondly, 
quality assurance requires total organisational focus. Quality is not just the 
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responsibility of the quality control department or quality inspectors, but 
everyone’s responsibility. The third message is that prevention is always the 
prefered strategy. Hence, the goal should be to find the way that once 
something has gone wrong, it could be immediately identified and corrected so 
that it could never turn into a defect. Finally, quality should be designed in. 
Products are designed in a way so they are less likely to be built with defects. 
In recent decades, the quality movement has shifted from a focus on inspection 
to a focus on prevention. Prevention emphasises education, organisational 
collaboration, design improvement, process variation reduction and 
accountability of the total company (Lee and Whang 2005). In reality, many 
companies implemented the above principles and found out that it is possible to 
increase quality without increasing costs and geopradizing productivity.  
 
Figure 3.2 SC Security and Quality 
 
 
  Source: Lee and Wolfe (2003, p.14) 
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Although aknowledging that the added costs of security are far from trivial, Lee 
and Wolfe (2003) still believe that it is possible to implement important security 
improvements in ways that enhance SC productivity and effectiveness. The 
quality movement in particular offers models that can be effectively applied to 
SC security. Lee and Wolfe (2003) see in the security initiatives actually 
implemented, especially in the USA, such as inspecting products and 
containers at point of origin, using technology to automate the chain of custody, 
monitoring the process closely during transport and creating transparency and 
visibility across the SC and information rather than physical inspection, all these 
measures are in conformity with the principles of TQM. Lee and Whang (2005) 
confirmed this by stating that the key to sussess in SC security is to apply 
prevention, process control and the Six Sigma approach, initially developed for 
quality control.   
Figure 3.3 The Six Sigma cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Source: Lee and  Whang 
(2005, p. 293) 
 
 
Define: define what is to be measured, 
what the quality problems are, and how 
they could be identified. 
Measure: put in place a measurement 
system that would track and monitor the 
appropriate quality performance measures 
and provide visibility and access to key 
stakeholders. 
Analyse:  perform analysis of possible out-
of-control conditions and conduct a root 
cause diagnosis. 
Improve:  respond to identified problems 
by restoring the process to an in-control 
condition, and communicate decisions to 
stakeholders. 
Control: Eliminate the root cause if 
possible, reduce process variations, and 
make structural changes to the process so 
that chance for the out-of-control condition 
to occur again is minimised. 
 
Define 
Control Measure 
Improve Analyse 
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It should be noted that the Six Sigma steps: identify, assess and evaluate, 
mitigate, monitor and re-assess, are in fact similar to the general risk analysis 
paradigm followed by most known RA and management methods such as QRA 
and FSA. The same methodology is adopted by the recently released ISO 
28000-2007 series which provide specifications for security management 
systems for the SC. 
In the same way, Doak (2003) supported the new security approach and 
asserted that this is, in fact, not totally new: “Pre-inspections and key 
shipping/documentation information have always been sent well ahead for 
customs clearances and customer contract requirements. It made good 
business sense and is comparable to the emphasis on quality measures taken 
in the late seventies and eighties, with the focus on making it right first time” 
(Doak 2003). Commenting on industry complaints regarding the cost of 
compliance for security programs, Doak (2003) stated that executives did not 
argue with the costs for quality initiatives in the seventies and the eighties or 
with the recent Six Sigma programs. This is due to the fact that executives are 
realising that the long term benefits of quality far exceed the costs. He argues 
that a similar issue is happening to SC security. 
Similarily, safety risk management in the maritime and port industy has been 
moving towards the application of the principles of the TQM, although this has 
been slow and conservative. Such move was accelerated by the multiple 
maritime disasters which repeatedly called for the adoption of a proactive 
approach to risks while much of the maritime safety policy worldwide has been 
developed reactively in the aftermath of serious accidents such as theExxon 
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Valdez, the Estonia, the Erika and the Prestige. The IMO’s recent adoption of 
the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and the Goal- Based Standard (GBS) 
frameworks is considered a confirmation of  the move of the maritime industry  
towards a proactive approach to risks and vulnerabilities. 
Also, recent studies such as Nwaoha et al. (2011, 2013), Vanem et al. (2008) 
and Bubbico et al. (2009) have applied proactive approach by adopting robust 
quantitative and qualitative technics to proactively and integartively  assess 
risks and vulnerabilities in the LNG maritime and port systems. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Finally, it appears from the above review of literature that the subject of marine 
and port SCRM, as related to LNG transport and logistics has not yet been 
investigated thoroughly. The sparse existing literature on the subject is mostly 
published by professional bodies and rarely analyses the issue from a logistics 
and SC perspective. On one hand, most literature approaches the safety and 
security RM in isolation and on the other hand, the facility-security perspective 
prevails in most LNG port security studies instead of the SC perspective.  
However, recent papers have clearly indicated that LNG safety mitigation 
measures and safeguards are effective barriers to minimise the consequences 
of security risks in the event of intentional attacks on LNG facilities.  
It is believed that while risk assessment of LNG safety and security risks and 
hazards is moving in the right direction, little is done in the area of LNG ports 
risk management, especially the lack of a practical standard framework capable 
of applying integrated and holistic approach to risks and optimally managing the 
interfaces and shared impacts among safety and security risks in LNG ports.  
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It is noticed that LNG ports safety and security interfaces are still to be 
investigated. A thorough analysis and understanding of those interfaces will 
have a decisive impact on the optimal RM approach which can enable  effective 
protection of LNG ports SCs. The following table summarises the interfaces 
among safety and security RMs in LNG ports as discussed in the litterature 
reviewed  so far. 
Table 3.2 Safety and security interfaces in LNG ports 
Interfaces Safety Security 
RA - Consider security 
requirements; 
- Integrate security 
regulations and 
procedures 
 
- Consider safety 
requirements 
- LNG properties and 
hazards 
- LNG industrial processes 
- Integrate safety 
regulations and 
procedures 
 
RM - Review of security RCOs 
- Impact of those RCOs on 
the safety system; 
- Notify any malicious acts 
in the port; 
- Awareness of security 
operations in the port 
 
- Review of safety RCOs 
- Impact of those RCOs on 
the port security system 
- Notify any unsafe 
behaviour in the port  
- Awareness of safety 
operations and practices  
Emergency 
response 
- Communicate the safety 
ALARP level to be 
considered in the ERP 
Communicate the maritime 
security (MARSEC) levels to be 
considered in the ERP.  
Port recovery 
and business 
continuity 
- Build redundancy in each 
critical infrastructure of the 
LNG port system 
- Coordinate between 
emergency response and 
port management to bring 
the port back to operation 
in the minimium possible 
time  
Declare the port safe and 
secure for normal/ partial 
operation in an incident 
aftermath, in full coordination 
with safety department and the 
port authority. 
Source: The author 
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CHAPTER 4 
 INTERNATIONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY  
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its inception, the focus of the international community, including the LNG 
industry has been on ensuring safety along the LNG VC which means ensuring 
safer liquefaction and regasification plants, LNG storage tanks and pipelines, 
LNG export/import terminals and vessels and making sure that these are 
designed, constructed and operated to the highest standards. This is necessary 
to minimise risks to persons and damage to property and to the environment 
(Griffin, 2012). Also, since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, terrorism 
has been a potential source of concern to the LNG SC, including LNG ports and 
LNG ships. 
Although such risks are credible, the LNG industry has been successful, to a 
certain extent, in avoiding such risks and hazards and it still enjoys an enviable 
safety and security records with few incidents. Part of this success is 
attributable to the large armada of laws, regulations, standards, guidelines and 
industry best practices in place which have been developed, updated and 
implemented during the whole history of the LNG industry with a wide coverage 
of the whole LNG VC.  
This chapter reviews the international safety and security regulatory frameworks 
applicable to the design and operation of LNG vessels and onshore marine 
terminals as well as the international organisations and industry bodies which 
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have played an active role in the set up and development of such a rich safety 
and security legislative framework.  
LNG marine terminal facilities and tanker safety and security are subject to 
various international and national rules and regulations. These have been 
developed by both the LNG industry and international specialised bodies, such 
as the IMO. In today’s LNG business environment, some specialists believe that 
the more prominent role of the LNG spot market could potentially open up the 
LNG business to a greater safety risks as operators become more risk averse in 
order to meet schedules. Also there are increasing concerns that rapid 
expansion of the LNG fleet could lead to a shortage in skilled personnel (Griffin, 
2012). 
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Figure 4.1 Diagram showing the organisation and flow of the chapter 
 
Source: The Author 
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4.2 INTERNATIONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY REGULATORY BODIES 
With the UN system, the IMO is the UN specialised agency most active in 
promoting maritime conventions at an international level.  The Maritime Safety 
Committee is the IMO’s technical committee addressing safety at sea, including 
construction and equipment of ships, aids to navigation, prevention of collisions, 
safety procedures and requirements, the handling of dangerous cargoes and 
the safe manning of ships.   
IMO also adopts non-binding recommendations and codes of practices not 
suitable for regulation by formal treaty instrument (Griffin, 2012). 
Other non-governmental bodies have also a crucial role in the safe design, 
construction and operation of LNG vessels and marine terminals. These 
include: 
 The Society for International Gas Tankers and Terminal operators 
(SIGTTO); 
 The Oil Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF); 
 The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) 
 The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
 The World Shipping Council (WSC) 
 The International Navigation Association (INA) 
 
Among the above non-governmental organisations, SIGTTO is the industry 
leader in providing guidelines, recommendations and best practices to its 
members on matters related to safe handling and transportation of liquefied 
gases. Also, NFPA, although being a national American association, plays an 
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important international role in the development of codes and standards related 
to fire risks (Griffin, 2012). 
Ship classification societies, represented by IACS, have long influenced the 
safe design, construction, and maintenance of ship hull structures and essential 
shipboard engineering systems by setting industry standards through inspection 
and rating of ships for marine insurance and other purposes. Their work 
complements the IMO’s international treaties and conventions. The IACS and 
individual classification societies, such as Lloyd’s Register (Lloyd’s), have been 
proactive in enhancing LNG carrier safety, emphasising the need for 
incorporating risk analyses in shipping processes. Furthermore, IACS design 
guidelines for offshore LNG facilities fill a void created by the absence of 
specific governmental regulations (Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). 
Public concerns about LNG safety and security make RA and communication a 
critical part of the facility sitting process. LNG organisations routinely identify 
new risks and update their technical design standards and operating 
procedures to mitigate them. These recommended improvements are 
disseminated initially through organisations such as SIGTTO and IACS, but 
they eventually become requirements through international standards and 
government regulations. 
Regarding enforcement, international maritime laws and regulations are 
enforced and policed at the national level by the flag state and the coastal state 
(Flag State/ PSCs). Under the UNCLOS 1982, coastal states are allowed to 
legislate and enforce regulations to ensure safety of navigation within their 
respective territorial seas and EEZ.  Classification societies have also a crucial 
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role in this through policing the international law related to ships’ and maritime 
safety regulations (Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). The responsibilities to ensure 
that vessels comply with the provisions of the relevant regulations rest upon the 
owners, masters, the Flag States and the Classification societies. Unfortunately, 
some Flag States, for various reasons, fail to fulfill their internationally-agreed 
commitments and, consequently, some vessels are sailing the world’ seas in 
unsafe condition, threatening the lives of all those on board as well as the 
marine environment. Port State Control (PSC) is a system of harmonized 
inspection-procedures designed to target sub-standard vessels with the main 
objective being their eventual elimination. 
PSC process was quickly accelerated by a number of successive shipping 
accidents, especially the Amoco Cadiz disaster which triggered the 
promulgation of more stringent regulations on shipping safety; and gave birth to 
the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MOU) on PSC in Europe. This 
covered safety of life at sea, prevention of pollution from ships and the living 
and working conditions onboard.  
PSC is carried out by a PSC Officer (PSCO). The PSCO is a properly qualified 
person, authorised to carry out Port State Control inspections in accordance 
with MOU regulations by the maritime authority of the Port State and acts under 
its responsibility. A PSC Inspector will board a vessel without announcement 
and check primarily the ship’s documents for completeness and validity. If there 
are any grounds to believe that the ship is substantially not in compliance with 
the international conventions, the inspectors will carry out an “expanded 
inspection” of the ship’s condition and the required equipment. The ship master 
will receive an official inspection report consisting of Form A and B. Form A lists 
   
100 
 
the vessel’s details and the validity of the relevant certificates. Form B shows 
the list of “deficiencies” found, together with the action code which describes a 
time frame for rectification for each deficiency. If there is evidence that the 
vessel represents a hazard to safety and/or to environment, the PSCO has the 
right to detain the ship in port until the respective deficiencies are rectified. The 
PSC authority will either re-survey by its own inspectors or ask for a survey 
report from the classification surveyor to verify the rectification. It should be 
noted that all vessels made for international voyage are subject to PSC, 
including LNG tankers. At present, there are around 9 regional agreements on 
PSC representing the PSC regions around the world. In the Arabian Gulf, The 
Arabian Gulf Region includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Arab Emirates. 
 
In the following sections, international, regional and some domestic regulations 
related respectively to safety and security of LNG facilities design, construction 
and operation, will be presented and discussed. However, this overview will be 
limited only to regulations involving LNG ports and maritime terminals and 
tankers, including those general rules and regulations which are also applicable 
to LNG ports and vessels.   
4.3  SAFETY REGULATIONS 
As discussed earlier, the LNG industry is subject to the same hazard and safety 
requirements as any industrial activity. Risk mitigation systems must be in place 
and maintained at all time to mitigate and reduce risk to employees, 
communities, infrastructure and facilities, and to the surrounding environment.  
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In this respect, LNG industry must conform to relevant international, national 
and local regulations, standards and codes as is the case for any process 
industry. 
Beyond routine industrial safety considerations, LNG presents specific safety 
requirements related to the nature of LNG and its intrinsic properties as a 
hazardous material. Generally, LNG facilities are subject to multiple layers of 
protection which create four (4) essential safety requirements, all of which are 
integrated within an effective combination of industry standards and regulations.    
According to CEE (2006), ‘industry standards are written to guide industry and 
also to enable public officials to more efficiently evaluate safety, security and 
environmental impacts of LNG facilities and industry activities. Regulatory 
compliance should ensure transparency and accountability in the public domain’  
The four essential safety requirements discussed earlier in chapter 2 for 
instance primary containment, secondary containment, safeguards systems and 
separation distance, apply to all LNG fixed and movable assets and facilities 
across the LNG VC such as LNG production, liquefaction, loading/ unloading 
terminal facilities, LNG tanker, storage and re-gasification plants. 
Industry standards are the appropriate operating and maintenance procedures 
of any industrial system which should be put in place with an assurance that 
these are adhered to and that relevant personnel are appropriately trained to 
implement and apply them on a regular basis. LNG safety regulations concern 
also onshore industrial processes as well as technical maritime activities 
pertaining to tanker design and equipment, tanker manning and operation, 
tanker navigation safety and the ship/ port interface.  All such regulations and 
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standards are jointly and cooperatively developed by the LNG industry 
(SIGTTO, OCIMF...etc.) and the IMO, ILO...etc.  
4.3.1 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
LNG transportation by sea is internationally regulated through international 
maritime conventions and treaties developed and enacted by IMO in 
collaboration with the industry.  
Safety related risks have been addressed cooperatively by both the IMO and 
the LNG industry since inception of the latter, mostly as a response to early 
incidents involving gas carriers and LNG terminals. 
Earlier in chapter 2, the types of LNG tanker designs as well as their safety 
features were presented and discussed in detail. The ships’ safety systems are 
divided into ship handling and cargo handling systems. The ship handling safety 
features, similar to any other international seagoing ship, include sophisticated 
navigation radars and GPS systems that alert the crew to other traffic and 
hazards in the ships’ surroundings. Also, distress systems and beacons 
automatically send signals in case the ship is in difficulty. Such distress systems 
are also common to all ships engaged in international voyage.  
The cargo safety system features include an extensive instrumentation package 
that safely shuts down the LNG handling system (ESD systems) if it starts to 
operate outside the normal working parameters. Moreover, LNG tankers are 
equipped with gas and fire detectors capable of detecting any abnormal gas 
leak and resulting fire.  
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LNG tankers are subject to a number of safety standards and codes, some are 
applicable to all international seagoing ships and others are specific to LNG 
vessels.  LNG tankers are subject to the following IMO safety standards: 
 
 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, (SOLAS 
Convention) and its amendments. 
The first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914 in response to the Titanic 
disaster, the second in 1929, the third in 1948, and the fourth in 1960. The 1960 
Convention, which was adopted on 17 June 1960 and entered into force on 26 
May 1965, was the first major task for IMO after the Organisation's creation and 
represented a considerable step forward in modernising regulations and in 
keeping pace with technical developments in the shipping industry. The 
objective was to keep the Convention updated by periodic amendments but in 
practice the amendments procedure proved to be very slow, to the extent that it 
appeared practically impossible to secure the entry into force of the convention 
amendments within a reasonable period of time. 
As a result, a new Convention was adopted in 1974 which included not only the 
amendments agreed upon until that date but a new amendment procedure - the 
tacit acceptance procedure - designed to ensure that changes could be made 
within a specified (and acceptably short) period of time. The 1974 convention 
entered into force on 25th May 1980.The SOLAS Convention and its 
amendments are generally regarded as the most important of all international 
treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships. It provides, among others, that 
the ship should be designed, constructed, maintained and operated in full 
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compliance with the structural, mechanical and electrical requirements of a 
recognised classification society (Griffin, 2012). 
The SOLAS Convention covered all essential measures to be taken on board 
during emergency situations. These measures, applicable to all seagoing ships, 
concern the necessity to carry on board a sufficient number of lifeboats and the 
necessary communication means for distress alert, procedures and training for 
emergency evacuation and the necessity for the ship to continuously monitor 
radio frequencies dedicated to distress calls. SOLAS also stipulated certain 
requirements related to the stability of passenger ships in both normal and 
damaged conditions (known as intact stability and damage stability). These 
requirements were extended to LNG ships. Other areas covered by SOLAS 
include fire protection, detection and extinction; design of life saving appliances; 
and conditions associated with the carriage of dangerous goods. 
Of particular significance to LNG ships is Chapter V, regulation 22 (Navigation 
Bridge Visibility) which sets requirements for achieving good visibility from a 
bridge of a ship, including specifications for the field of vision from various 
positions. The elevated level of LNG cargo tanks and associated accessories 
poses a challenge to naval architects in complying with the visibility regulations. 
This issue is accentuated with the existence in certain ports of low bridges 
crossing port channels. As a result, LNG tankers designed to comply with 
navigation safety regulations cannot access certain ports where access 
channels are crossed by low bridges.   It is worth mentioning that the provisions 
of SOLAS constitute an important part of the international maritime law 
controlled and policed under the PSC inspections. 
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 The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREG), 1972 
The 1972 COLREG Convention was designed to update and replace the 
Collision Regulations of 1960 which were adopted at the same time as the 
1960 SOLAS Convention. One of the most important innovations in the 
1972 COLREGs was the recognition given to traffic separation schemes - 
Rule 10 which gives guidance in determining safe speed, the risk of collision 
and the conduct of vessels operating in or near traffic separation schemes 
(IMO, 2012). 
The first such traffic separation scheme was established in the Dover Strait 
in 1967. It was operated on a voluntary basis at first, but in 1971 the IMO 
Assembly adopted a resolution stating that observance of all traffic 
separation schemes is made mandatory - and the COLREGs make this 
obligation clear. 
The COLREGs include 38 rules divided into five sections: Part A - General; 
Part B - Steering and Sailing; Part C - Lights and Shapes; Part D - Sound 
and Light signals; and Part E - Exemptions. There are also four Annexes 
containing technical requirements concerning lights and shapes and their 
positioning; sound signalling appliances; additional signals for fishing 
vessels when operating in close proximity, and international distress signals 
(IMO, 2012). 
 The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978 
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The 1978 STCW Convention was the first to establish basic requirements on 
training, certification and watch keeping for seafarers on an international 
level. Previously the standards of training, certification and watch keeping of 
officers and ratings were established differently by individual governments, 
usually without international reference. As a result standards and 
procedures varied widely in shipping, an industry known to be the most 
international of all industries. The Convention, which entered into force on 
28 April 1984, prescribes minimum standards relating to training, certification 
and watch keeping for seafarers which countries are obliged to meet or 
exceed (IMO, 2012). 
The Convention did not deal with manning levels: IMO provisions in this area 
are covered by a regulation in Chapter V of SOLAS, whose requirements 
are backed up by resolution A.890 (21) Principles of safe manning, adopted 
by IMO in 1999. 
The Articles of the Convention include requirements relating to issues 
surrounding certification and PSC. One especially important feature of the 
Convention is that it applies to ships of non-party States when visiting ports 
of States which are Parties to the Convention. Article X requires Parties to 
apply the control measures to ships of all flags to the extent necessary to 
ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the 
flag of a State which is not a Party than is given to ships entitled to fly the 
flag of a State that is a Party.  
The difficulties which could arise for ships of States which are not Parties to 
the Convention are one reason why the Convention has received such wide 
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acceptance. By December 2000, the STCW Convention had 135 Parties, 
representing 97.53% of world shipping (IMO, 2012). 
According to (IMO, 2012), The STCW convention and its code were 
amended several times since their promulgation in 1974.  A summary of 
these amendments can be found in Appendix 2. 
 The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code.  
The IMDG Code is accepted as an international guideline to the safe 
transportation or shipment of dangerous goods or hazardous materials by ships 
including LNG. It is intended to protect crew members and to prevent marine 
pollution in the safe marine transportation of hazardous materials. It is 
recommended to governments for adoption or for use as the basis for national 
regulations. Class 2 of the code concern the handling of gases transported in 
bulk, including LNG. 
The implementation of the Code is mandatory in conjunction with the obligations 
of the members of United Nation governments under the SOLAS and MARPOL 
Conventions. It is intended for use not only by the mariner but also by all those 
involved in industries and services connected with shipping, including, for 
example, dockers and port workers involved in the handling of dangerous 
materials.  It contains advice on terminology, packaging, labelling, placarding, 
markings, stowage, segregation, handling, and emergency response (IMO, 
2012). The code is updated and maintained by the MSC Sub-Committee of the 
IMO every 2 years.  
 The International Safety Management (ISM) Code: 
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The ISM code concerns  the safety of ships and the prevention of marine 
pollution by means of adequate ship management requirements which have to 
be met by ships and shipping companies on a yearly basis. It provides an 
International standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for 
pollution prevention. The purpose of the ISM Code is: 
 To ensure Safety at Sea 
 To prevent human injury or loss of life 
 To avoid damage to the environment and to the ship. 
SOLAS adopted the ISM Code in 1994 and incorporated it into chapter IX. By 
2002 almost all of the international shipping community was required to comply 
with the ISM Code. In order to comply with the ISM Code, each ship class must 
have an adequate Safety Management System (SMS). Another requirement of 
the ISM Code is for the ship to be maintained in conformity with the provisions 
of relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which 
may be established by the Company. 
Each ISM compliant ship is audited, first by the Company (internal audit) and 
then each 3 years by the Flag State’s Maritime Administration (MARAD) to 
verify the fulfilment and effectiveness of their Safety Management System. 
Once SMS is verified to be effectively implemented, the ship is issued with The 
Safety Management Certificate.  
 The International Code for the Construction and Equipment of 
Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk, (IGC Code).  
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It is the most significant IMO regulation specifically related to LNG ships. The 
IGC Code was developed by IMO to provide an international standard for the 
safe carriage by sea of liquefied gases and other substances, by prescribing the 
design and construction standards of ships involved in such carriage and the 
equipment they should be fitted with so as to minimize the risk to the ship, to its 
crew and to the environment. LNG vessels are also required to apply specific 
provisions regulating their construction and equipment contained in the IGC 
code. The code applies to gas carriers constructed on or after July 1st, 1986. 
Classification societies have incorporated the code into their rules pertaining to 
the design and construction of gas tankers (Griffin, 2012). 
In addition to the above code, there are two additional gas codes, namely: 
 The Code for existing ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (Existing 
Ship Code-IMO) 
 The Code of Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied 
Gases in Bulk (The GC Code-IMO). 
The regulations for the design and construction of gas carriers stem from 
practical ship designs codified by the IMO. All new ships (from June 1986) are 
built to the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships 
Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (the IGC Code). This code also defines cargo 
properties and documentation provided to the ship (the Certificate of Fitness for 
the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk), shows the cargo grades the ship can 
carry. In particular this takes into account temperature limitations imposed by 
the metallurgical properties of the materials from which the containment and 
piping systems are made. It also takes into account the reactions between 
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various gases and the elements of construction not only on tanks but also 
related to pipeline and valve fittings.  
When the IGC Code was produced, an intermediate code was also developed 
by the IMO - the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying 
Liquefied Gases in Bulk (the GC Code). This covers ships built between 1977 
and 1986. (UK-P&I Club, 2002) 
It should be noted that gas carriers were in existence before IMO codification 
and ships built before 1977 are defined as ‘existing ships’ within the meaning of 
the rules. To cover these ships, a voluntary code was produced by the IMO – 
the Code for Existing Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (the Existing Ship 
Code). Despite its voluntary status, almost all ships remaining in the fleet of this 
age have certification in accordance with the Existing Ship Code. This mainly to 
safeguard international chartering opportunities which otherwise would be 
severely compromised (UK-P&I Club, 2002). 
The above three codes are applied by the gas industry in addition to regulations 
and a survey cycle of operational fitness applied to other sectors of the shipping 
industry and which provide a solid base for safety of LNG shipping (Walkeret all,  
2003). 
Also, LNG industry organisations such as SIGTTO, OCIMF and the 
classification societies have been active in setting up standards and industry 
best practice related to LNG tanker safety, design, construction and operation. 
A sample of such standards and industry best practices include: 
 SIGTTO Tanker Safety Training for Liquefied Gas, 2007: This is a 
completely new guide for Liquefied Gas Carriers., covering the IMO 
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specialised level course (Model 1.06) for ships' officers serving on both LNG 
and LPG carriers.   
 SIGTTO Passage Planning Guide. Malacca & Singapore Straits, (3rd 
Edition) 2011. 
 SIGTTO Liquefied Gases Marine Transportation and Storage, Edition 2000. 
 Manifold Recommendations for Liquefied Gas Carriers, 2d Edition: These 
recommendations have been developed in conjunction with OCIMF to 
present a unified document on manifold arrangements and strainer 
guidelines for LPG and LNG carriers. The aim is to promote improved 
safety and efficiency in operations and assists in planning the position of 
loading and discharging facilities in new jetties (Witherby Seamanship, 
2011).   
Modern LNG marine terminals incorporate numerous safeguards in the design, 
construction and operation of the facility and employ state-of-the-art technology. 
For instance, most projects use a full containment engineering design for 
onshore and offshore tanks. Full containment means that the LNG storage 
tanks are double-walled, which is basically a tank inside a tank (CEE, 2006). 
The outer tank is made of pre-stressed concrete. The inner tank is specially 
designed to hold the cryogenic liquid and will consist of high-alloy steels with 
nine percent nickel. The space between the tank shells is filled with insulation 
material. Full containment tanks are designed so that if the inner tank fails, the 
outer tank is capable of safely containing the existing amount of LNG. 
 As discussed earlier, LNG carriers also use a double-hull design for enhanced 
safety. LNG tanks are constructed of either stainless steel or aluminium. They 
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are heavily insulated to protect the steel hull from cold and to maintain the LNG 
cargo at its low temperature. The area between the inner hull and the LNG 
tanks is filled with a nitrogen gas blanket that is permanently monitored for gas 
leakage through gas detectors. 
LNG facilities also include high-tech gas detection systems to rapidly identify 
even the slightest break in containment, as well as shut-off valves to 
immediately prevent leaks and spills in the improbable case of tank failure. 
Safety of LNG import/ export terminals is ensured through an adequate mix of 
industry standard procedures, regulations and advanced technology. Such 
safety measures are incorporated from inception of the terminal project at the 
design stage and during construction and commissioning. Other operating 
standards are applied during the operation stage of the terminal to safeguard 
the onshore terminal facilities and employees as well as the tankers alongside 
and the surrounding environment. 
There are non-port specific regulations and standards, most of them marine 
standards regulating ships, ships’ safe manning, safe navigation and safe 
carriage of goods by sea. Most of the aforementioned international standards 
deal also with ships while at transit at ports. All aforementioned regulations 
mention indirectly the port, berths and their navigable waters in connection with 
the navigation and safety of ships. 
Since LNG ports and marine terminals are located in territorial waters, they are 
not subject to international conventions in the same way as the case of vessels. 
Generally LNG port facilities are regulated by country specific national laws and 
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regulations pertaining to the transportation and handling of hydrocarbon and 
Hazmat products (Griffin, 2012). 
In this respect, each country has got its own standards for the design and 
construction of LNG marine terminal facilities. Also, LNG industry organisations 
such as SIGTTO, OCIMF and the International Group of LNG Importers (GIIGN) 
have been active in setting up standards and industry best practice related to 
LNG terminal safety, design, construction and operation. A sample of such 
standards and industry best practices includes: 
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF): Safety Guide for 
Terminals Handling Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS): Ship/Shore Check List and 
Guidelines London, 1982. 
Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) 
 A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine Terminals Handling Liquefied 
Gases in Bulk, SIGTTO. 2d edition 2001. 
 A Guide to Contingency Planning for the Gas Carrier alongside and Within 
Port Limits, SIGTTO. 3rd edition, 1999 
 A Contingency Planning and Crew Response Guide for Gas Carriers 
Damage at Sea and in Port Approaches. 
 Liquefied Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals 3rd Ed. 1999 
World Bank Group: Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Ports, 
Harbors, and Terminals, 2007 
World Bank Group:  Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines for LNG 
Facilities, 2007 
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It is also important to note that due to lack of international harmonized 
standards, the International Standard Organisation (ISO) formed an 
international working group in 2006 called TC 67 Work Group 10: 
’Standardisation for Installations and Equipment for LNG, Excluding 
product or Testing’. The group’s objective and scope of work include 
compatibility and harmonisation of LNG codes, adopted by individual countries, 
to bring them to an international standard level. This shall allow a significant 
reduction of the large number of various companies, industry, national, and 
regional standards in use today with significant cost savings to the industry 
(GIIGNL, 2009). 
Standards development bodies (SDBs) such as API have offered to ISO/TC 67 
a number of Specifications, Standards and Recommended Practices as basis 
for new international standards. Individual work group experts have contributed 
with specifications, technical reports etc. The new international standards are 
therefore based on a wide range of relevant documents. 
SDBs seek to influence the new international standards so they are suitable for 
use locally and in businesses around the world. The standards are built by the 
consensus process which is vital for the success of any international standard. 
At the end of the process, the standards are voted to become ISO standards 
according to the rules of ISO. This process will yield international standards 
which are further developed than its base documents (Griffin, 2012). 
Only one set of international materials and equipment standards are required 
for the oil and gas industry. Regional standards may continue to be in effect due 
to regulatory issues. Naturally each standard could include various performance 
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and quality levels, regional variations etc. to meet the wide ranging needs of the 
industry. National standard organisations may import the international standards 
into their own national documents to make these international standards 
available on a national basis. 
The key to success of this worldwide oil and gas standardisation effort is one 
set of good and usable international standards, that have been developed 
through consensus building, and which meet the worldwide needs of the 
industry. 
Another working group has been formed under the ISO Technical Committee 67 
working Group 11 (ISO TC 67 WG 11). ISO Technical Committee (TC) 67 
covers materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, 
petrochemical and natural gas industries, while Working Group (WG) 11 
focuses on the coating and lining of structures and equipment. Qatar is the chair 
and hosts the secretariat of ISO TC 67 WG 11. The first meeting of WG11 was 
held recently in Doha under Qatar Petroleum’s HSE Regulations and 
Enforcement Directorate. The first project of the working group is the 
development of a new standard on ‘Coating and Lining of Internal Surfaces of 
Above-Ground Storage Tanks’. This international standard will establish the 
international requirements for corrosion mitigation of internal surfaces of the 
steel storage tanks used in the petroleum industry. The meeting was attended 
by coating experts from member countries of the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (Witherby Seamanship, 2011). 
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4.3.2 REGIONAL AND NATIONAL SAFETY REGULATIONS 
o European standards 
In Europe, project applicant for import terminal is required to conduct a safety 
RA according to the European standard for Quantitative RA (QRA), and submit 
the results of these QRA studies to the permitting agency for review and 
approval. The most important European legislation in this regards is the 
European directive 96/82/EC (SEVESO II) which aims at preventing major 
accidents involving dangerous substances, including LNG, and the limitation of 
their consequences. The provisions of this directive were developed on the 
basis of a fundamental review of the directive 82/501/EEC (SEVESO I). One of 
the main areas revised is the management policies and systems which were 
found to be responsible for 85% of the accidents reported. SEVESO II sets 
basic principles and requirements for policies and management systems 
enhancing the prevention, control and mitigation of major accidents (GIIGNL, 
2009). 
 EN 1473 - The European Norm standard EN 1473 Installation and 
equipment for LNG - Design of onshore installations evolved out of the 
British Standard, BS 777743 in 1996. It is a standard for the design of 
onshore LNG terminals. This standard is not prescriptive but promotes a 
risk-based approach for the design of onshore LNG facilities. A risk- 
based approach starts with the assessment of the likelihood of risk 
occurrence or failure and how such risk probability can be best reduced 
by mitigating factors; consequences are then measured relative to the 
level of mitigated risk (CEE, 2012). 
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 EN 1160 – Installation and equipment for LNG – General Characteristics 
of LNG contains guidance on properties of materials commonly found in LNG 
facility that may come into contact with LNG. 
 EEMUA 14744 - Recommendations for the design and construction of 
refrigerated liquefied gas storage tanks. This contains basic 
recommendations for the design and construction of single, double and 
full containment tanks for the bulk storage of refrigerated liquefied gases 
covering the use of both metal and concrete materials (CEE, 2006). 
 EN 13565 - Fixed firefighting systems – foam systems 
 Part 1: Requirements and test methods for components 
 Part 2: Design, construction and maintenance. 
 
o U.K HSE regulations 
According to Griffin ( 2012), no specific government permit is required to 
construct and operate LNG facilities in the UK. However, owners and operators 
of such facilities shall comply with relevent planning and HSE regulations. The 
primary responsibility for safety lies with the operator of the LNG terminal, who 
has to ensure that the terminal is designed and constructed, then operated 
safely (UK-HSE, 2013). 
In this regards, planning permissions are required pursuant to the Planning Act 
2008.The hazardous substances consent for the storage of LNG exceeding a 
threshold quantity of 15 tonnes must be acquired from the relevant local 
planning authority dealing with hazardous substances consents as per the 
Planning Regulations of 1992 (Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). 
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All companies wishing to construct and hold stocks of hazardous substances 
including LNG must apply to the Hazardous Substances Authority (HSA) which 
is usually the local planning authority. HSA has to consult eleven organisations, 
including HSE, about the advisability of locating a hazardous substance 
establishment in the location chosen by the investor. The HSE role is to assess 
the risks based on the plant particulars and features which have impact on the 
risk to people and which may need to become conditions of consent. HSE 
advises on health and safety under the Health and Safety at Work Act; while the 
scope of planning legislation is the responsibility of the hazardous substance 
authority (HSA) (UK-HSE, 2013). 
Therefore, among other governmental organisations, HSE provides advice on 
health and safety related issues to the HAS and may advise that consent be 
granted subject to certain health and safety conditions. In most cases, HSE sets 
a consultation zone around the site so that for any future proposed development 
within that zone, HSE must be consulted to provide its technical opinion about 
the adequacy of locating particular developments in that zone. The planning 
permissions described above are separate from the hazardous substance 
consent. All of them relates to the land use planning process (pre-operation 
stage of the project) however, effective plant operations safety is achieved 
primarily through the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 
(COMAH) (Garry, Weems, & King, 2012).  
a) Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH) 
COMAH are the principal legislation covering LNG establishments. Their aim is 
to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances and to limit their 
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consequences to people and the environment.COMAH regulations cover the 
unloading equipment at the jetty, the site itself, and the LNG facilities behind the 
jetty up to the national gas transmission system, including the storage tanks, the 
re-gasification plant and the transmission pipeline.  Dangerous substances on 
the ship are not covered by COMAH but are subject to the Dangerous 
Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987.The COMAH regulations are 
enforced jointly in England and Wales by a Competent Authority (CA) 
comprising the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency 
(EA), while in Scotland; CA is composed of the HSE and the Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency. In the case of LNG establishments HSE is 
the lead authority (UK-HSE, 2013). 
Any LNG facilities developer is required to submit to CA a pre-construction 
safety report (PCSR) which should demonstrate and ensure that safety is 
considered fully at the design stage. The CA shall examine the PCSR to make 
sure sufficient and adequate safety precautions have been incorporated into the 
design which shall ensure the risk to be reduced to the ALARP level. 
Construction cannot proceed until CA has concluded its review. Regular 
inspections are made during construction to ensure compliance with the PSCR 
(Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). 
The developer is then required to submit a pre-operations safety report (POSR) 
prior to the commissioning of LNG facilities. This report must prove that all 
safety measures are provided for to prevent major accidents and that risk from 
the operations of the plant is kept to the ALARP level. Operations cannot start 
until the POSR report is approved.   
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Prior to plant commissioning, the operator is also required, under the COMAH 
regulations, to submit an emergency plan related to incidents control 
minimisingrisk effects to persons and the environment (UK-HSE, 2013). 
Since the Department of Transport (DoT) is the responsible party for the 
carriage of dangerous substances by sea, the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) is delegated to support DoT in ensuring enforcement and compliance 
with statutory maritime safety regulations. In this respect, the Marine Safety 
Code along with the Guide to Good Practice on Port Marine Operations, 
published by DoT, defines the duties of the port authorities and how they can 
best fulfil such duties. Compliance with such regulations at the port level is 
monitored by the Maritime Coast Guard (Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). 
Regarding LNG operations such as carriage, loading, unloading and storage of 
LNG in harbour areas, these are controlled under the Dangerous Substances in 
Harbour Areas Regulations 1987. Such regulations confer to the HSE the 
responsibility for their enforcementaccording to the Health and Safety at Work 
Act; while statutory harbour authorities are still responsible for maritime 
navigation safety and the fitness and seaworthiness of vessels, including LNG 
tankers. 
b) The Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 
Under the above regulations, pipeline operators are entitled to notify the HSE of 
any new pipeline planned to be constructed to connect to the national gas 
transmission grid. HSE shall assess and inspect the pipeline’s design, 
construction and operations. 
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o The U.S regulations 
The following are the main U.S standards regulating LNG facilities design, 
sitting and operations, including LNG import/ export terminals: 
 49CFR Part 193 LNG Facilities: Federal Safety Standards- This section 
covers sitting requirements, design, construction, equipment, operations, 
maintenance, personnel qualifications and training, fire protection, and 
security. 
 33CFR Part 127 Waterfront Facilities Handling LNG and Liquefied 
Hazardous Gas - This federal regulation governs import and export LNG 
facilities or other waterfront facilities handling LNG. Its jurisdiction runs from 
the unloading arms to the first valve outside the LNG tank which covers the 
LNG peers from the berth all the way to the LNG storage tanks at the tank 
farm. 
 NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of LNG 
(LNG) – This is an industry standard issued by the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA). NFPA 59A which covers general LNG facility 
considerations, process systems, stationary LNG storage containers, 
vaporization facilities, piping systems and components, instrumentation and 
electrical services, transfers of natural gas and refrigerants, fire protection, 
safety and security. It also mandates alternative requirements for vehicle 
fueling for industrial and commercial facilities using American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) pressure vessel containers. This standard 
includes requirements for LNG facilities to withstand substantial 
earthquakes. The NFPA standard for level of design means that the LNG 
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facilities are strongly fortified for other events such as wind, flood, 
earthquakes and blasts. The latest update of NFPA 59A was published in 
2001. 
 NFPA 11 Standard for low, medium and high expansion foam. 
 NFPA 17 Standard for dry chemical extinguishing systems. 
Regulations applicable to LNG ships include: 
 33 CFR 160.101 Ports and Waterways Safety: Control of Vessel and Facility 
Operations. This U.S. federal government regulation describes the authority 
exercised by District Commanders and Captains of the Ports to ensure the 
safety of vessels and waterfront facilities, and the protection of the navigable 
waters and the resources therein. The controls described in this subpart are 
directed to specific situations and hazards. 
 33 CFR 165.20 Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Areas: 
Safety zones. A safety zone is a water area, shore area, or water and shore 
area to which, for safety or environmental purposes, access is limited to 
authorized persons, vehicles, or vessels. It may be stationary and described 
by fixed limits, or described as a zone around a vessel in motion. It is 
commonly used for ships carrying flammable or toxic cargoes, fireworks 
barges, and long tows by tugs, or events like high speed races. 
 33 CFR 165.30 Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Area: 
Security Zones. This section defines a security zone as an area of land, 
water, or land and water that is so designated by the Captain of the Port or 
District Commander for such time as is necessary to prevent damage or 
injury to any vessel or waterfront facility, to safeguard ports, harbors, 
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territories, or waters of the United States. It also determines the purpose of a 
security zone to safeguard vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities 
from destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, 
accidents, or other causes of a similar nature in the United States. 
Generally, it covers ships with flammable or toxic cargoes, cruise ships, 
naval ships, and nuclear power facilities and airports (CEE, 2006). 
As can be noticed from the above, U.S. regulations generally cover the 
prevention and mitigation of events derived from both safety accidents and 
security acts of sabotage or terrorism in an integrated regulatory framework. 
4.4  SECURITY REGULATIONS 
4.4.1 International Standards 
Since September 2001, the threat to the international transport systems has 
changed due to the widespread and impact of international terrorism. The 
international maritime community, represented by the IMO, has responded to 
such threat by developing the Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS 
Code), along with the introduction of other amendments to the SOLAS 
convention. The IMO conference adopted the ISPS Code and the SOLAS 
amendments in December 2002 and they entered into force on July 1, 2004 
(McNicholas, 2008). Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 and the ISPS Code apply to 
ships and port facilities. The extension of SOLAS 74 to cover port facilities was 
agreed to be the speediest means of ensuring the necessary security measures 
entered into force and given effect quickly (IMO, 2003). It should be noted that 
the provisions related to port facilities under the SOLAS extension should relate 
only to the ship/port interface. The wider scope of the security of port areas was 
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agreed to be covered under another instrument which shall be enacted jointly 
by IMO and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). That’s what was 
multilaterally endorsed in 2003 as the IMO/ILO code of practice (COP) on 
security in ports. 
This COP is intended to be compatible with the provisions of SOLAS, the ISPS 
Code and resolutions adopted by the 2002 SOLAS Conference. The COP is not 
intended to replace the ISPS Code; it extends the consideration of port security 
beyond the area of the port facility into the whole port. Also, measures proposed 
within the COP will apply to the entire port, including port facilities, as defined in 
the ISPS Code; however, they should not replace the security measures in 
place within the port facility.  
 
a) The ISPS Code 
This code does not deal specifically with LNG terminals and tankers but has got 
a wider scope relating to all ports serving ships of 500 GRT and above, and to 
passenger and cargo vessels at ports engaged in international trade. As stated 
in IMO (2003), ‘the objectives of this Code is to establish an international 
framework involving co-operation between Contracting Governments, 
Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port 
industries to: 
 detect/ assess security threats and take preventive measures against 
security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade; 
 to establish the respective roles  and responsibilities of all these parties 
concerned at the national and international level, for ensuring maritime 
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security, to ensure the early and efficient collation and exchange of security 
related information; 
 to provide a methodology for security assessments  so as to have in place 
plans and procedures to react to changing security levels; 
 and to ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security 
measures are in place’ (IMO, 2003). 
It should be noted that the security threats addressed under the present code 
are not just terrorism related, but include also stowaways, piracy, drug and 
contraband smuggling, sabotage, hijacking, cargo tempering, hostage-taking, 
vandalism, the use of the vessel to carry perpetrators and their equipment, and 
the use of a vessel as weapon (McNicholas, 2008). 
Under the ISPS Code, each vessel/ port facility must possesses and carry on-
board a ship security plan (SSP), approved by the relevant authority, specifying 
access control measures, security measures for cargo handling and ships’ 
stores, surveillance and monitoring, security communication, incident 
procedures and training and drills requirements (Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). 
Furthermore, each ship-owner company must appoint a ship security officer 
(SSO) responsible for the implementation, periodic review and updating of the 
SSP, as well as a company security officer who should be part of the company’s 
shore side management. His role is to monitor and arrange for audits related to 
the implementation of the SSP.    
The ISPS Code contains detailed security requirements for governments, port 
authorities and shipping companies under a mandatory section (Part A), 
together with a series of guidelines and recommendations on how to meet Part 
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A requirements and those of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 in a voluntary section (Part 
B). The code sets three maritime security (MARSEC) levels ranging from 
low/normal (1) to high (3) proportional to the nature and scope of the incident or 
perceived security threat. 
b) Amendments to SOLAS 
IMO recognised the need for the 1974 SOLAS convention to be amended to 
provide for fast-track enactment and implementation median as well as 
technical and policy guidance for the ISPS code.  The main amendments 
concerned changes in some existing regulations (regulation 19 of chapter V, 
regulations 3 and 5 of chapter XI-1) and the creation of a new chapter XI-2, 
titled ‘Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security’. This chapter provides 
definitions related to maritime security and incorporate within the convention 
key policies and requirements of Part A of the ISPS Code (McNicholas, 2008). 
c) The WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitates 
Global Trade   
The World Customs Organisation (WCO) framework of standards sets forth the 
principles and minimum standards to be adopted by customs agencies of the 
WCO member states in order to provide increased security to the global SC. 
Such initiative demonstrates the WCO belief that international trade is an 
essential driver of economic prosperity and that world customs agencies have a 
role to play in ensuring secured global trading system as an essential part of the 
global SC (McNicholas, 2008).      
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According to McNicholas (2008), the main objectives of the WCO framework 
are: 
 ‘Establish standards and provide SC security and facilitation at the global 
level to ascertain predictability and certainty; 
 Enable integrated SC management for all modes of transport; 
 Enhance the role, functions and capabilities of customs agencies to meet 
the challenges of the 21st century; 
 Strengthen cooperation among customs and businesses and between 
custom administrations to improve capabilities to detect high risk 
consignments; 
 Promote seamless movement of goods and secure international SC.’ 
WCO Framework has two pillars; each one defines technical policy-related 
procedures and standards: 
‘Pillar 1: Integrated SC management; cargo inspection authority; modern 
technology and inspection equipment; RM systems; high risk cargo or 
containers; advanced electronic information; targeting and 
communications; performance measures; security assessments; 
employee integrity; and outbound security inspections. 
Pillar 2: Partnership; security; authorisation; technology; 
communications; and facilitation’ (McNicholas, 2008). 
The WCO has been cooperating with the ISO organisation to establish 
standards to secure the global SC and provide step by step certification 
standard. The ISO has got many types of certifications and its cooperation work 
with WCO will go a long way towards progressively forcing SC security policies 
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and procedures through the whole cargo SC. The following section reviews and 
discusses some ISO SC security standards pertaining to the maritime SC.   
d) ISO Standards: 
 ISO/PAS 28000 Security Management Systems for SCs 
 
ISO 28000 is a security management standard for SCs. It was first published 
in 2005 as a Publically Available Specification (PAS). This 2007 version, 
published on 15 September 2007, replaces the 2005 edition and has a main 
purpose to help improve the security of SCs by helping organisations to 
protect people, products and property. ISO 28000 applies to all 
organisations as parts of SCs regardless of their size. It applies to airports, 
seaports, and terminals as well as to organisations that move products by 
air, sea, rail, or road. This standard concerns logistics, storage, 
transportation, and service companies as well as manufacturers, shippers, 
wholesalers, and distributors (Praxiom, 2012). 
ISO 28000 defines a set of security requirements and expects SC 
organisations to establish a security management system (SMS) that 
complies with these requirements. Such SMS is used to protect people, 
products, and property.By helping to establish and maintain a SMS, ISO 
28000 will help to improve the organisations’ overall security of SC and 
inspire the trust of its customers.  
According to Praxiom (2012), ‘Not only can ISO 28000 help you  
to preserve the integrity of your shipments and safeguard your customers’ 
valuable property, it can also help you to protect personnel. When properly 
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implemented, an ISO 28000 SMS will not only decrease disruptions and 
shorten transit times; it can also help you to reduce theft and combat 
smuggling, piracy, and terrorism.’ 
Since it is a generic security management standard, ISO 28000 helps 
organisations comply with national, regional and international security 
programs such as SOLAS requirements, the ISPS Code and the WCO 
frameworks.  
 ISO PAS 20858 provides recommendations regarding ISPS implementation 
on port facilities. 
 ISO 31000 is the latest ISO standard providing principles and generic 
guidelines on RM and released in October 2009.  
 
4.4.2  Regional and National Regulations 
The EU security regulations 
Prior to the IMO security framework being adopted, the majority of security 
actions and response measures put in place throughout the European Union 
were as a result of individual actions by EU Member States. These include 
measures to protect against terrorism in the maritime sector which vary 
significantly across the EU. Following adoption of the new IMO security regime, 
the EU Member States agreed the need for measures at Community level to 
achieve the community’s harmonised action. The adoption of Regulation (EC) 
No 725/2004 by the European Parliament and the Council on 31 March 2004 
was an important step towards this goal.  
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The followings are the main EU regulations related to maritime and port 
security: 
Regulation (EC) No725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security. The 
main objective of this Regulation is to implement Community measures for 
enhancing the security of ships through preventive measures to combat the 
threats of intentional unlawful acts, including terrorism, piracy and armed 
robbery at sea. The Regulation provides a basis for the harmonised 
interpretation and implementation and community monitoring of the IMO 
regulations which amended the 1974 SOLAS Convention and established the 
ISPS Code. The Regulation went further than the IMO regime (ISPS Code) by 
making compulsory a number of recommendations introduced into Part B of the 
ISPS Code (Butcher, 2011-p.8). 
Directive 2005/65/E: This Directive complements the security measures 
introduced by Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 by making an entire port subject to 
a security regime. In order to obtain maximum protection for maritime and port 
activities, measures should be taken that cover all ports within a perimeter 
defined by the Member State in question, thereby ensuring that security 
measures taken in accordance with the Regulation benefit from enhanced 
security within the areas of port activity. These measures should apply to all 
ports in which one or more port facilities covered under the Regulation are 
situated. The Directive also provides mechanisms for implementing these 
measures and checking their conformity. The Member States should have 
transposed this Directive by 15 June 2007 (Hellenic Shipping News, 2012). 
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The Directive adopted the same security levels stipulated by the ISPS Code, as 
per the perceived risk, namely: 
 Security level 1: minimum protective security measures must be maintained 
at all times;  
 Security level 2: appropriate additional protective security measures must 
be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of security 
incident; and  
 Security level 3: further specific protective security measures must be 
maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable, 
although it may not be possible to identify the specific target (Butcher, 2011-
p.10). 
European Commission Regulation (EC) No 324/2008 on procedures for 
conducting Commission inspections in the field of maritime security 
In order to monitor the application by Member States of EU legislation on 
maritime security, the Commission conducts inspections to verify the 
effectiveness of national quality control systems and maritime security 
measures, procedures and structures at each level of each Member State and 
of individual port facilities and relevant companies. The European Maritime 
Safety Agency (EMSA) participates in these inspections led by the 
Commission's services and provides the Commission with technical assistance 
in the performance of the inspection tasks in respect of ships, relevant 
companies and recognised security organisations. In accordance with Directive 
on port security, the Commission should monitor the implementation by Member 
States of the Directive jointly with the inspections provided for ships and port 
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facilities. The regulation adopted on 9 April 2008 lays down procedures for the 
monitoring by the Commission of the implementation of Directive 2005/65/EC 
jointly with the inspections at the level of Member States and port facilities 
(Hellenic Shipping News, 2012). 
Maritime Security Committee (MARSEC) 
The MARSEC is a regulatory committee established by virtue of Article 11 of 
Regulation (EC) No 725/2004. It assists the Commission with regard to its 
activities under Directive 2005/65/EC. The Regulatory Committee is chaired by 
the Commission and consists of experts representing all Member States. 
Periodical exchange of information between Member States and Norway and 
Iceland has taken place, as well as best practices and indications on national 
instructions. Most importantly, it was recently agreed to create a mechanism for 
securing mutual information where each Member State could inserts sensitive 
information i.e. security levels adopted, threat evaluations and others topics 
relevant to the security of European shipping (Europa, 2013). 
The UK security regulations 
According to Garry, Weems and King (2012), the transportation of dangerous 
goods in UK, including LNG, is the responsibility of the UK Department of 
Transport (DoT). For the case of sea transportation of dangerous goods, DoT 
has delegated such responsibility to the Maritime Coastguard Agency. The 
Coastguard’s power is derived from the Coastguard Act of 1925, the Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1995, and the Merchant Shipping and Maritime security Act of 
1997. 
   
133 
 
Following the promulgation of the ISPS Code at the European level, the 
maritime security regulation EC 725/2004 was adopted to enhance ship and 
port facility security and provide effect to the implementation of the ISPS code in 
EU member states. This regulation comes into force on May 19, 2004. (Garry, 
Weems, & King, 2012). 
Although the ISPS Code was legally put into effect in the UK the same date, 
amendment to the relevant UK legislation was required to make some 
provisions of the ISPS code fully effective. This was done through the ship and 
port facility security regulations 2004. These regulations designated the UK 
maritime competent authority for maritime and port security and the maritime 
security focal point for the IMO regime; established a monitoring regime for 
compliance with security regulations and the IMO security requirements; 
imposed criminal sanctions for unlawful presence in a security restricted area of 
a ship or port facility; and introduced requirements for ship detention and 
revocation notices following any failure to comply with security regulations 
(Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). 
The Department for Transport's Transport Security Directorate (Transec) has 
the authority to oversee and ensure compliance with the ISPS Code 
requirements by UK port facilities and UK flagged ships by the deadline of the 1 
July 2004. Transec has set a policy framework through which Transec is 
responsible for UK ports and passenger shipping, and the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA) has been delegated responsibility for non-
passenger shipping (Butcher, 2011). 
The U.S. security regulations 
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According to CRS (2009), the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) are the U.S. federal agencies 
primarily responsible for the regulation of onshore LNG facilities. 
Also, several federal agencies oversee LNG infrastructure security. Under the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard has lead 
responsibility for LNG shipping and marine terminal security and the security 
and accountability for Every Port Act of 2006. On October 13, 2006, the 
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347) was 
enacted. While not addressing LNG security specifically, the act includes 
general maritime security provisions which could apply to LNG vessels and 
facilities.  
The DOT’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) of the Department of Homeland security both have 
security authority for LNG storage plants within gas utilities. The Coast Guard, 
OPS and FERC cooperate in the sitting approval of new LNG facilities, 
inspection and operational review of existing facilities, informal communication, 
and dispute resolution (CRS, 2009). 
CEE, (2006) identified the following legal safety standards governing LNG 
terminal design and operation, as well as marine fleet construction and 
operation in the U.S.: 
a) 49 CFR Part 193- Federal Safety Standard which set requirements covering 
all LNG facilities from design to construction, equipment, operations, 
maintenance, personnel qualifications and training, fire protection and 
security. As it stands, this standard is comprehensive and regulates both fire 
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safety and security of LNG facilities from design all the way to construction 
and operation. 
b) 33CFR Part 127 - Waterfront Facilities handling LNG and Liquefied 
Hazardous Gas. This federal regulation covers all marine terminal 
import/export facilities from loading and /unloading arms to the valve outside 
the LNG tank. 
c) NFPA 59A - Standard for the production, storage and handling of LNG. This 
is a National Fire Protection Agency standard which covers the whole 
processes of general LNG facilities from production to liquefaction, storage, 
piping, instrumentation and electrical services, transfer of natural gas, fire 
protection, safety and security.  
d) NFPA 57 Standard for LNG vehicular Fuel Systems- Although this standard 
regulates mostly vehicle fuel system, its scope covers storage facilities of 
70.000 gallons of LNG and less. 
 
As asserted by Garry, Weems, & King, (2012), LNG ships are now subject to 
stringent security measures applicable under the Magnuson Act and the Ports 
and Waterways Safety Act. These measures include the following: 
 Special traffic control measures for the LNG vessels while in transit or 
approaching a US port. 
 Enforcement of security zones around the vessel to prevent other 
vessels from approach it; 
 Escort by US Coast Guard patrol craft; and 
   
136 
 
 Coordination with other federal and state law enforcement and /or 
emergency management agencies to reduce the risks to other port areas 
or infrastructure.  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, additional security measures were implemented, 
including the 96 hours advance notice of arrival for all ships calling U.S. ports, 
which was previously limited to 24 hours only. The U.S. Coast Guard shall 
conduct at sea boarding to ensure the vessel is under control while in transit at 
the U.S. port. 
Furthermore, the Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 aligns the U.S 
security legislation with the ISPS Code. This act applies to vessels, marine 
facilities and maritime personnel and extends the U.S. Coast Guard jurisdiction 
to 12 nautical miles from shore (Garry, Weems, & King, 2012). 
4.5  CONCLUSION 
From the above, LNG ports and maritime SC seems to be well regulated, either 
in the area of HSE or in security. LNG safety legislation is not new and has 
contributed in maintaining the extraordinary safety record of the LNG industry 
while legislation related to security is pretty much recent and still in the period of 
evaluation. Meanwhile, the international maritime and port community has 
achieved an important step forward in achieving safer and secured international 
SCs by establishing and implementing the ISPS Code and similar international 
standards.   
However, the RM approach and the way maritime and port regulation is 
implemented may have a critical impact on the overall efficiency of safety and 
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security RM. Intra and inter port cooperation and information sharing among 
safety and security managements should be further developed to ensure 
effective integration in the implementation of safety and security legislation. The 
efficiency of this arsenal of regulations depends, to a large extent, on the way it 
is approached and implemented. Recent development in RM has privileged 
holistic and integrated approach (i.e. All-hazard approach in the U.S.). Such an 
approach will be discussed further in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS AND APPROACHES 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the RA and management methodologies and 
approaches related to safety and security risks in LNG Ports SCs. It intends first 
to present and analyse these approaches and methods; and secondly to 
investigate ways in which RM for both safety and security could be improved 
through integration of their assessment and management as well as disaster 
preparedness coordination and response from the stand point of a holistic 
approach. 
 
Generally, risk can be assessed and managed in three ways: through (1) 
prevention, (2) mitigation or (3) through both prevention and mitigation. 
Prevention seeks to avoid an accident or an attack; mitigation aims to reduce 
the consequences and effects of an accident or attack. Combination of the two 
types of strategies can improve both safety and security involving LNG Ports 
SCs and can enhance the protection system from a surety perspective. 
First, existing safety approaches are discussed followed by an overview and 
discussion of internationally recognised security methods. 
5.2  CONVENTIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN SHIPPING AND PORTS 
The conventional approach to risk defines it as being the chance of occurrence 
of an accident or unwanted event. It combines a probabilistic measure of 
occurrence of an event with the consequence of such event in quantifiable 
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terms. Generally, the process of RA follows three main set of sequenced and 
inter-related activities: 
 The assessment of what can go wrong, its probability of occurrence and the 
possible consequences/ impact should that event occur.   
 The management of risk in terms of available measures/ RCOs and their 
trade-offs in terms of cost and benefits (Cost efficiency/effectiveness). 
 The impact of RM decisions and strategies on future options and 
undertakings. 
 
The system safety approach regards accidents as hazardous events for which 
causes and consequences are well known and which frequency is influenced by 
certain factors. 
The total consequences of an event form the size of the accident, whereas the 
frequency of such event may range from high frequency low impact events to 
low frequency high consequence events. Events that tend to be repetitive and 
routine in nature are mostly low impact (car accidents, machine failure…etc.). 
However, low frequency events, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks, 
tend to be more complex with long lasting and severe consequences.     
In terms of risk analysis, several hazard analysis tools have been developed. 
Two main categories of tools can be distinguished depending on whether the 
causes or consequences of events are analysed and whether the sequence of 
causes or consequences is considered: 
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Table 5.1 Major hazard analysis tools 
 Consequence Analysis Cause analysis 
Sequence dependent Event tree Analysis Markov Process 
Sequence independent Failure mode and effects Fault tree Analysis 
Source: (Bichou, 2008, p: 5) 
 
Generally, most RA methods and approaches are either cause related or 
consequence based methods. This does not mean that once methods focus on 
one variable of the equation, the other variable is completely neglected from the 
analysis. It is analysed according to the likelihood of occurrence of events 
(Bichou, 2008). 
5.3  SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACHES 
Different regions apply distinctively different safety regimes for avoidance of 
unintentional events, with the greatest divide being between consequence-
based management and risk-based management.   
A consequence-based approach for accidents as per NFPA 59A is applied in 
the U.S. and is common in Asia. The NFPA approach has the benefit of 
requiring less analysis than the risk-based approach, and may be easier to 
communicate to the public. By focusing on worst-case consequence scenarios 
for accidents while disregarding the probability of occurrence, however, this 
approach limits the ability to assess the effectiveness of project-specific 
measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of events. Meanwhile, by focusing on 
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worst –case scenario, proposed RCOs may be less cost effective since, 
generally, mitigation measures for worst-case scenario is costly to implement.    
A risk-based approach begins with assessing the probability that the subject 
risk, or failure, will occur and how such probability can be best reduced by 
mitigating factors; consequences are not ignored, but are measured relative to 
the level of mitigated risk.  Such an approach is embodied in EN1473, which is 
widely applied in the EU for safety.  The processes differ slightly from country to 
country, but they all apply a risk-based approach.  Russia has begun 
developing LNG legislation that will be risk-based as well.  Qatar Gas used RAs 
to document that Q-flex-size carriers can dock at the terminal without increasing 
the risk to public.  In fact, the risk may be reduced when comparing equal import 
levels. 
Canada has a risk-based approach defined in her legislation, but it lacks formal 
acceptance criteria, and Canadians also look towards NFPA for plant layout.  
The risk-based approach requires competence and tools for performing state-
of-the-art risk analysis.  African countries generally lack defined legislation for 
LNG.  Instead, the engineering contractor typically uses whichever international 
approach it has the most experience in applying.   
Beyond the risk-based and consequence management approaches, safety RA 
techniques are numerous and it is not always possible to clearly differentiate 
among them. They can be organized into two parts: comprehensive RA 
approaches and partial RA techniques. 
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5.3.1 Comprehensive risk assessment approaches 
These are methods accounting for hazard identification, frequency and 
probability of hazardous events and the consequence of accident scenarios. 
This means that these methods deal with risk in its entirety, defined as the 
arithmetic product of probability and consequence of accidents. Four (4) 
techniques are identified as part of this category: QRA, FSA, the Goal Based 
Standard (GBS) and the USCG Risk Based Decision Making Guidelines (Ronza 
2007). 
 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) 
QRA aims at estimating the risk entailed by a system, in terms of human loss 
or, on some occasions, economic loss. QRA results are presented in two forms, 
(1) ƒ-N curves which represent the frequency (ƒ) and the number of victims (N) 
caused by a number of determined accident scenarios. The acceptable risk 
level is also represented by a straight decreasing line. (2) Risk contours or iso-
risk curves representing individual risk around the installation is analysed. 
Nowadays, there are a number of computer programs available which help 
performing QRAs. 
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Figure 5.1 QRA Steps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Ronza (2007, p.73) 
 
 
 FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FSA) 
 
FSA is a proactive safety approach adopted by IMO to ensure that actions are 
taken before a disaster occurs. It is a systematic process for assessing the risks 
associated with shipping activities and for evaluating the costs and benefits of 
IMO’s options for reducing these risks. Furthermore, FSA is now used as a tool 
to assist in IMO decision-making process regarding the evaluation of new 
standards or for updating old ones (Ronza 2007).  
Collection of relevant information 
(Geography, Climate, Physical, 
chemical & Technical data) 
Hazard Scenario 
Identification 
Frequency estimation 
Event trees 
Consequence Analysis 
Estimation of Ind. Risk 
Estimation of global 
risk 
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FSA was first developed by the UK Marine Safety Agency in 1993 and 
proposed to IMO in 1996 to serve in the guidelines for safety assessment, with 
the aim to ensure oversight of safety and pollution prevention and facilitate the 
IMO decision making process regarding development of new regulations and 
standards (Trbojevic et al, 2000). 
Table 5.2 FSA main steps and activities 
FSA Steps Activities 
Risk identification Brainstorming of all possible risks and risk factors 
RA 
Identification of credible threats, their likelihood and 
their ranking  
RM Identification of safeguard options 
Cost-Benefit analysis Evaluation of safeguard options 
Decision-making Decision on the final risk mitigation strategy 
Source: (Ronza 2007) 
Three analytical tools are used along with the FSA process: 
 Brainstorming technique for risk identification (To identify all possible and 
plausible threats) 
 The Cost-Benefit and Cost-efficiency (CBA, CEA) techniques for the 
evaluation of the cost effectiveness of safeguard options and risk 
mitigation strategies. 
 The Delphi method for requesting and treating expert opinions, as an aid 
in the decision making.  
The method has been considered as probably the most systematic and 
comprehensive framework for RM in the maritime safety and environmental 
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protection. It represents a significant evolution in the way IMO has been dealing 
with maritime safety. 
The reason behind this methodological shift is the noticeable historical fact that 
while safety standards and techniques were improved and implemented, more 
and more accidents continue to occur. An analysis of the causes of failure for 
maritime accidents revealed that the origin of accidents lies not in the technical 
and human control systems but in the safety management practices (Trbojevic 
et al, 2000). 
 THE GOAL BASED STANDARD (GBS) 
Kontovas, et al. (2007-1) defined IMO’s GBS as: 
 “1.  Broad over-arching safety, environmental and/or security standards that 
ships are required to meet during their lifecycle; 
2.  the required level to be achieved by the requirements applied by class 
societies and other recognized organizations, Administrations and IMO; 
3. clear, demonstrable, verifiable, long standing, implementable and 
achievable, irrespective of ship design and technology; and 
4. specific enough in order not to be open to differing interpretations.” 
 
Following a proposal from Greece, Bahamas and IACS, the IMO’s MSC78 
adopted a five-tier system for the GBS. The first three (3) tiers constitute the 
goal-based standard to be developed by IMO, whereas tiers IV and V are 
detailed provisions and rules to be developed by classification societies and 
other industry organizations.  
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It is apparent from the above GBS system that IMO wants to play a larger role 
in the determination of standards to which the ships are built, which was 
traditionally the responsibility of class societies and shipyards. 
Table 5.3 GBS tier system 
Tiers Meaning 
Tier    I:   Goals A set of goals to be met in order to 
build and operate safe and 
environmentally friendly ships 
Tier   II: Functional requirements A set of requirements relevant to the 
functions of the ship structures to be 
complied with in order to meet the 
above-mentioned goals   
Tier   III: Verification of Compliance 
Criteria 
Provides the instruments necessary 
for demonstrating that the detailed 
requirements in Tier IV (Rules) comply 
with the Tier I and Tier II  
Tier IV: The detailed rules which apply 
the functional requirements to satisfy 
the goals 
The detailed mandatory requirements 
developed by IMO, National 
Administrations and/or classification 
societies and applied by National 
Administrations and or/ Class societies 
acting as recognised organisations to 
the design and construction of a ship 
in order to meet Tier I and Tier II 
Tier V:Industry standards, guidelines, 
recommendations, codes of practice 
and safety and quality systems for 
shipbuilding, ship operation, 
maintenance, training, manning, etc. 
Industry standards and shipbuilding 
design and building practices that are 
applied during the design and 
construction of a ship. 
Adapted from Kontovas, et al. (2007-1, p.4) 
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IMO has developed the basic principles of the GBS to be applicable beyond the 
goal-based design and construction of ships to encompass goal based 
standards for other areas. Also, the high importance of GBS is further 
demonstrated through its recent inclusion in the IMO strategic plan.  
Kontovas, et al. (2007-1) critically reviewed FSA and recent GBS approaches, 
in light of the recent on-going discussions at IMO to link the two approaches. 
They further cautioned against attempts from some rule makers and designers 
to cut corners and adopt risk based formulations borrowed from other 
industries, which may not be adequate for ships. The FSA approach needs to 
be improved prior to any attempt to use it as part of the GBS in modern 
maritime rule-making and design. The authors identified the following issues: 
 Risk tolerance level for maritime transport is still lacking, and more effort is 
needed to define risk acceptance criteria for maritime transport. The 
recommended RCOs should be both effective in reducing the risk to the 
“desired level” and cost effective. IMO guidelines provide no official risk 
acceptance criteria and decisions are actually based on those published by 
the UK HSE (HSE, 1999). 
Table 5.4 HSE criteria for individual risk 
 
 
 
 
Source: (HSE, 1999) 
Risks below the tolerable level but above the negligible risk should be made As 
Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP) by adopting a cost-effective RCOs. In 
Maximum tolerable risk for crew members  10¯³  annually 
Maximum tolerable risk for passengers  10¯⁴ annually 
Maximum tolerable risk for public ashore  10¯⁴ annually 
Negligible risk                                             10¯⁶     annually 
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recent amendments to FSA guidelines (Annex 1 of document MSC 81/WP.8), it 
is made clear that the above numbers are only indicative. Therefore, the crucial 
issue of what are acceptable risk criteria for maritime transport is still not 
defined.  
Moreover, the authors noted that the expression of these risk limits should be 
on a per trip basis (or per voyage as compared to ‘per flight’ basis accounted for 
in air transport) and not on an annual basis, since the later does not account for 
the number of trips per year undertaken by a person, which would influence the 
risk exposure of a passenger vis-à-vis the risk level of a crew member. In fact, 
the crew takes the risk of their job willingly, so it is assumed that they are willing 
to tolerate risk more than others.  
Furthermore, risks formulated this way do not seem to compare adequately to 
air transport, in which the most recently estimated probability of being involved 
in a fatal air crash is 10⁻⁸ per flight (Barnett 2006). This ironically means that a 
maritime transport passenger incurs annually 100 times more risk than the 
airline passenger who takes an average of 8 flights per year.     
 HAZID Deficiencies:  
Risk matrices translate the risk as the product of two variables (probability and 
consequence) into a single number.  Doing so may lead to misleading results 
since much of the relevant information provided by the two dimensions of risk 
may be lost. Examples of risk matrices demonstrated that some frequent low 
consequence events are ranked on top of and prioritized over extremely rare 
but rather catastrophic events. This particular case may lead to problems in risk 
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prioritisation and may result into wrong conclusions. Therefore, there is a need 
to define an appropriate risk matrix for each FSA.  
 Environmental Criteria Deficiencies: 
Kontovas et al. (2007-1) noted that in all FSA studies, cost effectiveness is 
limited to covering only fatalities and injuries from maritime accidents. So far, no 
FSA study has tried to assess environmental risk. Furthermore, the initial FSA 
risk matrix does not provide for environmental risks within its severity risk index 
component. 
 Deficiencies in CBA:  
Kontovas et al. (2007-2) explained also how step 4 in FSA, which is CBA, is 
rather vulnerable because “it involves numerous assumptions on a great 
number of variables, and as a result runs the risk of wrong conclusions” 
The recent formation by IMO of an MEPC correspondence group to review FSA 
steps is seen as an interesting action responding to Kontovas et al. (2007-1, 2) 
concerns regarding the above FSA vulnerabilities. 
 The USCG RISK BASED DECISION MAKING (RBDM) 
GUIDELINES 
The U.S. Coast Guard has developed several RA and management tools 
dealing with maritime accidents in general, with some focus on port accidents. 
Some of these tools and methodologies allow for HazMat transportation, 
including LNG. 
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All USCG’s work in this field is compiled in a comprehensive RM handbook 
forming the Risk-based Decision-making (RBDM) Guidelines. These guidelines 
are made up of 3 volumes: 
 Vol.1 (Risk-Based Decision-making Navigator) is an introduction to the next 
two volumes and presents methodologies followed. 
 Vol.2 (Introduction to Risk-based Decision Making) describes the principles 
of RBDM and risk evaluation, management and communication. 
 Vol.3 (Procedures for Assessing Risks) describes the following RA tools: a) 
Pareto Analysis; b) Checklists; c) Risk Ranking and Risk Indexing; d) 
Preliminary Risk Analysis; e) Change Analysis; f) What-if Analysis; g) FMEA; 
h) HazOp; i) Fault trees (FTA); j) Event trees (ETA); k) Event and causal 
factor charting; l) Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PrHA). 
According to the USCG, the RBDM guidelines is a set of systematic methods 
which equip the marine safety offices (MSOs) with a complete, reliable and 
easy-to-use toolbox on which he can rely to carry out RA and evaluation. The 
notion of risk to which the guidelines refer is relatively wide and involves not 
only hazardous cargo, but also unexpected events causing harm to people, 
installations and the environment. Therefore, the USCG RBDM guidelines 
approach can be defined as more generic and able to assess risks beyond the 
safety systems.  
 
The comprehensive approaches presented above tend to consider both 
probabilities/frequencies as well as consequences of risks and hazards. As 
such, most of them address simultaneously prevention as well as mitigation of 
risk in a relatively systematic way.   
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5.3.2 Partial risk assessment techniques 
These are methods which focus only on one element of risk, either probability/ 
frequency or severity of consequences according to the standard definition of 
risk as the product of probability of event times severity of consequences should 
that event occur. 
 Historical analysis, databases and statistics 
Historical analysis is often used as a means to estimate frequency and /or the 
probability of accidents, and thus to design events or fault trees. Referring to 
past accidents is always an interesting way of forecasting possible undesired 
events in the future. It is mainly a qualitative exercise which allows drawing 
quantitative conclusions if sufficient records of accidents are available. Many 
aspects of accidents and their trends can be inferred from the data set: cause of 
accidents; substances involved; amount of HazMat spilled; accident type (Fire, 
explosion, gas cloud, and dust explosion….etc.); consequences of the accident 
(casualties, injuries, economic loss, environmental damage…etc.). 
Moreover, past accidents represent “experimental data” which is, in fact, 
achieved at high cost but allow for lessons to be learned for the future. This is 
true in fields where experimental activities are practically impossible or can be 
performed at prohibitive cost. They are an important means of validating 
physical models for thermal radiation, blast propagation and gas dispersion. 
That is why nowadays, there are several institutions which maintain records of 
past accidents (databases): HSE in the UK, Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (CSB) and the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) are examples of such institutions. Some of these databases take also 
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records of incidents and near-misses because they provide as valuable 
information and lessons as those deriving from accidents.  
 Frequencies, probabilities and event trees. 
In the area of quantitative RA, it is often necessary to assign a probability that 
certain events may happen instead of others. For example: the probability of a 
gas cloud being ignited or the probability of an LNG tanker running aground in 
the waterway. The frequency of a certain event happening over time, for 
example: the frequency of a tank failure. Frequency is expressed in terms of 
event/duration-time units. Alternatively, frequency can be expressed on a per 
operation basis, especially if the failure is expected to occur only when the 
device or machine is in operation. Example: a ship-ship collision in a port may 
be expected to occur, on average, once every ten thousand port calls. 
Probability and frequency data are used in QRA analysis. More often, 
probability and frequency calculations are made on the basis of expert opinion, 
but sometimes they are derived from historical analysis. 
 
 Risk indices and ranking 
Risk indexing expresses the level of risk associated with a plant or an 
installation. It appeared first as a RA technique in the chemical industry. The 
first index to be used in the chemical industry was the Dow Chemical 
Company’s Fire and Explosion Index, originally published in 1964 and its most 
recent update is the 1994 edition (Ronza 2007). 
It can be argued that risk indexing is the same as QRA in a way that both 
approaches are intended to describe the level of risk. Whereas QRA expresses 
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risk in proper quantitative units (Exp. Expected casualties per year), a risk index 
provides only a generic ranking of risk based on expert judgment, which can be 
compared to actual figures calculated for a specific plant or  system. In this 
case, a risk index is expressed in terms of verbal assessment (unacceptable, 
tolerable, negligible…etc.). The U.S. Coast Guard use risk indexing as a form of 
prioritisation to assist in prioritising and ranking risks in maritime and port safety. 
Risk indices are conceived based on expert judgment. An index is normally 
devised by a group of experts and follows a process of brainstorming, 
interviews, bibliography and on-site inspections.  
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the above presentation of safety RA 
approaches: 
 
 Both comprehensive and partial RA methodologies are exclusively used for 
the assessment of safety risks in the oil and gas as well as in the process 
industries, with the exception of the FSA and the US Coast Guard RBDM 
which are mainly used as systematic approaches for maritime safety, 
especially in the field of maritime navigation. The latter’s scope includes both 
safety and security RA and management in the maritime and port networks.  
 All above RA approaches share similar RA elements, processes and steps 
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5.4  SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS 
5.4.1 The U.S. Department of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) RA 
methodology 
The DHS’ scope of responsibilities is large, spanning over most, if not all, 
aspects of homeland security and supporting all government and private entities 
that contribute to homeland security. For some functions DHS is responsible for 
all risk analysis elements, while for others for which the responsibility is shared, 
effective coordination is required with owners and operators of private or public 
entities/ facilities as well as with state, territorial and local departments of 
homeland security and emergency management; as well as with other federal 
agencies. While DHS is responsible for mitigating a range of threats to 
homeland security, including terrorism, natural disasters, and pandemics, its 
risk analysis effort is weighted heavily towards terrorism (CRS, 2007). 
Since it is widely accepted that every community faces a certain level of risk 
from terrorism, DHS officials acknowledge that it is impossible to protect and 
harden every target in US territories. Therefore, it is important to identify sites 
and critical infrastructure deemed to be at most risk and put efforts into their 
protection.  
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US federal government created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the specialised government arm to 
mitigate and protect the country against the threat of terrorism. It also created 
the State Homeland Security Grant Programme (SHGP) as assistance to states 
in their efforts to prepare for and respond to the threat of terrorism.   
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Since the beginning of the DHS security grant programme, a debate raised 
among states across America on the rationale for the grant monies allocation. 
At its inception, the allocation of security grants among states was made 
according to the size of population in the absence of sound risk assessment 
methods. This finds its origin in the fact that one of the main goals of terrorist 
attacks is to make the highest possible number of casualties among the civilian 
population.  
However, this prioritisation method at the local, state and national levels was 
problematic to justify DHS security activities since it favours states of smaller 
population and low risk and disadvantages others such as the states of New 
York and California, with larger population and facing much higher terrorist 
risks.          
Therefore, the rationale behind the distribution of the SHGP funding seemed 
counter intuitive. As a result, it was clear that a sound security RA methodology 
was required to enable rational and systematic identification and evaluation of 
homeland security risks as well as a transparent disbursement of SHGP funding 
among states.  
a) Evolution of the DHS risk assessment methodology 
DHS RA approach has evolved in line with the government approach to 
distributing DHS funding. ‘The evolution of the grant programme and the risk 
methodologies it employs has occurred against the backdrop of the 
transformation of the nation’s understanding of homeland security itself’ (CRS, 
2007, p.3).  
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At its inception, DHS focus was solely on terrorism but with time and due to 
other catastrophic incidents, the DHS scope was enlarged to include a range of 
non-terrorism threats, such as natural disasters.  Part of the DHS funds was 
also allocated to the mitigation of natural disasters. 
 
Over the years, DHS faced numerous criticisms from various groups, including 
state and local leaders expressing their frustration with DHS’s RA process and 
the related distribution of grant. The main source of frustration was on the 
perceived lack of transparency regarding the RA process, “especially with 
regards to the source of information used and the weighting of the formula’s 
variables and underlying data sub-elements’ (CRS, 2007, p.4). 
 
In 2004, the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks upon the USA commonly 
called the 9/11 commission, recommended in its final report that homeland 
security assistance should be strictly based on assessment of risks and 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore,   the commission questioned if useful criteria to 
measure risk and vulnerability be developed which can assess all variables and 
further suggested a number of factors that should be considered in the risks and 
vulnerabilities assessment, including population, population density, 
vulnerability and the presence of critical infrastructure within each state. 
There have been at least three stages in the evolution of the DHS RA 
methodology: 
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Table 5.5 DHS RA stages of development 
Stages Period Risk assessment methodology 
Stage 1 Pre-9/11 -2003 This stage is related to the period 
preceding the creation of the 
DHS. The Department of justice 
(DoJ) had primary responsibility 
for assessing risk. 
Risk was assessed and 
measured according to 
population numbers. 
R=P (Population) 
 
Stage 2 2004-2005 During this stage, critical 
infrastructure (CI), population 
density and other variables have 
been included in risk 
assessment. 
Risk was assessed as the sum of 
Threat (T), Critical Infrastructure 
(CI) and Population Density (PD). 
R= T+CI+PD 
Stage 3 2006-today At this stage, the probability of 
particular events was 
systematically introduced into the 
risk estimation formula. Also for 
the first time, DHS introduced 
assessment of both risk to assets 
and geographical areas. 
R=T*V*C 
=T* (V&C) 
    Source: Adapted from (CRS, 2007) 
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According to (CRS, 2007), Stage one in the development of the DHS RA 
methodology concerns the era prior to the 9/11 attacks and before the creation 
of the DHS and corresponds to the time when DoJ was in charge of security 
RA. Population (P) was the main risk factor considered in the calculation of risk 
(As per the Defence against Weapons of Mass Destructions Act of 1996). The 
states funding proportions after 9/11 was 40% statutorily mandated and 60% as 
per the state’s risk level (R=P) (CRS, 2007). 
In 2004, the 60% allocated according to risk was calculated as per the following 
formula: R=T+CI+PD.  Where, T refers to threat; CI relates to Critical 
Infrastructure; and PD refers to Population Density. 
It was the first year DHS considered incorporating several sub-categories of 
data such as current threat level (T), critical infrastructure assets within an 
urban area (CI), and population density (PD). 
In 2005, the risk calculation formula was changed and DHS considered other 
categories of data which were represented in the formula by R=T+V. DHS did 
not move to a probabilistic risk formula until 2006.  
Since 2006, DHS has moved to a more developed formula which is still under 
use now.  
The 40% statutorily mandated funding is still applied, however the remaining 
60% depending on the states’ risk level is calculated according to the following 
risk formula: 
 
 
As per this formula, risk is calculated for both geographic areas and assets 
according to the following sub-categories: 
R= T*V*C 
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Figure 5.2 State geographic risk analysis attributes 
 
     
Source: (CRS, 2007) 
 
Geographic: (Figure 5.2) 
 Threat (T) is calculated according to intelligence reports and updated 
information. 
 Vulnerability (V) is estimated according to total number of international 
visitors to any given state as well as the number of miles of international 
border...etc. 
 Consequence (C): human health, economic, strategic mission, psychological 
and other sub-sets of these categories.  
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Figure 5.3 Asset-based risk analysis attributes 
 
 
Source: (CRS, 2007) 
 
 
Assets: (Figure 5.3) 
 
 Threat (T): strategic intent, attractiveness of target, capabilities. 
 Vulnerability (V): Value assigned by DHS 
 Consequence (C): human health, economic, strategic mission, psychological 
and other sub-sets of these categories.  
 
In summary, the DHS formula for risk calculation remains the same whether it is 
asset-based or geography-based: R= T*V*C 
This formula is strategic not only for DHS grant allocation but to all Homeland 
security Departments’ activities as well. The scope of the DHS RA and 
management approach goes beyond terrorism threat to encompass risks of 
natural disasters as well as safety risks in the maritime and port domains. 
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While the RM process may be similar whether the source of risk is a hurricane 
or a terrorist attack, however the inputs provided into the RA model will be far 
different. DHS guidance shows that both the Urban Areas Security Initiative 
(UASI) and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention (LETPP) programmes 
are largely designed to provide state and local governments with funds to 
prepare and protect against as well as respond to and recover from acts of 
terrorism. While this purpose also exists in the State Homeland Security 
Program (SHSP), it has the additional purpose of supporting the implementation 
of the National Preparedness Goal. The other two grants currently under the 
Homeland Security Grant Program umbrella, the Metropolitan Medical 
Response System (MMRS) and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP), are almost 
completely focused on preparedness for post-event response (crisis 
management). 
In short, while DHS’s RA methodology is largely geared toward countering 
terrorism, the results of the assessment, along with other factors, such as 
effectiveness, are used for purposes which go beyond terrorism (CRS, 2007). 
Within DHS, there are other agencies and centres responsible for RA and 
management, including the U.S. Coast Guard – Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (U.S.C.G) and the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk 
Analysis Centre (HITRAC). The latter is tasked with combining intelligence 
threat data, as assessed by the DHS Office of Intelligence, and analysis with 
infrastructure vulnerabilities. DHS detailed its RA approach in its National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which was issued in June 2006 and 
updated in 2009. 
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b) The DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)  
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the coordinated 
approach needed to establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for 
critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection so that Federal 
funding and resources are applied in the most effective manner to reduce 
vulnerability, deter threats, and minimise the consequences of attacks and other 
incidents. CI/ KR includes systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the US. that their incapacitation or destruction would have a devastating 
impact on national security, national economic security, public health or safety, 
or any combination of those matters.  
NIPP addresses the physical, cyber, and human considerations required for 
effective implementation of comprehensive programmes. The plan specifies the 
key initiatives, milestones, and metrics required to achieve the CI/KR protection 
mission. It sets forth a comprehensive RM framework and clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities for the DHS, Federal Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs), and 
other Federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector security partners (DHS, 
2009). 
The cornerstone of the NIPP is its RM framework that establishes the 
processes for combining consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to 
produce a comprehensive, systematic, and rational assessment of national or 
sector risk. The RM framework is structured to promote continuous 
improvement to enhance CI/KR protection by focusing activities on efforts to: 
set goals and objectives; identify assets, systems, and networks; assess risk 
based on consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats; establish priorities based 
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on RAs and, increasingly, on return-on-investment for mitigating risk; implement 
protective programs and resiliency strategies; and measure effectiveness. The 
results of these processes drive CI/KR risk-reduction and management 
activities (DHS, 2009). 
Figure 5.4 NIPP RM Framework 
 
Source: (DHS, 2009) 
 
DHS, SSAs, and other security partners share responsibilities for implementing 
the RM framework. 
The RM framework is tailored and applied on an asset, system, network, or 
function basis, depending on the fundamental characteristics of the individual 
CI/KR sectors. This approach is appropriate for critical infrastructure of national 
or state importance, including ports handling Hazmat and their SCs, such as 
LNG export/ import marine terminals as well as activities/ organisations involved 
in the storage, handling, transportation and distribution of LNG and hydrocarbon 
based products across the maritime and ports SC.   
 
 
Continuous improvement to enhance protection of CI/KR 
 
Feedback 
loop 
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Table 5.6 NIPP core criteria for RA 
Criterion 
 
Description 
 
Complete  The methodology should assess consequence, vulnerability, 
and threat for every defined risk scenario and follow the more 
specific guidance given in NIPP, such as documenting the 
scenarios assessed, estimating the number of fatalities, 
describing all protective measures in place, and identifying 
attack methods that may be employed.  
 
Reproducible  
 
The methodology must produce comparable, repeatable 
results, even though assessments of different critical 
infrastructure and key resources may be performed by 
different analysts or teams of analysts. It must minimise the 
number and impact of subjective judgments, leaving policy 
and value judgments to be applied by decision makers.  
 
Documented  
 
The methodology and the assessment must clearly document 
what information is used and how it is synthesized to 
generate a risk estimate. Any assumptions, weighting factors, 
and subjective judgments need to be transparent to the user 
of the methodology, its audience, and others who are 
expected to use the results. The types of decisions that the 
RA is designed to support and the timeframe of the 
assessment (e.g., current conditions versus future operations) 
should be given.  
 
Defensible  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The risk methodology must logically integrate its components, 
making appropriate use of the professional disciplines 
relevant to the analysis, and be free from significant errors or 
omissions. Uncertainty associated with consequence 
estimates and confidence in the vulnerability and threat 
estimates should be communicated.  
    Source: adapted from (DHS, 2009) 
 
 
In this respect, the case of the U.S. Coast Guard is interesting to be reviewed 
as a RM approach for the maritime and port sector.  
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5.4.2 The US. Coast Guard’s Maritime Security RA Model (MSRAM) 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S ports have been 
considered critical infrastructure and potential terrorism targets for several 
reasons. According to GAO (2011), ‘Ports, waterways, and vessels are part of 
an economic SC handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually and 
an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on global shipping, 
international trade, and the U.S. economy’.  
The U.S. Coast Guard, a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency for 
maritime security, which includes the protection of U.S. ports, coasts, and inland 
waterways as part of its Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) 
mission. This mission involves protecting the maritime domain and marine 
transportation system, including preventing terrorist attacks, and responding to 
and recovering from attacks that do occur. In addition, the Coast Guard has 
other statutory missions such as enforcement and control of maritime safety 
rules and regulations. 
 
The Coast Guard’s primary approach to assessing and managing security risks 
has been embodied in its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM). 
Since its development and implementation in 2005, MSRAM has provided the 
Coast Guard with a standardised way of assessing risk to maritime 
infrastructure, referred to in MSRAM as targets, which can include chemical 
facilities, LNG import/ export terminal facilities, oil refineries, hazardous cargo 
vessels, passenger ferries, and cruise ship terminals, to name a few. MSRAM is 
designed to allow comparison between different targets at the local, regional, 
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and national levels with the goal of reducing risk by prioritising security activities 
and resources.  
From 2001 to 2006, the Coast Guard assessed maritime security risk using the 
Port Security RA Tool (PSRAT). PSRAT served as a rudimentary risk calculator 
that ranked maritime CI/KR with respect to the consequences of a terrorist 
attack. Among other limitations, PSRAT could not compare and prioritise 
relative risks of various infrastructures across port.  
DHS’s National Strategy for Transportation Security includes the development 
of risk-based priorities across all transportation modes. With regard to the Coast 
Guard, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) calls for the 
Coast Guard and other port security stakeholders, through implementing 
regulations, to carry out certain risk-based tasks, including assessing risks and 
developing security plans for ports, facilities, and vessels. In addition, the Coast 
Guard Authorisation Act of 2010 requires the Coast Guard to (1) develop and 
utilise a national standard and formula for prioritising and addressing assessed 
security risks at U.S. ports, such as MSRAM; (2) require Area Maritime Security 
Committees (AMSC) to use this standard to regularly evaluate each port’s 
assessed risk and prioritise mitigation of the most significant risks (GAO, 2011). 
 
Unlike PSRAT, MSRAM is designed to capture the security risks facing different 
types of targets, allowing comparison between different targets and geographic 
areas at the local, regional, and national levels. MSRAM’s approach is intended 
to ensure that threat information is consistently applied across ports.  
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MSRAM vulnerability assessment includes three factors: achievability which is a 
factor designed to capture the innate degree of difficulty of an attack on a target; 
security system, a measure of the probability that the system in place will 
successfully interdict the attack and target hardness.   
Consequence represents the projected overall impact of a successful attack on 
a given target or asset.  Factors considered in this category include death/ 
injury, economic, environmental, symbolic impacts and impact on national 
security (GAO, 2011). 
 
The U.S. Congress requested the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to 
examine (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard’s RA approach aligns with 
DHS RA criteria, (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard has used MSRAM to 
inform maritime security risk decisions, and (3) how the Coast Guard has 
measured the impact of its maritime security programs on risk in U.S. ports and 
waterways. 
GAO reported that MSRAM generally aligns with DHS RA criteria, but additional 
documentation on key aspects of the model could benefit users of the results. 
MSRAM generally meets DHS criteria for being complete, reproducible, 
documented, and defensible.  
However, DHS recently determined that the Coast Guard’s risk reduction 
measure was not appropriate for inclusion as a DHS strategic performance 
measure and has considered it as a management measure. According to DHS, 
a strategic measure is designed to communicate achievement of strategic goals 
and objectives and be readily understandable to the public, and a management 
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measure is designed to gauge programme results and tie to resource requests 
and be used to support achievement of strategic goals (GAO, 2011). 
 
5.4.3 The Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) Methodology 
 
API & NPRA (2004) define the SVA as the process that includes determining 
the likelihood of an adversary successfully exploiting vulnerability and 
estimating the resulting degree of damage. Based on this assessment, 
judgments can be made on the degree of risk and the need for additional 
countermeasures. 
SVA is a systematic process which evaluates the likelihood that a threat against 
a facility will be successful. It actually goes beyond the facility to encompass the 
potential severity of consequences to the surrounding community and to the 
wide energy SC. The SVA process relay on the skills and knowledge of various 
participants from related disciplines, such as process safety, physical and cyber 
security, emergency response, operations management and other disciplines as 
deemed necessary (API & NPRA, 2004). 
The objective for conducting SVA is to identify security hazards, threats and 
vulnerabilities facing a facility or a SC, as well as their protection 
countermeasures.  
The foundation of the SVA’s security management approach is the need to 
identify and analyse security threats and vulnerabilities and to evaluate the 
adequacy of the RCOs provided to mitigate the threats. As such, the SVA is a 
management tool that can be used to assist in accomplishing this task. 
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SVA is not necessarily quantitative; but usually performed qualitatively using the 
best judgment of the SVA team. The goal is to get a qualitative determination of 
risk to provide a sound basis for rank ordering of security related risks and thus 
making priorities in the application of countermeasures. 
According to (API & NPRA, 2004), it is essential to bear in mind that all security 
risks cannot be completely prevented. Security objectives are to employ four 
basis strategies to help minimize risk: Deter, Detect, Delay, and Respond 
5.4.3.1 SVA risk definition  
 
Table 5.7 SVA risk definition 
Security Risk is a function of: 
 
 Likelihood of a successful attack against an asset and 
 Consequences of a successful attack against an asset 
Likelihood is a function of: 
 
 The Attractiveness of the asset to the adversary 
 The degree of the Threat posed by the adversary, and 
 The degree of Vulnerability of the asset 
Source: (API & NPRA, 2004) 
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Table 5.8 SVA risk variables 
Consequences Consequences are the potential of adverse impacts to a 
facility, the local community and/or the nation as a result of a 
successful attack 
Likelihood Likelihood is a function of the chance of being targeted for 
attack, and the conditional chance of mounting a successful 
attack. This is a function of Threat, Vulnerability and Target 
Attractiveness. 
Attractiveness Attractiveness is a surrogate measure for likelihood of attack. 
This factor is a composite estimate of the perceived value of 
a target to a specific adversary 
Threat Threat is a function of an adversary’s intent, motivation, 
capabilities, and known patterns of operation. Different 
adversaries may pose different threats to various assets 
within a given facility or different facilities 
Vulnerability Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an 
adversary to gain access and damage or steal an asset or 
disrupt a critical function. This is a variable that indicates the 
likelihood of a successful attack given the intent to attack an 
asset 
Source: (API & NPRA, 2004) 
 
5.4.3.2 SVA approach  
 
The SVA general approach is to apply RA resources and ultimately special 
security resources where justified based on the SVA results. The process 
involves consideration of each asset both at the general level and from specific 
asset viewpoint.  
Consideration of the asset at the general level is useful in determining the 
overall impacts and loss, the outer perimeter security, access control and 
general physical security; whereas the specific asset level looks at the criticality 
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of the facility, its strategic value both in terms of economic and homeland 
security impacts as well as its value to the adversaries. Generally all facilities 
will maintain a minimum level of security with general countermeasures such as 
administrative and access control. Certain assets will justify a more specific 
level of security such as additional surveillance or barriers based on the strict 
consideration at the specific asset level.       
Figure 5.5 Overall asset screening approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conduct initial screening to 
determine which facilities 
should have SVA 
Review all facilities assets to 
determine Criticality and 
Attractiveness 
Select critical assets for 
security consideration 
Select target assets for 
scenario analysis 
Apply Specific 
Security 
Countermeasures 
Apply General 
Security 
Countermeasures 
 
Source: (API & NPRA, 2004) 
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1.1 Identify critical assets and infrastructure 
1.2 Evaluate existing countermeasures 
1.3 Evaluate severity of impacts 
 
2.1 Adversary identification 
2.2 Adversary Characterisation 
2.3 Target Attractiveness 
2.4 Select target for further analysis 
 
 
3.1 Define scenarios and evaluate specific consequences 
3.2 Evaluate effectiveness of existing security measures 
3.3 Identify Vulnerabilities and estimate degree of   
       vulnerability.  
 
 
4.1 Estimate likelihood of attack by vulnerability, threat and 
      attractiveness. 
4.2 Evaluate risk and need for additional countermeasures 
 
 
 
5.1 Identify and evaluate countermeasures options 
5.2 Prioritise potential enhancements by cost, 
effectiveness, and other factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 SVA methodology steps 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Source: (API & NPRA, 2004) 
 
It should be noted that each step in the SVA process has got its own predefined 
methodology and process. Prior to conducting the SVA, there are a number of 
preparatory activities that must be done to ensure an efficient and accurate 
analysis. The following are factors which enable successful completion of an 
SVA: 
 The activity should be planned well in advance; 
 Have the full support and clearance from the management; 
Step 1: Asset 
Characterisation 
Step 2: Threat 
Assessment 
Step 3: 
Vulnerability 
Analysis 
Step 4: Risk 
Assessment 
Step 5: 
Countermeasures 
Analysis 
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 The data should be verified and complete; 
 The objectives and scope should be concise; 
 The SVA team should be knowledgeable and experienced at the process; 
 The team leader should be experienced at the SVA process methodology.  
Most important of the pre-SVA activities is the determination of the SVA specific 
objectives and scope, and the selection and preparation of the SVA team. 
Pre-requisites to conducting the SVA includes gathering necessary study 
information, threat information, forming and training the SVA team on the 
method to be used, as well as conducting baseline security survey and planning 
the means of documenting the process (API & NPRA, 2004). 
 
Figure 5.7 Typical timeline for conducting SVA 
 
Planning  
Training 
  Orientation    
    SVA Sessions Follow-up     Report       
Implementation 
 
 
  Baseline Security Audit 
 
 
 
      Source: Adapted from (API & NPRA, 
2004) 
 SVA Planning Stage 
 
 SVA Sessions Conducted 
  
 Post- SVA Sessions (Follow up and reporting) 
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5.4.3.3 SVA team 
The SVA approach relies on the use of a representative group of company 
experts as well as outside experts as deemed necessary to identify potential 
security related events or conditions. 
The internal company group of experts typically consists of representatives from 
fields of security, RM, operations engineering, safety, environmental, regulatory 
compliance, logistics/distribution, IT and other team members as required. 
This group of experts should focus on vulnerabilities that would enhance the 
effectiveness of the facility security plan. As stated by (API & NPRA, 2004), the 
primary goal of this group is to capture and incorporate information that may not 
be available in a typical operator database. 
As part of the SVA approach, the terrorism RA for a process dealing with 
flammable or toxic substances should be handled by a team of experts from 
both security and process safety areas. This is because the team should 
evaluate and integrate traditional security protection with process safety 
countermeasures to enable a combined security and process safety strategy. 
SVA is conducted primarily by a full time ‘Core’ team led by a team leader, 
complemented as needed by other part-time team members. Core 
competencies for the SVA full time and part-time teams are shown in the table 
below: 
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Table 5.9 SVA team members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from (API & NPRA, 2004) 
The core team may be supplemented by part time competencies as required. 
Part time skills may include specialists in security, cyber security, process 
industries or operations.  
Table 5.10 Sample Statement of Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (API & NPRA, 2004. p: 16) 
 
Such an approach has the merit of integrating safety and security RA and 
management which provides a stronger approach and better protection by 
addressing both safety and security vulnerabilities and the impact that may 
The SVA Core Team members should have the following skills and 
experience: 
 Team leader: knowledge of and experience with the SVA 
methodology; 
 Security representative: knowledge of facility security procedures, 
methods and systems; 
 Safety representative:  knowledge of potential process hazards, 
process safety procedures, methods and systems of the facility; 
 Facility representative: knowledge of the design of the facility under 
study including asset value, function, criticality, and facility 
procedures; 
 Operations representative: knowledge of the facility process and 
equipment operations; 
 Information systems/ automation representative (for cyber security 
assessment) - knowledge of information systems technologies and 
cyber security provisions; knowledge of process control systems. 
 
To conduct an analysis to identify security hazards, threats, and 
vulnerabilities facing a fixed facility handling hazardous materials, and to 
evaluate the countermeasures to provide for the protection of the public, 
workers, national interests, the environment, and the company. 
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arise from one risk aspect on the other within the framework of a global 
approach. 
As stated in (API & NPRA, 2004. p: 1), the main characteristics of the SVA 
process is that it is ‘a team- based approach that combines the multiple skills 
and knowledge of the various participants’ including process safety 
professionals. Also, although SVA focus is on security threats and 
vulnerabilities facing an energy facility, it goes beyond the facility itself to 
encompass assessing potential consequences to the surrounding environment 
as well as to the energy SC. 
Therefore, the SVA approach can be considered as a comprehensive 
methodology since its scope includes security and safety threats and 
vulnerabilities within the wider energy SC.      
 
5.5  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY RISK 
APPROACHES 
 
The system safety approach regards accidents as hazardous events for which 
causes and consequences are well known and frequency is influenced by 
certain factors. 
The total consequences of an event form the size of the accident, whereas the 
frequency of such events may range from high frequency low impact events to 
low frequency high consequence events. As stated earlier in this chapter, 
events that tend to be repetitive and routine in nature are mostly low impact (car 
accidents, machine failure). However, low frequency events, such as natural 
disasters and terrorist attacks, tend to be more complex with long lasting and 
severe consequences.  
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Table 5.11 Main characteristics of safety and security events 
Safety event 
 
Security event 
 
 
 Predictable through statistical means 
and system failure analysis (near 
misses) 
 Managed through engineered 
mitigation measures and good 
practice. 
 Often triggered by an unsafe 
practice within the system 
(unintentional). 
 
 Low frequency and high impact 
 Difficult to predict as they do not 
follow statistical reasoning; 
 Their management is more 
intelligence based; 
 Triggered by intentional act 
 
 May yield higher impact since 
the perpetrator is an intelligent 
agent who tends to maximise the 
outcome of attack. 
Source: the author 
 
Table 5.11 summarises the main characteristics of un-intentional events (safety 
risks) and intentional acts (security events).     Although the input and focus of 
the RA in both safety and security are different, RA and management 
approaches in both disciplines generally follow the same process. 
5.5.1 Main characteristics of the above safety and security 
approaches 
From our earlier discussion on popular RA and management approaches, the 
following remarks can be made:  
 FSA is considered an advanced and proactive RA and management tool but 
needs to be extended to port safety to address the ship/port interface; this 
matter is still under consideration by IMO. 
 The multi-layer International Security Regulatory Framework is complex and 
challenging but it offers the opportunity for efficient and secure trade, port 
logistics and SC operations.  
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 Most safety and security frameworks and approaches pose a dichotomy and 
provide less integration between the two disciplines in terms of RA and 
management, except for SVA, MSRAM and USCG.RBDM Guidelines. 
 Some safety and security frameworks, for instance MSRAM, SVA and the 
USCG.RBDM Guidelines, although each one focuses more on a single type 
of risk they still consider both safety and security types of risks in their 
analysis. This is in line with recent developments within the risk community 
in USA which tend to apply a holistic approach to risk and believe that such 
comprehensive approach (Safety, security and natural disasters RM) would 
benefit the overall protection system. 
5.5.2 RM strategies in LNG ports 
The outcome of the U.S based approach to risk has a direct impact on the LNG 
Port RM strategies implemented in the U.S as well as in other parts of the 
world.   One of the factors that facilitated both conception and implementation of 
such all-hazards approach is the fact that maritime and port safety, security and 
natural disasters planning and response missions are all made under the U.S 
Coast Guard mandate.  
In practice, every LNG port applies a customised RM approach depending on 
the site specific conditions and features. In the U.S, performance-based 
strategies are developed to provide the necessary flexibility to deal with 
combined and evolving safety and security threats. These ‘performance-based 
strategies are often used in instances where there is a lack of good information 
on operational consequences or hazards (SANDIA, 2004-p.55). 
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The aim of such strategies is mainly prevention and mitigation of both safety 
and security risks in an integrative and cost effective manner. Prevention seeks 
to avoid an accident or attack; mitigation reduces the effects of an accident or 
attack. Combination of both types of strategies can improve both safety and 
security involving either accidental or intentional incidents. 
Table 5.12 Prevention and mitigation strategies in LNG ports 
Prevention Mitigation 
ISOLATION 
 Physical separation(distance) 
 Physical barriers 
 Keep-out exclusion zones(buffers) 
 Interrupted operations (aircraft, 
bridge traffic) 
RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
 Plans in place and current 
 Equipment & people in place and 
ready 
 Drills 
 Evacuation plans 
OF VOID SPACES WITH INERT GAS MAINTAIN MOBILITY (Tanker + towing) 
INERTING OF VOID SPACES  LIMIT SPILL AMOUNTS & RATES 
VARIED TIMES OF OPERATIONS SECURITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
FORCES 
INTELLIGENCE 
 Communication links in place and 
ready 
 Timely updates 
 Interagency communication links 
 
FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITIES 
 Leak detectors 
 Deluge systems 
 Radiant barriers (high-pressure 
high density foam system) 
 Backup fire fighting capabilities 
INCREASED MOBILITY (Tugs) REDUNDANT MOORING & OFFLOADING 
CAPABILITIES 
ARMED SECURITY ESCORT(Boat, aircraft 
or on-board) 
OFFSHORE MOORING & OFFLOADING 
CAPABILITIES 
SWEEPS (Divers, sonar, U.S.CG boarding) SPEED LIMITS 
SURVEILLANCE (On-ship, on-land, 
underwater and aerial) 
CRYOGENICALLY-HARDENED VESSEL 
EMPLOYEES BACKGROUND CHECKS SHIP ARMOR, ENERGY-ABSORBING 
BLANKETS 
TANKER ACCESS CONTROL 
PROGRAMME 
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
STORM PREDICTION & AVOIDANCE 
PLANS 
REDUNDANT CONTROL SYSTEMS 
SAFETY INTERLOCKS BACKUP FUEL SOURCE (Oil) 
Source: (SANDIA, 2004, p: 58) 
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For a complete picture on the potential consequences in a particular breach 
scenario, a target-mechanism-consequence model (TMC) is used. The target is 
the vulnerable element of the LNG infrastructure system on which some 
mechanisms act to produce un-desired consequences. 
Targets: These can be floating targets, fixed targets in water or targets ashore. 
Mechanism     : Physical, cyber or interpersonal 
Consequences: Can be local, cascading or delayed. 
Table 5.13 Example of the TMC model 
Targets Targets afloat Fixed targets in water Targets ashore 
Example LNG Tanker Bridge LNG Terminal 
Mechanism Physical Cyber Interpersonal 
Example Collisions On-ship 
communications 
Sabotage 
Consequences Local Cascading Delayed 
Example Death/ injury to 
tanker crew  
Death/ injury to escort 
vessel crews 
Death/ injury to 
rescue vessel 
crews 
Source: Adapted from (SANDIA, 2004, p: 55 &56) 
 
Mechanism   : Failure mechanism can either be accidental or intentional. 
Consequence: Intentional mechanisms, such as deliberate acts of sabotage 
and terrorism, can often produce greater consequences than accidental 
mechanisms since the perpetrator can maximize the effects of an attack by 
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choosing the time and place which would yield the maximum effect. He may 
also plan several simultaneous attacks to compound the consequences. All 
these effects must be considered while developing the risk reduction and RM 
approach. 
5.6  CONCLUSION 
From the above presentation of the RA approaches and methods, it is clear that 
such approaches and their level of integration and scope are strategic in 
designing efficient and cost effective RA and management strategies, especially 
those related to critical infrastructure such as ports handling hazardous 
materials. 
It is also apparent that U.S. made methods are more advanced in this regards, 
since they evolved from conventional methods dealing separately with each 
type of hazard towards all-hazard approach integrating safety, security and 
natural disasters prevention and mitigation.  
This approach, although adopted recently, has the prospect of being cost 
effective, since it unifies and rationalises the use of RA and response resources 
and provide better communication and coordination among the maritime and 
port SC RM stakeholders. However, this approach needs to be studied further 
to evaluate its efficiency as it continues to be applied by the U.S and in other 
parts of the world.        
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CHAPTER 6 METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In their discussion of research purpose and the importance of research 
methodology Clough & Nutbrown (2002) claim that the task of methodology is to 
explain and justify the particularity of the methods used for a given study. They 
also emphasized that ‘methodology provides reasons for using particular 
research recipe’ and further summarised the importance of methodology by 
asserting that ‘research is methodology’ (Clough & Nutbrown, 2002, p.22, 3).  
The aim of this chapter is to identify and support the rationale for the choice of 
methods selected to help achieve and fulfil the research aims and objectives. 
The chapter commences with a discussion of the theory of research 
methodology and paradigms and identifies that trade-offs exist in the various 
methodologies. It continues by identifying the research questions and objectives 
and puts forward justification for the use of mixed method approach to address 
the research problem and related research questions within the scope of the 
present topic of LNG ports RM.  If the research selected the use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, it used a variety of methods and 
techniques even within each particular paradigm of research method, be it 
qualitative or quantitative. 
6.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Research philosophy and paradigm is an important part of research 
methodology which enables research orientation and data collection in a 
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systematic and effective way. Saunders et al.(2009. p. 107-108) state that 
research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and its nature. It 
contains important assumptions about the ways the researcher views the world. 
Such assumptions underpin the research strategy and the methods chosen as 
part of that strategy.  Holden and Lynch (2004) argue that those assumptions 
are consequential to each other. For them, ontological views affect 
epistemologiocal persuasions and the choice of methodology logically follows 
the researchers’ philosophical assumptions. Burrell and Morgan (1979) in 
Holden and Lynch(2004) state that developing a philosophical perspective 
requires the researcher to make assumptions about two dimensions: the nature 
of society and the nature of science. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
the societal dimension involves two distincts views of society: regulatory or 
radical change. The first one views social evolution in a rational and cohesive 
way, while the radical change perspective looks at social development as 
contradictory and conflicting. Those two opposing perspectives are the basis of 
two different schools of thoughts: the rational view of society representing 
modernism, whereas the radical change perspective is the expression of post-
modernism (Holden & Lynch, 2004). 
Science may be considered subjective or objective. According to Holden and 
Lynch (2004) these philsophical approaches are delineated by core 
assumptions related to ontology (reality) and epistemology (knowledge). 
Ontology and epistemology are described by Clough and Nutbrown(2002, p. 30) 
as the twin terms of methodology for philosophers. Saunders et al.(2009) further 
explain that objectivism and subjectivism are the two aspects of ontology as 
concerned with the nature of reality.       
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6.2.1 Objectivism versus subjectivism 
According to Saunders et al.(2009), objectivism proposes that social entities 
exist in reality independent of social actors. Therefore, the objectivist stance 
dissociates social reality and the social actors. The subjectivist view, in contrast, 
looks at the social phenomena as creations from the perceptions and 
consequent actions of social actors. This subjectivist perspective is often 
associated with social constructivism which views the reality as socially 
cosntructed (Saunders et al. 2009).   
Holden and Lynch (2004) argue that the objectivist approach to social research 
was developed from natural sciences. Social science researchers decided to 
use the highly efficient methods borrowed from the natural sciences to 
investigate social phenomena. However, subjectivism arose as critics to the 
objectivist approach which argues that social and natural sciences are 
disparate. 
6.2.2 Positivism versus interpretivism 
Saunders et al.(2009)  state that a study that reflects the philosophy of 
positivism is one that adopts the stance of natural science with regards to the 
formulation of hypotheses from an observable social reality and the production 
of a generalisable knowledge similar to the ‘law-like geneneralisations’ 
produced by physical and natural scientists.  In this respect, only phenomena 
that can be observed will lead to the production of credible data. Positivism 
assumes that the research objectives have inherent qualities that exist 
independently of the researcher Ibid (2009, p.113). For positivists, the outcomes 
of a study are evaluated in light of a theory of truth; in a way that the truth or 
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falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and 
whether it accurately describes it (Zulu, 2007). 
The Interpretive approach argues that the social reality of business and 
management is far too complex to be reduced to definite laws similar to those 
generated by the physical sciences (Ibid, 2009).  It assumes that social 
knowledge of the world is generally built through lived experiences or social 
construction of the world. The notion of ‘social actors’ is quite significant here 
which the researcher has to give due consideration. Conducting research 
among social actors such as humans shall be considered differently to objects 
(Ibid, 2009). Positivism assumes that the researcher and reality are separate, 
while interpretivism assumes that the researcher and reality are inseparable 
(Zulu, 2007).  
There is an important consideration in this research philosophy and approach in 
the identification of an appropriate theoretical paradigm that can be used as the 
underlying basis for conducting scientific investigation. A theoretical paradigm is 
essentially a "loose collection of logically held together assumptions, concepts, 
and propositions that orientates thinking and research" Similarly; a paradigm 
has been defined as the "basic belief system or world view that guides the 
investigation" (Zulu, 2007). 
Considering its interdisciplinary scope and nature, this research adopts a 
subjectivist interpretive stance throughout the exploratory part of the research. 
Also a positivist approach is adopted during the testing and confirmatory stage 
of the enquiry. This is believed to stand as an appropriate approach to explore 
and explain the far too complex, multi-faceted and socially constructed reality of 
LNG ports safety and security risks assessment and management. In this 
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respect, Saunders et al.(2009)  explain that it is the role of the researcher  to 
seek to understand the subjective reality of their study customers in order to be 
able to make sense of their motives, actions and intentions in a meaningful way. 
Therefore, consideration of the social element, represented by safety and 
security professionals, is decisive in explaining the reasons for the various 
theoretical and practical gaps in the management of interfaces among the two 
disciplines of RM in the ports and maritime settings.   The study then follows a 
multi-paradigm approach in addressing its research objectives; it follows a 
pragmatic stance described by Barbour(2008, p.161) as a philosophical 
framework where ‘multiple assumptions and diverse methods can comfortably 
co-exist’. Green et al. (2004, p. 277) argue that  
‘‘Flexibility, creativity and resourcefulness- rather than a prior 
methodological elegance- are the hallmark of good mixed method 
design.’’ 
The present study deploys a combined approach that includes qualitative and 
quantitative research. Qualitative methods are used as exploratory tools to 
acquire primary and secondary data, whereas quantitative techniques are 
deployed to test and confirm primary and secondary data, as well as their 
assumptions and findings. Indeed, the nature of this study's research questions 
is such that it combines "what" and "how" types of questions, hence rendering a 
mixed methods approach necessary (Li-Anne, 2003). Such an approach can 
provide key insights into the broader theme of RM in LNG ports and focuses 
heavily on the central idea that RM in LNG ports and marine terminals has to be 
looked at and dealt with holistically from a SC perspective, integrating the 
pivotal role of the port authority assisted by the LNG port community.  
   
187 
 
 
       
6.3  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
It is generally accepted that any research project will involve the use of theory. 
Saunders et al.(2009) state that the way the researcher will deal with theory has 
an impact on the research design. Glaser and Strauss (1967, 6) argue that the 
Figure 6.1 Philosophical stance of the present research 
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generation of a theory involves a research process in which hypotheses and 
concepts not only come from the data but are systematically worked out in 
relation to the data. Also, theory can be developed at different junctures of the 
research according to the nature of the research and how it is approached 
(Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). Generally, two methodological approaches are used 
in this regards, either induction or deduction. 
According to  Saunders et al.(2009, p. 124), deduction is the dominant research 
approach in natural sciences which involves the development of a theory that is 
subject to rigorous testing. A deductive approach favours first the development 
of a theory followed by the formulation of hypotheses which are subsequently 
tested using a well-designed research strategy. According to Robson (2002), 
there are five successive steps in the deductive research process: (1) deducing 
a hypothesis or preposition from a theory; (2) expressing hypotheses in 
operational terms to tell how it is measured; (3) testing of hypothesis; (4) 
evaluating the outcome of hypothesis testing to confirm, reject or modify the 
theory and; (5) confirm or modify the theory according to the findings.   
Ibid (2009) states that as far as the research approaches are related to the 
research philosophies, deduction is more linked with positivism while induction, 
which is the alternative approach, owes more to interpretivism. Inductive 
research is more likely to be concerned with the context in which events take 
place. Researchers, using this particular approach, tend to work more with 
qualitative data and use various data collection techniques in an effort to 
construct different views of the phenomena under study (Ibid, 2009, p.126). 
Within this tradition, the researcher observes phenomena and collects data so 
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as to subsequently arrive at conclusions, or develop theory based on data 
analysis. Although this discussion may give the impression that there are rigid 
divisions between deduction and induction, this is not actually the case since it 
is possible and often advantageous to utilise both deductive and inductive 
approaches to the same piece of research (Saunders et al.2009, p. 127). 
As stated earlier in chapter one, abundant literature exists for port safety and 
security risks which discusses in details port safety and security risks 
management separately as two independent subjects. However, very little has 
been written on the relationships, interfaces and shared impacts among safety 
and security risks in the LNG port and maritime industry. Due to this scarcity of 
literature around the topic, the use of an inductive approach is chosen in an 
attempt to generate data from the industry and analyse such data to arrive at 
meaningful conclusions. Saunders et al. (2009) testifies that such an approach 
is appropriate in case the topic under study is new, generates much debate and 
on which there is little existing literature (Ibid 2009, p. 127). Therefore, an 
inductive approach is adopted throughout the exploratory and conceptual part of 
the research while deduction is employed during the testing and confirmatory 
phase.  
This research has focused on theory generation in order to: 
 Develop an integrated and holistic approach to the issue of safety and 
security risks assessment and management in LNG ports SC.  
 Construct a high level conceptual model materialising such approach by 
identifying the main RM actors and stakeholders of the LNG port system, 
their roles and relationships within a coordinated and participative 
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approach. Such model shall also integrate the safety and security systems 
as an integrated part of the overall port RM system.  
 Provide an enabler for a practical integration of the three main components 
of the port management system: port safety and security RM system, port 
emergency management system and port business continuity.   
 
6.4  RESEARCH STRATEGY  
The research has evolved from a number of data sources and observations. 
First of all, the researcher’s own observation of the reality of RM, as a port 
professional, within the LNG ports in the Arabian Gulf has been the basis for the 
researcher’s curiosity to further investigate and analyse the subject on practical 
grounds. It was clear from the observation and the various interactions with risk 
professionals at LNG ports that the overall RM system is fragmented and lacks 
a coordinated approach. An initial review of available literature on safety and 
security risks management approaches and methodologies revealed the 
existence of further distortions as well as theoretical and practical gaps. This 
assisted in the formulation of the research problem and helped to frame and 
refine the research questions. This stage, described by Filippini (1997) as the 
`preliminary descriptive research' enabled the researcher to build up a picture of 
the phenomenon being studied. During this stage, called also, conceptualisation 
phase, an attempt is made to make sense of conceptual frames, concepts and 
relationships in an effort to explain and scope the phenomenon under study. 
After clarifying and scoping the research problem, the next phase is to formulate 
an appropriate strategy to address the research problem and answer the 
research questions.     
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Considering the interdisciplinary nature of this research, a multi-method 
approach has been selected, composed of an in-depth literature review, the 
Delphi technique and quantitative statistical techniques. Such a multi-method 
approach is selected and deployed to make use of the triangulation technique. 
Triangulation, ‘interpreted as a mean of mutual confirmation of measures and 
validation of findings’ (Berg, 2001 p. 5) is employed to test and validate the 
findings of the theoretical and empirical studies performed as part of this 
research; for instance the data collected from the literature review and the one 
derived from the two rounds of the empirical Delphi study. 
6.4.1 Qualitative versus Quantitative 
Over the years the terms multi-methods, triangulation and mixed methods 
appeared in literature as approaches to facilitating a combining qualitative and 
quantitative research that is intended to end the pragmatic war (Cicic and 
Patterson 1999; Zulu 2007; Collins and Dressier 2008). According to Barbour 
(2008) mixing methods is often employed to compensate for the perceived 
shortcomings of stand-alone methods with the aim of providing a more 
complete picture or a wider coverage.  
Despite the views supported by the proponents of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, both methods tend to have their strengths and 
weaknesses and both methods have long been used as research tools for 
social sciences. According to Sarantakos (2005), there is no absolutely ‘right’ 
methodology. A research methodology is chosen in the given research 
conditions, the research questions to be answered, the available resources, 
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and, above all, the types of data required. Thus, the use of both methods is 
acceptable, as they are not mutually exclusive and can be mixed and matched 
(Van Maanen, 1979). Berg (2001) asserted that qualitative and quantitative are 
not distinct approaches. Also combining both methods is not new; Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) suggest intermediate positions. They think that ‘combining 
methods may be done for supplementary, complementary, informational, 
developmental, and other reasons’ (p. 28).  
6.4.2 Mixed Method 
According to Bazeley and Kemp (2011), there are multiple rationales for mixing 
methods and component parts of studies are integrated depending on the 
rationale or purpose. Three main rationales are put forward by Bazeley and 
Kemp in this regards: 
 Integration of methods assists in building stronger conclusions, as the 
strengths of one method tend to compensate for the weaknesses of the 
other. 
  Mixing methods is considered as a means to initiate a new 
understanding of the study subject since the dialectical approach, 
created as a result of mixing methods and approaches, promotes further 
exploration and understanding. 
 Finally, mixed methods are seen as an alternative way to providing a 
more complete picture by understanding causal effects and processes.        
Bazeley and Kemp (2011, p.56) asserted that in order to achieve one or the 
other of the above purposes, mixing methods should involve the following:  
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 ‘having a common purpose or goal to unite these; 
 Interdependence of these different elements in reaching the goal; 
 Having a sum greater than the parts (Bazeley, 2010)’ 
 
6.4.3 Triangulation 
Bazeley (2010.p 7) further states that the term   
‘Triangulation is the most used and perhaps the most misused metaphor 
in the mixed methods’ 
Bazeley (2010) argues that the concept of triangulation derives from Webb et 
al., (1966) who suggested that triangulation is used to confirm a preposition as 
the most persuasive evidence of measurement, once such preposition has been 
confirmed by two or more measurements processes. Moreover, triangulation is 
a term commonly used in other professions as well such as surveying activities, 
map making, navigation and military. Many researchers adopt triangulation by 
using multiple data-gathering techniques to investigate the same phenomena 
(Berg, 2001; Seale, 1999).  
For this research, an in-depth literature review, the Delphi technique and 
quantitative statistical techniques are deployed to make use of the triangulation 
technique. Triangulation is ‘interpreted as a means of mutual confirmation of 
measures and validation of findings’ (Berg, 2001 p. 5). Apart from the misuse of 
the term triangulation by some researchers as detailed by Bazeley (2010), our 
understanding and use of the concept of triangulation, in the context of the 
present research, conforms to Webb et al., (1966) and Olsen(2004) and has a 
purpose to test and validate the findings of the theoretical and empirical studies 
performed earlier; for instance the secondary data collected from the literature 
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review and the primary source data derived from the two rounds of the empirical 
Delphi study. 
6.4.4 Research methods 
Chapters 1 to 6 represented the theoretical descriptive part of the research. 
They address the ‘who’, ‘what’ and why’ question types to find out what is 
occurring (descriptive) and why it is occurring the way it is (explanatory).    
The exploratory part of the research begins in chapter 7 with an empirical 
analysis through two rounds of Delphi surveys undertaken among a panel of 
international experts, including industry professionals from world leading LNG 
ports of the Arabian Gulf. A Delphi study based on an online survey is selected 
to act as a scoping exercise which follows a sequential, mixed-method, and 
predominately qualitative approach. According to Barbour (2008, p.153), one 
common rationale for mixing methods is ‘the development of research tools and 
usually involves using qualitative methods for the initial exploratory phase’ of 
the research. Mason (2006) argues that one main rationale for using mixed 
methods is to access multiple perspectives and dimensions since lived realities 
are multi-dimentional. Tapio et al (2011) look at the use of policy Delphi for 
scenario formation, and pose more fundamental questions about the combining 
of qualitative and quantitative information. Also, Meyrick(2003) argues that with 
respect to qualitative or quantitative approaches, the Delphi method can 
incorporate elements of both types of techniques. It is with this perspective that 
the empirical Delphi survey has been selected as an appropriate research tool 
in the initial phase of this research to explore the multi-faceted and multi-
disciplinary dimensions of the present research problem. Unlike what the 
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literature review was thoroughly unable to do, the Delphi exercise will hear first-
hand from experts and stakeholders on matters related to the research aim and 
objectives. In this respect, the Delphi study is used to build consensus among a 
panel of LNG ports and RM experts on a number of observations, hypotheses 
and prepositions raised from the earlier descriptive and explanatory stage of the 
study. In conformity with Rowe and Wright’s earlier idea, the results of the 
Delphi exercise are considered just as a first step in the enquiry process which 
will be further interrogated and evaluated in phase II of the research through a 
quantitative emprical study. This is believed to further enhance and strenghten 
the outcome of the Delphi exercise.  
With respect to the Delphi survey, a sample of LNG terminal operations and risk 
experts are consulted as part of this empirical study in an attempt to explore 
how safety and security disciplines of the LNG port SC organisations interface 
to solve common risk issues and what kind of work relationship prevails among 
them. Furthermore, the aim from the Delphi exercise is to explore the RA and 
management methods and practices in LNG Port SCs and to characterise the 
role of ports within the LNG SC. Particular focus is made on the relationships 
and interfaces between safety and security risks and the issues posed by such 
interfaces, as well as the role of port authorities and port stakeholders in the 
management of such interfaces to enable a coordinated and cost effective 
management of safety and security risks. Subsequently, the Delphi concensus 
among the panel of experts was reached after two rounds of questionnaires and 
its commonly agreed results (statements)  were brought forward and used as 
hypotheses to be further tested through an online quantitative study using 
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online survey among a larger panel of international experts from the LNG ports 
and RM community.  
As stated by Rowe and Wright (2011, p.1488) ‘Using Delphi as only part of a 
wider process (with qualitative and quantitative components) may well prove a 
means to enhance its utility’. This integration of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches and their sequences is believed to be useful since the first method 
enabled exploration of a wide range of issues in connection with the research 
problem which could not be seen during the initial explanatory and conceptual 
phase, and assisted in providing first confirmation of the  observations made 
during the initial stage. Meanwhile, the quantitative methods were deployed to 
test and validate the Delphi findings.   
Therefore, the Delphi survey research was triangulated with a quantitative 
survey study using factor analysis and other statistical techniques of the SPSS 
20 package. Triangulation and mixed methods are used here in line with 
Bazeley and Kemp’s (2011) rationale for providing a more complete picture by 
understanding causal effects and processes as well as a means to initiate a 
new understanding of the study subject, since the dialectical approach, created 
as a result of mixing methods and approaches, promotes further exploration 
and understanding. Also, Robson (2002) sees triangulation as the use of 
multiple sources to enhance the rigour of the research and to help counter all of 
the threats to validity. 
This exercise will assist in reviewing and confirming the role of ports and 
maritime networks as focal points within the LNG SC and in assessing their 
capacity to lead integrated collaborative mitigation strategies and anti-terrorist 
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measures. The outcome of the quantitative study forms the basis for the high 
level LNG RM conceptual model to be proposed. For more details, the reader is 
referred to chapter7.  
In preparing for the conceptual model, chapter eight starts with a summary of 
the main findings of the quantitative study and introduces the use of Systems 
Thinking Approach (STA), more specifically the Soft Systems Method (SSM), as 
an appropriate method for this research to build the conceptual model for LNG 
ports SC RM.  The choice of SSM is justified by the fact that this methodology 
provides an interesting analytical framework to deal with complex management 
problems such as the case of our research problem. According to 
Greswell(1998, p.112), Soft Systems Thinking (SST) in contrast to Hard 
Systems Thinking (HST), views the world as problematic and an ill-defined 
situation which can be tackled using certain systemic constructs to aid learning 
and understanding. SST was developed as an alternative solution to the 
problem of using HST’s reductionist approach to tackle messy and ill structured 
problems which are predominant noticed in organisations and described as a 
process of enquiry and learning (Checkland, 1990).The SST approach has 
been developed by several authors notably Checkland (1981), Wilson (1984) 
and Ackoff (1981). 
 
The proposed conceptual model has been developed according to the above 
soft systems approach. This approach has the merit to look at ‘real-world 
problem’ as part of an overall system. Our earlier analysis demonstrated that 
due to their interfaces and shared impacts, safety and security risks 
management needs to be approached as part of a unified RM system which is 
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actually an integral part of the overall port management system. That is why the 
Soft Systems Approach has been selected as an appropriate analytical tool to 
assist in building the conceptual model for the real-world problem of LNG ports 
SC RM, to depict its components, its main actors and their relationships. The 
model has been constructed using Checkland’s seven interconnected stages 
which form a learning loop (Checkland, 1999). The proposed conceptual model 
allows an optimal restructuring and re-organisation of LNG ports and marine 
terminals in the area of safety and security RM, leading to an integrated, holistic 
and coordinated management of safety, security, environment and quality risks 
and threats.  
The research outcomes will need to prove its relevance to the situations being 
observed and explored and any proposal to be put forward will need to be 
justifiable and attainable (Dinwoodie and Xu, 2008). For these reasons, the 
proposed model has been put under the rigour of both the theoretical and 
practical scrutiny and tested through a focus group discussion with 
professionals and experts representing the main LNG port SC organisations led 
by the port authority. One of the main aims of this study was to tackle a real-
world problem and arrive at a practical and applicable solution. Therefore, the 
process of enquiry started with the observation of the problem of RM from the 
actual reality of LNG ports and ended by contrasting the findings with the 
practical real-world to evaluate and justify its applicability. 
The focus group consultation is performed with the participation of professionals 
from two major industrial ports in Qatar: the LNG hub port of Ras-Laffan which 
is the largest and busiest LNG exporting facility in the world and the multi-
purpose hydrocarbon-based port of Mesaieed. A sample of six experts 
   
199 
 
representing the safety, security and ports logistics operations and 
management departments from those ports was consulted during all stages of 
the research, from inception of the enquiry until the testing stage of the 
conceptual model.  This testing and evaluation step provided valuable feedback 
from the industry and enabled further refinement of the model.  
6.5  CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, a mixed method approach has been applied to the 
research problem of RM in LNG ports SC with triangulation as a means to 
enhance the rigour of the research and provide a complete picture of the issues 
under study. Although the research approach used both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, it has adopted an overall predominately qualitative 
methodology which incorporated both inductive and deductive analyses. On top 
of the quantitative method used, one characteristic of the methodology adopted 
is its use of a variety of qualitative methods and techniques such as a survey in 
the form of a Delphi study, Soft System Methodology (SSM) and a focus group 
consultation.    
The next chapter will explore the views and ideas of stakeholders and experts, 
on existing practices and future prospects of integrated safety and security risks 
management in LNG ports through the empirical study starting with the Delphi 
survey exercise. 
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CHAPTER 7 
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 
DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
7.1 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY- DELPHI STUDY ROUND ONE 
7.1.1 Introduction 
As explained in the research design, it has been decided to use the Delphi 
technique for qualitative data collection with a web based questionnaire as a 
survey tool.  
As stated by Linstone and Turoff (2002), the Delphi technique may be 
characterised as a method for structuring a group communication process so 
that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to 
deal with a complex problem. For Sullivan and Claycombe (1977), Delphi is a 
systematic procedure for soliciting and organising expert opinion about the 
future.  
Some studies (Ariel, 1989; Fadda, 1997; Yong et al., 1989) have employed the 
Delphi technique to predict likely events in the future; others (Hwang, 2004; 
Cottam et al., 2003; Anderson, Rungtusanathan, & Schroeder, 1994; Meier et 
al., 1998) used the technique to investigate or explore a current situation. 
Linstone and Turoff (2002) as well as Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) suggest that 
the Delphi technique is suitable as long as it has the basic characteristics of 
expert panel members, anonymity of response, use of a series of 
questionnaires (iteration), and feedback.  
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For the purpose of this research, this technique has been selected due to its 
suitability and practicality to such a complex interdisciplinary subject of SCRM 
as applied to ports and marine terminals handling LNG commodity. 
The following describes the Delphi approach applied and the results of the first 
round of the Delphi survey undertaken to collect and analyse qualitative data 
from a Delphi panel in LNG Ports SCs.  
It is attempted here to look at the best way to have LNG port SC member 
organisations looking at the issues of safety and security in a more integrative 
and holistic way when it comes to the assessment and management of risks. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate available options to have a cohesive and 
unified RM approach in LNG port SCs. This will require a certain consensus 
among LNG port SC members on the importance and benefits of such an 
approach both on theoretical as well as on practical levels. The following 
section discusses the design, administration and panel respondents of the 
Delphi survey questionnaire.  
7.1.2 Delphi questionnaire design and administration 
As there is no fixed guideline or rule pertaining to the number of statements 
which should be deployed in the first-round questionnaire, the first round 
questionnaire of this Delphi study was drawn deliberately from an in-depth 
literature review performed previously. 
Since the research subject attempts to investigate the relationships, the 
opportunities for standardized and coordinated management options for safety 
and security risks in LNG ports SC and how the two disciplines of risk could 
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benefit from the tremendous advancement achieved in quality management 
discipline, it was decided to frame the questionnaire into four parts: 
 Part one deals with questions related to security RA and management. 
 Part two relates to safety types of risk. 
 Part three investigates the relationships between safety and security, and; 
 Part four questions how safety and security risk management could benefit 
from the principle and approach of Quality management, more specifically 
the Total Quality Management (TQM) approach which indeed is considered 
effective in addressing quality risks. 
There are 26 statements in the first round of this research.  Each statement has 
options of ‘agree’, ‘disagree’ and unable to comment’. In the case of 
disagreement, the respondent is asked to explain the foundation of its 
disagreement. An example (statement number twenty three of this first round 
Delphi survey) is given below:  
1. Safety and security RA and management need to take advantage of the 
quality revolution, especially the Total Quality Management (TQM) Principle. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If your disagree, please comment as to why 
..........................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................... 
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Formulation of questionnaire for the Delphi First Round 
Figure 7.1 Formulation of questionnaire for first round Delphi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
Figure 7.1 shows the formulation of the first round Delphi questionnaire. An in-
depth literature review resulted in a preliminary questionnaire, which was pre-
tested in collaboration with prominent LNG port experts during a professional 
forum held in 2010 in Doha- State of Qatar. The author accepted the 
opportunity during a SIGTTO (The Society for International Gas Tanker and 
Terminal Operators) regional meeting held in the State of Qatar to discuss 
research assumptions and observations with LNG experts from the Middle East.  
Those experts are managers and leaders of LNG Terminals, LNG shipping 
companies, LNG port authorities and LNG RM specialists. 
In light of expert discussions and subsequent comments, the first round Delphi 
questionnaire was finalised.  
Extensive 
literature review  
 
Expert opinion 
Own experience  
and understanding  
Problems/ Issues/ Linkage/ 
Factors Identification 
Preliminary 
questionnaire 
First round Delphi 
questionnaire 
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Based on the comments from experts, the number of statements for the first 
round Delphi survey questionnaire is set to 26. Since the internet provides easy 
and efficient administration of surveys, it was decided to use a web- based 
survey by loading the questionnaire already finalised on the Survey Monkey 
website. Invitation to participants to take part to the online survey was done by 
email messages sent individually to respondents. The email message 
reproduced the invitation letter with a deadline for responses and included the 
web link to the survey posted on Survey Monkey website.   
The questionnaire for the first round survey with the forwarding letter is attached 
in Appendix 4. 
Panel and Process of the Delphi Study 
The selection of an appropriate panel is very important for a successful Delphi 
study. The panel members are chosen so that they have a deep interest in the 
issue under study, and can share their experience and expertise.  
Since the topic’s main objective is to investigate safety and security risks 
assessment and management in the context of LNG port SC, it was necessary 
to involve RM experts as much as possible from all LNG port SC organisations. 
In this context, the following types of professional organisations have been 
consulted in this survey: 
- LNG Port logistics managers 
- LNG Shipping lines 
- LNG Security departments 
- LNG HSE departments 
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- LNG terminal managers 
- LNG port authorities-Harbour Master 
- LNG Port Development sections 
- Natural Gas upstream organizations 
- Quality management specialists 
- Academia, specialist in RM 
A list of 40 potential participants was prepared with detailed contact numbers 
and email addresses. The author used his knowledge of the LNG port sector to 
recruit potential experts in the LNG SC to obtain their permission to participate 
in the online survey. 
Before sending email invitations, most respondents were contacted by phone to 
request their approval and explain to them the subject under study and the 
importance of their expert opinion for the study, as well as to convince them to 
allocate part of their valuable time to complete the survey.  
Potential respondents were canvassed in initial phone conversation and if they 
requested, the questionnaire was sent by email. They were asked to reply 
within two weeks and then were reminded again (up to 3 email reminders and at 
least one telephone call per participant). These efforts yielded 50% response 
rate and a panel size of 20 respondents. This response rate is encouraging 
because many Delphi surveys experienced much lower participation rate. 
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Table 7.1 Structure of the Delphi panel in Round One 
Category of panel 
members 
Number consulted Number responded 
LNG Port logistics and SC 
managers 
4 4 
LNG Shipping lines 2 1 
LNG Port Security 
departments 
4 1 
LNG HSE Department 6 4 
LNG terminal managers 
 
2 1 
LNG port authority 6 4 
Natural Gas upstream 
organizations 
 
3 1 
Quality management 
specialists 
4 1 
Academia, specialists in RM 8 3 
Totals 40 (100%) 20 (50%) 
Source: The author 
The panel broadly represented the three levels of management: five (5) from 
top management (responsible for strategic management), nine (9) from middle 
management (responsible for management of a functional unit or department) 
and six (6) from junior management (responsible for operational or supervisory 
works).  
7.1.3 Results of the first round Delphi survey 
There are 26 statements in the First Round Delphi Survey; all participants 
responded to all questions, except for two questions (Q19 and Q21), which 
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were responded to by nineteen panel members. Two panel members each one 
skipped one question. 
Detailed results of the first round can be found in Appendix 4. 
The following formula for Average Per cent of Majority Opinions (APMO) is then 
applied.  
APMO = (Aggregate of Majority Agreements + Aggregate of Majority 
Disagreements)/  
           Total Opinion expressed including UCs  100   
Thus, APMO = 265/ 516* 100 
 = 51.36 % 
According to the APMO calculated, the ‘cut-off’ point for achieving consensus is 
51 %, any statement having 51 % or more opinion is said to have supported the 
hypothesis (or assumption). Statements having less than 51 % opinion are 
included in the second round questionnaire to determine the importance of not 
having consensus among the panel members. A higher level of consensus on 
any statement means more certainty, reliability and acceptability on the issue.  
 Statements having 51% + consensus: 16 (61.5%) 
 Statements having less than 51%% consensus: 10 (38.5%) 
As indicated above, 16 statements out of 26 achieved consensus in this first 
round survey, whereas 10 did not get consensus which will form the basis for 
the second round Delphi survey. Each second round Delphi question will be 
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formulated on the basis of comments made by respondents during the first 
round survey. 
Appendices F and G show all comments made by respondents to questions 
having achieved less than 51% consensus. Comments are reproduced as 
expressed by respondents without rewording. 
7.2  DELPHI STUDY SECOND ROUND 
As stated earlier, the second round questionnaire of the Delphi study 
was generated from the comments of the respondent’s panel on the 
original ten statements which did not achieve consensus. These 
comments were made into 34 statements which formed the second 
round Delphi survey (Appendix 5) 
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Figure 7.2 Formulation of questionnaire for second round Delphi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Author 
 
It was mentioned already that 20 panel members, who participated to 
the first round survey, were sent the questionnaire for the second 
round, fourteen (14) of whom have responded (70% participation). A 
comparison of participants for the first and second round survey is 
provided in table 7.2. 
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Delphi Survey 
Questionnaire 
 
16 statements 
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10 statements not 
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&their comments 
<70 % opinion 
First Round Delphi Survey 
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Opinion 
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Table 7.2 Structure of the Delphi panel in the two rounds of Delphi 
Category of panel member Participants (%) in 
1st  round 
Participants (%) in 
2nd round 
LNG Port logistics and SC 
managers 
4 3 
LNG Shipping lines 1 1 
LNG Port Security departments 1 1 
LNG HSE Department 4 3 
LNG terminal managers 1 1 
LNG port authority 4 2 
Natural Gas upstream 
organizations 
1 1 
Quality management specialists 1 0 
Academia, specialists in RM 3 2 
Total respondents 20(100%) 14(70%) 
Source: The author 
7.2.1 Result of the Second Round Delphi Survey 
There are 34 statements (against the ten original statements in the first 
round which did not receive consensus) in the second round Delphi 
survey; and fourteen panel members have provided opinions/ 
comments on every statement, out of the 20 respondents consulted.  
It is worth mentioning that among the six participants who dropped out 
in the second round have changed their respective positions and 
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companies and therefore were unapproachable by email since the only 
communication medium with them was through company email. The 
other four participants seem to be extremely busy during the duration of 
the survey. Three of them informed me by email that they are away 
from their countries and they will come back to me afterward to respond 
to the survey, however after chasing them for more than two weeks, 
they had not responded. 
Finally, 14 out of 20 participants responded, which is a 70% 
participation rate. 
The same APMO formula was applied. Thus APMO = 273+0/ 446*100= 
61.2 % ≈ 61 %.  
Considering the 61% Average Per cent of Majority Opinions (APMO), 
23 statements achieved strong consensus with a score of 61% and 
above; and 11 statements got a score less than 61%. 
Table 7.3 Second round consensus achieved 
Consensus level Consensus (score %) achieved 
Strong Consensus >61% 23 
No Consensus < 61% 11 
Total statements 34 
Source: the author 
As per the second round survey results, every original statement has got at 
least one second round statement/ comment having achieved consensus. 
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Therefore, consensus among respondents is achieved. Detailed results of the 
34 statements of the second round Delphi survey are shown in Appendix 5. 
7.2.2 Results of the Two Rounds of Delphi 
The findings of the survey will be discussed under the following conceptual 
dimensions or categories: 
 LNG port SC security  
 LNG port SC safety 
 LNG port SC safety and security 
 LNG port SC RM and quality 
 
Under the above categories, combined results from the two rounds of the Delphi 
study are presented here. 
 
7.2.2.1 LNG port SC security 
 
The panellists strongly agreed that security risks are becoming as important as 
safety risks and need to be integrated in the overall risk portfolio faced by LNG 
ports SCs (Statement 1). This is in conformity with most security literature which 
highlighted the increased security threats since 2001 and their widespread 
impact on international SCs. Many security specialists stressed the need to 
seriously consider security risks and address them in an appropriate manner to 
avoid SC disruptions. 
Also, these results confirmed the strategic role of LNG ports as central nodes 
within the overall LNG SC (Statement 2), since they bring together multiple 
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logistics, port and maritime related organisations and stakeholders, functions, 
roles, processes and flows.  
Responding to the statement ‘LNG Ports are sufficiently protected against 
security threats’ most participants agreed that LNG ports, due to their sheer size 
and accessibility both onshore and offshore, cannot be considered sufficiently 
protected against terrorist risks.  
Also, this statement cannot be generalized to all LNG ports and terminals, since 
these facilities differ in the degree of protection worldwide. In this respect, 
respondents stipulated that much work and international cooperation is required 
to improve security controls. 
Respondents also agreed that current international security legal framework is 
an advantage; however, ISPS and similar codes such as CT-PAT only require 
minimum level of protection. In certain environments these may not be sufficient 
to ensure adequate protection against security threats. Two issues of concern 
were identified in this regards: 
The implementation of security frameworks may need to be integrated from a 
holistic approach to avoid discrepancies and redundancy in the security system.  
Current frameworks are still treating individual facilities in relative isolation; 
therefore a coordinated approach needs to be applied to ensure resilience 
within the whole SC.   
Finally, it was agreed that RM across various disciplines such as security and 
safety takes place in isolation and little to no coordination exists between 
security and safety managements in the LNG Port SC. Furthermore, there is no 
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official structure within the LNG Port SCs which enables such coordination 
between security and safety RM.  
7.2.2.2 LNG port SC safety 
Responding to statements around the LNG Port SC safety system, the 
panellists confirmed the importance for each individual port SC member to 
ensure safety of its own operations (Statement 10.4); however, it was also 
argued that the safety of the whole LNG Port SC is a joint responsibility which 
should be coordinated and ensured by the port authority (Statement 10.3). 
Therefore, the Port authority is ultimately responsible for the overall safety of 
LNG facilities and must ensure that LNG facilities within the port perimeter are 
properly risk managed. Regarding the safety framework, most respondents 
agreed to the need for a standard safety framework to address both LNG 
shipping and port networks (Statement 13) and this will assist in better 
addressing the ship/ port interface (Statement 14). In this regards, respondents 
believe that the IMO’s FSA, as a safety framework initially devised for shipping, 
should be extended to address port safety as well (Statement 12).  
7.2.2.3 LNG port SC safety and security 
In this category, respondents agreed on the benefits of having a coordinated 
RM integrating both safety and security risks in LNG port SC, since they believe 
that safety and security are closely related issues and may yield better outcome 
if managed under a single entity and using a standard framework (Statements 
15, 16 and 17). Meanwhile, they argued that safety and security are two 
different disciplines which have different requirements in terms of RA, therefore 
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their risk assessment methodologies need to be different to cope with their 
specificities and requirements (Statements 18.1, 18.2 and 18.3). 
From the above, respondents concluded that although safety and security risks 
in LNG port SCs are two disciplines that may have different requirements, their 
management should be coordinated within the framework of a holistic RM 
approach to the benefit of a resilient and cost effective RM (statement 21).      
7.2.2.4 LNG port SC RM and quality 
It is important to note that respondents anonymously agreed on all five 
statements of this category. Participants accepted that there is a similitude 
between Port SC safety, security and quality management, mainly in terms of 
assessment and management approaches. (Statement 22). Since the quality 
discipline, especially the TQM principle, has introduced a revolution in terms of 
quality control and quality assurance methods and practices, respondents 
agreed that safety and security managements need to take advantage and 
learn from the quality approach in addressing risks and vulnerabilities. 
Finally, it was unanimously accepted that LNG Port SCs need to adopt an 
integrated risk assessment and management approach based on the principles 
of TQM and capable of dealing more efficiently with the three types of risks, 
safety, security and quality (Statement 26). 
7.3  QUANTITATIVE STUDY- SURVEY ANALYSIS USING SPSS 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Considering the strengths and weaknesses of the qualitative and quantitative 
methods, a triangulation technique, which includes in-depth literature review, 
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two rounds of Delphi surveys and quantitative techniques such as factor 
analysis, was adopted for this research. Having first completed an extensive 
literature review as well as two rounds online Delphi, the next step is to 
undertake a quantitative survey which is then factor analysed.  
On the other hand, an online survey, supported by email messages, is chosen 
for data collection, primarily to achieve higher speed and reliability as well as 
lower cost.  
The adoption of a quantitative study through an online survey method is 
selected in the absence of reliable historical data on safety and security events 
and near misses from world LNG ports and marine terminals. While data on 
safety accidents is available and may be obtained from recognized HSE 
databases, sufficient and reliable statistics on security incidents is difficult to 
obtain from LNG port terminals since it is generally considered sensitive and 
highly restricted. 
Therefore, an online survey carried out among a sample of representative panel 
experts was chosen to achieve cost effective research in terms of time and 
budget as well as higher data reliability.  This data is then quantitatively 
analysed using factor analysis as well as reliability and validity tests such as 
Likert chi-square. The objective is to test and validate the hypothesis and 
results obtained so far from the two rounds of Delphi and to a lesser extent the 
insights and assumptions derived from the extensive literature review (Chapter 
3). 
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7.3.2 Sample size and sample selection strategy 
Usually, collecting data from a large and infinite population is a difficult task 
which requires both long lead time and high cost. Marques de Sa, (2007) 
asserted that ‘population data is usually not available for study, since most often 
it is either infinite or finite but very costly to collect’. Similarly, Corbetta (2003) 
stated that research cannot be carried out on a social reality in its entirety. 
Therefore, the researcher has to draw a subset or sample from the population 
to have a look at and extract data from. This population subset or sample shall 
be representative of the studied population- ‘that it represents a small image of 
it’ (Marques de Sa, 2007). In a survey, a sample consists of those members of 
the population who are actually consulted. 
As pointed out by Marques de Sa, (2007), a representative sample should not 
mean having a composition similar to the composition of the population, rather 
this sample should be drawn randomly. 
Barreiro and Albandoz, (2011) distinguish between probability sample and non-
probability (haphazard) sample. For them ‘a random choice is by no means a 
choice without rules’. Therefore, a random sampling is inherently a probability 
sampling which follows certain criteria and procedure that enable the results 
obtained to be generalized to the whole population. According to Ladner (2008), 
probability methods include random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified 
and multi-stage cluster sampling. In non-probability sampling, subjects are 
picked up from the population in a non-random manner. These include 
convenience sampling, theoretical sampling, quota sampling, and snowball 
sampling. 
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Figure 7.3 Type of samples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Ladner, 2008) 
 
Sampling a representative panel of respondents from the international 
population of managers and experts in the area of safety and security RM in the 
LNG ports SCs is a crucial exercise to the validity and generalisability of the 
research results. For this study, a stratified sampling technique has been 
selected to recruit experts for the online survey (Attached as Appendix 4). The 
first step was to decide about the groups or strata of the panel experts. The 
following criteria were used to define the panel groups: 
 The groups must cover all disciplines and specialties with direct and indirect 
impact on RM in the LNG ports SC. 
 Members of each group shall be homogenous and belonging to a relevant 
LNG port discipline.  
The criteria for selecting respondents for all groups are: 
Probability samples 
Multi-stage 
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Systematic 
Random 
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219 
 
 Individual respondents must have sufficient expertise in their respective 
areas; not less than 10 years of experience for managers of LNG ports and 
terminal operators, as well as for consultants, HSE and security executives.   
 Individual respondents shall have experience in LNG ports and terminal 
operations. 
Furthermore, individual expert respondents were chosen from different parts of 
the world with experiences spanning the Middle East, Europe, south East Asia 
and the Americas. 
For this research, most of the panel respondents were randomly selected from 
experts satisfying the above criteria who participated, with the author, to the 
international LNG Outlook seminar held in Dubai in May 2012.  
Table 7.4 Structure of the panel respondents 
No Category of panel 
members 
Number consulted Number 
Responded 
1 LNG port logistics and LNG 
terminal managers 
20 13 
2 LNG Shipping Managers 20 8 
3 
 
LNG port security 
specialists 
 
20 5 
 
4 LNG HSE specialists 20 6 
5 LNG quality specialists 20 4 
6 Academia and consultants 
with LNG knowledge 
50 26 
 Total 150 (100%) 62 (41%) 
Source: the author 
Table 7.4 shows the structure of the panel respondents comprising the six 
professional categories deemed of international expertise covering the research 
subject. Six professional groups were selected to provide expert opinion on the 
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safety and security risks of LNG ports SCs. These groups believed to cover all 
disciplines and specialties having direct or indirect involvement in the 
management of safety and security risks in LNG ports. Thus stratified sampling 
is the technique selected for the purpose of this survey.  
As asserted by Marshal & Rossam (1999), the persons surveyed are managers 
and leaders in their respective organisations and therefore, they are highly 
influential, well informed and can provide expert opinion about the survey 
research subject. This is thus an elite interviewing method proven to be highly 
beneficial as it strengthens the reliability and validity of the data.   
From table 7.4 above, a total of 150 questionnaires were emailed and 62 
responses were received; a response rate of 41.33% is achieved. Such 
response rate remains acceptable by the study requirements and can be 
explained by the following factors: 
First, it is noticed that the consultation period coincided with the summer 
holidays (July and August). Since most participants were invited through their 
business emails, many did not respond back, most probably because they were 
busy or they usually don’t check their business emails during that period.  
Second, out of 20 port security professionals initially consulted, only 5 have 
responded. It is noticed that ports and terminal security managers are reluctant 
to provide opinion on surveys addressing security issues, probably because, 
from their perspective, such information is considered security sensitive.  The 
consultation period ended on 2nd September 2012 and late replies were not 
accepted.  
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7.3.3 Data analysis 
The objective of the present analysis is to quantitatively test and validate the 
Delphi results according to the data collected as a result of the survey. Such 
data should be consistent with the idea that the retained variables measure four 
different constructs or factors. 
First, a Principal Axis Factoring Analysis is conducted.  This analysis attempted 
to create factors, which are linear combinations of the variables (the 27 items on 
the questionnaire) that estimate the “latent variables” or constructs that the 
instrument is measuring.  The Principal Axis Factoring analysis method of 
creating factors attempts to create them in such a way that alpha (reliability) is 
maximized.  Factors can be created as much as there are variables, but that is 
not the intention.  Since it is claimed earlier that this instrument measures four 
constructs, SPSS is asked to create only four factors. More details on SPSS 
results can be found in Appendix 6. 
7.3.4 Methodology 
All data in the returned questionnaires (responses) was manually input into 
SPSS.  
Report queries were then written to enable the data to be extracted and 
analysed. All responses included multiple choices. This consultation exercise 
was not a referendum or a vote, its purpose was to seek the opinion of a panel 
of experts in the LNG Ports SCs, mainly on safety and security risk assessment 
and management methods, approaches and practices. The main objective of 
such exercise is to test and validate the findings of the Delphi surveys. 
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7.3.5 Results 
Table 7.5 Frequency results 
Statements % Agree & 
strongly Agree 
(A) 
% Disagree & 
strongly 
disagree (D) 
% Neutral 
(N) 
Final 
result 
Q2 82.5 - - Agree 
Q3 87.1 - - Agree 
Q4 56.5 8.1 35.5 Agree 
Q5 72.6 - - Agree 
Q6 71.0 - - Agree 
Q7 54.9 25.8 19.4 Agree 
Q8 61.3 - 29.0 Agree 
Q9 61.3 - 32.3 Agree 
Q10 80.6 - - Agree 
Q11 66.1 - - Agree 
Q12 67.8 - 29.0 Agree 
Q13 92.0 - 6.5 Agree 
Q14 35.5 22.6 29.00 Agree 
Q15 27.4 19.3 53.2 Neutral 
Q16 48.4 22.6 29 Agree 
Q17 77.4 - 22.6 Agree 
Q18 35.6 8.1 56.5 Neutral 
Q19 77.4 - 19.4 Agree 
Q20 85.5 - 14.5 Agree 
Q21 58.0 - 32.2 Agree 
Q22 61.3 - 21.0 Agree 
Q23 75.8 - 21.0 Agree 
Q24 82.3 - 16.1 Agree 
Q25 79.0 - 17.7 Agree 
Q26 67.7 - 25.8 Agree 
Q27 82.3 - 14.5 Agree 
Q28 80.7 - 16.1 Agree 
Source: the author 
The final result for each question should be either ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’ or 
‘Neutral’ , following the highest percentage score of responses achieved. 
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a) Factor Analysis 
A factor analysis is defined as a method for simplifying complex sets of data 
(Kline, 1994). A factor analysis addresses the structure of the inter-relationship 
or correlation of a factor among a large number of variables by defining a set of 
common underlying dimensions (Hair et al.., 1995). A factor analysis technique 
helps achieving a number of objectives: 
1. It can be used to assess or to identify the structure and degree of 
relationships among a set of variables, which are tapping one concept 
(correlation between variables). 
2. A factor analysis may be applied to a correlation matrix of an individual 
respondent based on their characteristics.  
3. A study may have a large number of variables and issues and a factor 
analysis can be applied to reduce a large set of variables to a much smaller 
set of variables.  
4. The use of factor analysis is to condense a large number of variables into a 
more limited number of factors. 
5. A factor analysis also tests the reliability of data.  
6. A factor analysis can be employed to create an entirely new set of variables, 
smaller in number, to replace the original set of variables for inclusion in a 
subsequent technique.  
Earlier in this chapter, four (4) dimensions or conceptual categories of RM are 
found in the LNG Ports SC, but more than fifty issues or variables are obtained 
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as a result of the two rounds of Delphi study undertaken. Thus, the research 
applies factor analysis to examine whether the issues could be condensed to a 
smaller number of dimensions.  
According to Cronbach (1951), the two most widely used forms of factor 
analysis are principal- component analysis and principal- factor analysis (in 
SPSS named as principal-axis factoring). A factor analysis is mainly concerned 
with describing the variation (or variance), which is shared by the scores of 
respondents on the variables. This is called common variance. A variable may 
have specific variance, which is unique and not shared with other variables and 
thus obviously is distinguished from the common variance. There may be 
another type of variance, error variance, which is the variation due to fluctuation 
or error in measuring something. But a factor analysis cannot distinguish error 
and specific variance. Thus these two variations combine to form unique 
variance. So, total variance = common variance + unique variance. In a 
principal-component analysis all (both common and unique) variances of a 
score or variable are analysed whereas in a principal-axis analysis only a 
common variance is analysed. Therefore, a principal component analysis is 
considered perfect, reliable and without error. For the sake of the present study, 
the following steps will be followed for conducting survey analysis: 
 Extraction of factors 
 Calculate a correlation matrix of all variables 
 Rotation of factors to create a more understandable factor structure 
 Conduct a reliability and validity test 
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 Testing of hypotheses 
 Interpretation of results 
Extraction of factors 
The prime objective of factor extraction is to make an initial decision about the 
number of factors underlying a set of measured variables. The first stage 
involves extracting factors from a correlation matrix to get the number of factors.  
Principal component analysis is used to facilitate these decisions (Green et al., 
1997). The first step of factor analysis through SPSS is to select the 
combinations of variables whose shared correlation explains the greatest 
amount of total variance. The first extracted factor of a principal components 
analysis (unrotated solution) is termed factor 1. Then factor 2 that is the 
combination of variables that explains the greatest amount of the variance 
remaining (after factor 1 extraction). This process continues until as many 
factors have been extracted as there are variables. There are mainly two criteria 
to decide which factor to include and which to exclude. The first criterion, known 
as Kaiser’s criterion, is to select those factors having eigenvalue, the variability 
of a factor, greater than one. The underlying reason of setting this criterion is 
that the total variance of any variable has been set (standardised) at one. In 
other words the factors having eigenvalue less than one (which explains less 
variance) are excluded. But in large matrices this greatly overestimates the 
number of factors. The relative magnitude of eigenvalue has to be considered 
and the researcher should have an initial decision about the number of factors 
based on the a priori conceptual beliefs (hypotheses) about the number of 
underlying dimensions. In this study, four conceptual dimensions are retained 
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which are used throughout the previous Delphi analysis. The same set of 
categories will continue to be considered and their correlations with the 27 
variables forming the survey will be further checked.    
Therefore, we requested SPSS to create only four factors.  The communalities 
in the extracted column tell us how much variance each variable has in common 
with the four factors. Items 2, 5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 22 and 28 were found to have 
disturbingly low values.  If a variable does not share much variance with the 
other variables or with the retained factors, it is unlikely to be useful in defining a 
factor. By checking the above nine (9) variables, it was found that they have no 
impact on the validity of the factors; therefore, they were simply excluded from 
the analysis. Consequently, 18 variables are left which are to form the four 
factors or conceptual categories.  
The factor matrix gives us the loadings that are the correlations between each 
variable and each factor. Note that items 3, 4 and 6 are positively correlated 
with Factor 1(part1) and items 8 through 10 are positively correlated with Factor 
2 (part2) and items 12, 13, and items 17 through 21 are positively correlated 
with Factor 3 (part3), and items 23 through 27 are positively correlated with 
Factor 4 (part4). 
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Rotated Factor Matrix 
 Factors 
 1 2 3 4 
Q6 .681 .396 .298 .333 
Q3 .471 .121 .065 .116 
Q4 .422 .008 -.013- .043 
Q25 .551 .575 .312 .191 
Q27 .118 .572 -.124- .270 
Q26 .546 .549 .121 .355 
Q24 .538 .546 .154 -.033- 
Q23 .442 .487 .172 .102 
Q20 -.097- .537 .622 -.073- 
Q17 .200 .150 .590 .178 
Q12 .501 .019 .526 .349 
Q19 .004 .375 .467 .064 
Q18 -.087- -.091- .445 -.106- 
Q21 .241 .180 .437 .058 
Q13 .225 -.043- .435 .085 
Q10 -.050- .181 .329 .706 
Q9 .213 .097 -.007- .585 
Q8 .111 .041 -.035- .454 
Extraction Method: Unweighted Least Squares.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
 
 
b) Reliability Analysis 
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Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is a measure of reliability. More specifically, 
alpha is a lower bound for the true reliability of the survey.  
Mathematically, reliability is defined as the proportion of the variability in the 
responses to the survey that is the result of differences in respondents’ 
opinions. That is, answers to a reliable survey will differ because respondents 
have different opinions, not because the survey is confusing or has multiple 
interpretations. The computation of Cronbach's alpha is based on the number of 
items on the survey (k) and the ratio of the average inter-item covariance to the 
average item variance (Cronbach, 1951). 
α= k (cov/var) 1/ (k−1) (cov/var) 
Under the assumption that the item variances are all equal, this ratio simplifies 
to the average inter-item correlation, and the result is known as the 
standardized item alpha (or Spearman-Brown stepped-up reliability coefficient).  
α=kr1/ (k−1) r 
1. Factor 1 (Part 1) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.626 3 
Look at the output for the Factor1 items (Part 1).  Cronbach’s alpha is 0.626, 
which is an acceptable value for a research instrument. 
2. Factor 2 (Part2) 
Reliability Statistics 
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Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.619 3 
 
The output for the second Factor items also shows an acceptable alpha 0.619. 
3. Factor3 (Part3) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.727 7 
 
The output for the third Factor items also shows an acceptable alpha 0.727.   
4. Factor4 (Part 4) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.846 5 
The output for the fourth Factor items also shows an acceptable alpha 0. 846.   
Table 7.6 Summary of Reliability & Validity 
  
 
N of items Reliability Validity 
   Factor1 3 0.626 0.79 
   Factor2 3 0.619 0.79 
   Factor3 7 0.727 0.85 
   Factor4 5 0.846 0.92 
   Total 18 0.846 0.92 
   
       Validity (y)= the square root of reliability (x) 
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c) Means by group 
 Table 7.7 Means by group 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean 
Q3 62 4.13 
Q4 62 3.53 
Q6 62 3.82 
Q8 62 3.58 
Q9 62 3.76 
Q10 62 3.94 
Q12 62 3.74 
Q13 62 4.35 
Q17 62 4.02 
Q18 62 3.39 
Q19 62 3.97 
Q20 62 4.06 
Q21 62 3.63 
Q23 62 3.81 
Q24 62 4.02 
Q25 62 3.90 
Q26 62 3.76 
Q27 62 4.05 
Valid N (list 
wise) 
62 
3.86 
Source: the author 
d) Likert Scales and Likert-Type Items 
According to Bertram (2012), a Likert scale is a psychometric response scale 
used in surveys to obtain a participant’s degree of agreement/ disagreement 
with the survey statements. Individual items in Likert’s sample scale had five 
response alternatives: Strongly approve, Approve, Undecided, Disapprove, and 
Strongly disapprove. It is named after Dr Rensis Likert, a sociologist from the 
University of Michigan, who developed the technique.  Likert noted that 
descriptors could be anything – it is not necessary to have negative and positive 
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responses. He implies that the number of alternatives is also open to 
manipulation. Indeed, contemporary work using many classifications exists 
besides the traditional five point classifications; some researchers use an even 
number of categories, deleting the neutral response (Likert, 1932). 
Table 7.8 Likert scale 
Weighted mean Level Attitude 
From 1 to 1.79 1 Completely disagree 
From 1.8 to 2.59 2 Disagree 
From 2.6 to 3.39 3 Neutral 
From 3.4 to 4.19 4 Agree 
From 4.2 to 5 5 Completely agree 
Source: (Likert, 1932) 
According to Likert scale, all variables can be arranged as follow: 
Table 7.9 List of variables according to Likert Scale 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Attitude 
Q3 62 4.13 4 
Q4 62 3.53 4 
Q6 62 3.82 4 
Q8 62 3.58 4 
Q9 62 3.76 4 
Q10 62 3.94 4 
Q12 62 3.74 4 
Q13 62 4.35 5 
Q17 62 4.02 4 
Q18 62 3.39 3 
Q19 62 3.97 4 
Q20 62 4.06 4 
Q21 62 3.63 4 
Q23 62 3.81 4 
Q24 62 4.02 4 
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Q25 62 3.90 4 
Q26 62 3.76 4 
Q27 62 4.05 4 
Valid N (list wise) 62 3.86 4 
Source: the author 
Summary 
According to the Likert scale, the four groups can be arranged as follows: 
Table 7.10 List of groups according to Likert scale 
 N Mean Level Attitude 
Group1 62 3.95 4 Agree 
Group2 62 3.84 4 Agree 
Group3 62 4.05 4 Agree 
Group4 62 4.19 4 Agree 
Source: the author 
7.4  STATISTICAL TESTS 
Likelihood chi-squared tests  
 
Agresti (2002, p. 24) stated that ‘the likelihood ratio chi-squared is an alternative 
test for multinomial parameters’. As such,this test is an alternative to the 
standard chi-square test. Weaver (2008) stated that this procedure has been 
around since the 1950s. According to Hays (1963) and Howell (1997), there is 
reason to believe that likelihood ratio tests are less affected by relatively small 
sample sizes than the Standard Chi-Square. (Scheaffer, 1999, p.7) Noted that 
since ‘the P- value of the chi-square test of association is very sensitive to the 
sample size; we need other measures to describe the strength of the 
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relationship’. Hays suggests that the likelihood ratio test is superior, especially 
when the degree of freedom – df >1. 
Accordingly, the Likelihood chi-squared test coupled with the strength of 
relationship test- Gamma is selected due to its quality as being less affected by 
the relatively small sample size as is the case with our data. It is used in this 
research to see whether there is a significant difference between the Delphi 
findings obtained as a result of the two rounds Delphi exercise and the online 
survey results. The objective is to quantitatively test and validate the Delphi 
results according to the data collected as a result of the present survey.   
Another reason for not using the standard chi-square test is the condition that 
data should reflect no more than 25% of cells having expected values less than 
5; which could not be met in our case (Saunders et.al , 2009). To avoid this 
shortcoming, the response scale is limited to only a three response options 
scale instead of the 5 response options suggested by Likert. According to Likert 
(1932) the number of alternatives forming the response scale is open to 
manipulation. Therefore, the following 3 options are considered: 
1- Disagree and strongly disagree; 
2- Neutral; 
3- Agree and strongly agree. 
This way, the ratio between the sample size and the product of rows and 
columns (R x C) will became N/RC= 62/ 9 > 5 
a. Hypothesis: H0: no relation, H1: have a relation. 
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Research Hypotheses 
The findings of the two rounds of the Delphi study conducted so far led to five 
main conclusions which fall under four conceptual dimensions or categories. In 
order to confirm and validate such results, these five main categories are 
considered as hypotheses for our factor analysis study. These five hypotheses 
(H) are: 
H1- Security risks are now equally as important as safety risks in LNG ports and 
marine terminals. 
This Hypothesis is supported by the following survey questions: 
Q.3 Security risks are now equally as important as safety risks in LNG ports and 
marine terminals. 
Q.4 The size and accessibility of LNG ports and marine terminal facilities makes 
them very difficult to protect against terrorist threats. Much more work and 
international cooperation is required to improve security controls. 
Q.6 Current security frameworks are still treating individual terminal facilities in 
relative isolation. Enhanced security protection requires a coordinated approach 
by integrating processes and systems at a local level if not on a regional and 
global basis. 
The above survey questions support the idea that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in the U.S, security risks have become important as safety risks and hence 
need to be treated on the same level of importance as safety risks and 
integrated within the routine risk assessment and management portfolio of LNG 
ports.  
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H2- There is a need for a standard safety framework to address LNG port 
offshore and onshore safety operations as well as the ship/ port interface. 
Hypothesis 2 is supported by the following survey questions: 
Q.8 Although safety of each individual member of the LNG Port Supply Chain is 
the responsibility of each individual member, safety of the whole LNG port 
Supply Chain is a joint responsibility which has to be coordinated and ensured 
by the port authority. 
Q.9 The IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for shipping should be 
extended to address port safety as well (onshore port operations). 
Q.10 A standard safety framework is necessary to address both LNG port 
offshore and onshore safety operations as well as the ship/ port interface. 
The above survey questions and their results attest to the need for a standard 
LNG port safety framework capable of addressing both onshore and offshore 
port operations. 
H3- Coordinated management of safety and security risks will positively impact 
the overall RM in LNG port SCs.  
H4- A unified RM methodology (an all hazards approach) for assessing both 
safety and security risks is more cost effective than a RM methodology in which 
security and safety risks are managed separately and with less coordination. 
Both hypotheses 3 and 4 belong to the same conceptual dimension ‘Interfaces 
between LNG Ports Safety and security’ and share the following survey 
questions: 
   
236 
 
Q.12 Safety and security in LNG ports Supply Chains are closely related issues 
and may yield better outcome if managed in an integrative manner within the 
framework of a unified risk management approach and through a single port 
supply chain entity. 
Q.13 Generally in practice, risk assessment in safety and security follow similar 
risk assessment and management steps.  
Q.17 Although safety and security risks in LNG port Supply Chains are two 
disciplines that may have different requirements, their management should be 
coordinated within the framework of a holistic approach to achieve resilient and 
cost effective risk management in LNG port Supply Chains.  
Q.18 Mitigation strategies are efficiently applied within the framework of a 
comprehensive risk management strategy in LNG Port Supply Chains. 
Q.19 A unified risk management methodology for assessing both safety and 
security risks and hazards can be more cost effective than a risk management 
methodology in which security and safety risks are managed separately and 
with less coordination. 
Q.20 An all-hazards approach in which safety security, natural disasters risks 
are assessed and managed is needed in LNG Ports supply chains to develop a 
cost effective and efficient risk management strategy. 
Q.21 Implementation and coordination of such all-hazards approach should be 
coordinated by the LNG port authority. 
It is clear from the above 7 questions, all of them support well both hypotheses 
3 and 4. These two hypotheses explain and justify the conceptual dimension 
related to the interfaces and shared impacts between safety and security RM, 
which is indeed the central theme of the study. Since safety and security 
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interfaces and their shared impacts pose a number of questions and issues in 
connection with the optimal approach to manage them from a port supply chain 
perspective and from the stand point of an integrated approach, the author finds 
it necessary to have more than one hypothesis to explain and justify that 
particular conceptual category.    
 
H5- An all-hazards approach needs to be qualitatively assured according to the 
principles of TQM.  
The above assumption is supported by the following survey questions: 
Q.23 Safety and security risk assessment and management need to take 
advantage of the Total Quality Management (TQM) Principles. 
 
Q.24 Prevention is the key principle in Total Quality Management (TQM) and 
should also be for the case of safety and security management. 
 
Q.25 Based on the principles of TQM, LNG port supply chains should adopt an 
integrated risk assessment and management approach capable of dealing with 
the three types of risks, safety, security and quality.  
 
Q.26 Adopting such an integrative approach will lead to efficient and cost 
effective risk management in LNG Ports SCs. 
 
Q.27 Integrated LNG Port Supply chain risk management should be assured 
through a quality assurance system based on the TQM. 
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These survey questions and their results attest to the need for the integrated 
approach to risks to be qualitatively assured according to the principles of Total 
Quality Management (TQM). 
a) Testing of Hypotheses: 
Each hypothesis is presented along with descriptive statistics. Corresponding 
tables are described as well. Likelihood ratio chi-squared coupled with Gamma 
tests were used to check the five null hypotheses. Significance was tested at 
the alpha = 0.05 level. Therefore, if the probability of occurrence of the 
calculated test statistic is less than or equal to the probability of alpha, a Type 1 
error, the null hypothesis is rejected and it is then concluded that the result 
supports the research hypothesis with more than 95% confidence.  Therefore, it 
is concluded that there is a relationship between the variables. The data was 
analysed to produce results for the following research questions.  
Research Question1 
H1: Security risks are now equally as important as safety risks in LNG 
ports and marine terminals. 
Is there a relationship between the importance of security risks and safety 
risks?  
H1ₒ: There is no relationship between Security risks and Safety risks in terms of 
importance to the LNG ports SCs 
H1ₐ: There is a relationship between Security risks and Safety risks in terms of 
importance to the LNG ports SCs 
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Likelihood chi-Squared Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
    
Likelihood Ratio 9.741 4 .045 
    
N of Valid Cases 62   
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Gamma .369 .248 1.285 .199 
N of Valid Cases 62    
 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
The table of likelihood chi-squared tests shows the Asymp. Sig. (or Alpha level 
of significance) is .045, as 0.045 is smaller than α=0.05, which means that the 
hypothesis null H1ₒ is rejected. This confirms our hypothesis that a relationship 
between Security risks and Safety risks exists in terms of importance to the 
LNG Ports SCs. Although the likelihood ratio is statistically significant, the 
gamma value shows a less strong relationship, which means that safety risks 
and security risks are not equally important within the LNG port SCs RM 
system.   
As explained earlier in chapter 2, security risks in general gained importance 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and became a critical issue to hydrocarbon ports, 
including LNG.  Since there is a demonstrated relationship among the two 
disciplines of risk such as interfaces and shared impacts, a coordinated and 
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unified approach in their risk assessment and management is crucial in 
achieving a robust and resilient LNG port SCs. 
Research Question 2 
H2. There is a need for a standard safety framework to address LNG port 
offshore and onshore safety operations as well as the ship/ port interface. 
H2ₒ: There is no relation between the need for a standard safety framework and 
the onshore/offshore safety operations.  
H2ₐ: There is a relationship between the need for a standard safety framework 
and the onshore/ offshore safety operations.  
 
Likelihood chi-Squared Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
    
Likelihood Ratio 16.153 4 .003 
    
N of Valid Cases 62   
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Gamma .586 .181 2.354 .019 
N of Valid Cases 62    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.    
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.  
 
The table of likelihood chi-squared tests shows, the Asymp. Sig. is .003, as .003 
is smaller than α= 0.05, which means that the hypothesis null H2ₒ is rejected. 
Also Gamma value attests to the existence of a strong relationship in this 
respect. 
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So, as per Gamma= .019, there is a strong relationship between the need for a 
standard safety framework and onshore/ offshore safety operations. This result 
confirms our hypothesis that a standard safety framework is needed to address 
LNG port offshore and onshore safety operations as well as the ship/ port 
interface. In this regards, respondents believe that the IMO’s FSA, as a safety 
framework for shipping, should be extended to address port safety as well.     
Research Question 3 
Coordinated management of safety and security risks will positively impact the 
overall RM in LNG port SCs.  
H3ₒ: There is no relation between coordinated management of safety and 
security risks and the efficiency of overall RM in LNG port SCs  
H3ₐ: There is a relationship between coordinated management of safety and 
security risks and the overall RM in LNG port SCs.  
The table of likelihood chi-squared tests shows, the Asymp. Sig. is .004, as .004 
is smaller than α=0.05, which means that the hypothesis null H3ₒ is rejected. 
So, there is a relationship between coordinated management of safety and 
security risks and the efficiency of overall RM in LNG port SCs. Also, Gamma 
value computed at the level of .038 attests to the strength of this relationship. 
This result confirms our hypothesis.  
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Likelihood chi-Squared Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
    
Likelihood Ratio 10.927 2 .004 
    
N of Valid Cases 62   
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Gamma .892 .087 2.076 .038 
N of Valid Cases 62    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.    
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.  
Research Question 4 
A unified RM methodology (an all hazards approach) for assessing both safety 
and security risks is more cost effective than a RM methodology in which 
security and safety risks are managed separately and with less coordination. 
H4ₒ: There is no relation between unified RM methodology for assessing safety 
and security risks and the overall cost effectiveness of such type of 
management. 
H4ₐ: There is a relation between unified RM methodology for assessing safety 
and security risks and the overall cost effectiveness of such management. 
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Likelihood chi-Squared Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
    
Likelihood Ratio 11.124 2 .004 
    
N of Valid Cases 62   
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Gamma .864 .112 1.998 .046 
N of Valid Cases 62    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.    
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.  
 
The table of likelihood chi-squared tests shows the Asymp. Sig. is .004, as .004 
is smaller than α=0.05 it is statistically significant, which means that the 
hypothesis null H4ₒ is rejected. So, there is a relationship between unified RM 
methodology for assessing safety and security risks and the cost effectiveness 
of such management. This result confirms our hypothesis that a unified RM 
methodology (an all hazards approach) for assessing both safety and security 
risks is more cost effective than a RM methodology in which security and safety 
risks are managed separately and with less coordination. 
This confirms our earlier findings that an all- hazards approach for LNG ports 
risk assessment and management is perceived as both cost effective and 
efficient in addressing safety and security risks and hazards. An all-hazards 
approach provides a framework for coordinated RM, be them safety or security 
related risks.  As explained in research question 3, the outcome of such 
coordination is an efficient RM of safety and security risks with less cost during 
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all stages of RM. This means better protection of LNG port facilities and SC 
members at the port, as well as less disruption to the LNG supply to 
international markets.  
Such a holistic approach ensures cost effective and timely RM as well as 
reliable supply of LNG commodity. 
Research Question 5 
An all-hazards approach needs to be qualitatively assured according to the 
principles of Total Quality Management (TQM).  
H5ₒ: There is no relation between the all-hazards approach and quality 
assurance as per the principles of TQM.  
H5ₐ: There is a relation between the all-hazards approach and quality 
assurance as per the principles of Total Quality Management (TQM). 
Likelihood chi-Squared Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
    
Likelihood Ratio 9.810 2 .007 
    
N of Valid Cases 62   
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Gamma .847 .112 2.272 .023 
N of Valid Cases 62    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.    
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.  
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The table of Likelihood chi-squared tests shows, the Asymp. Sig. is .007, as 
.007 is smaller than α=0.05, which means that the hypothesis null H5ₒ is 
rejected. So, there is a relationship between the all-hazards approach and 
quality assurance as per the principles of TQM. Also, Gamma significance level 
is .023 which attests to the strength of such relationship. This result confirms 
our hypothesis that quality assurance of the all-hazards approach is so 
important to its successful application in the area of LNG Port SCs RM.  
Most respondents confirmed that underpinning any continual improvement 
culture, in terms of security provision, interaction with HSE and mitigation of 
both sets of risks cooperatively and effectively can only be based on the 
adoption of quality assurance systems by both parties, namely LNG port 
security and safety providers in full coordination with the Port authority. Most 
security providers, which adopt quality assurance management systems, use 
ISO 9001 that is mostly focused on the management of guard forces and not on 
operational performance of the guards on the ground, and contributing to the 
customers operation/ HSE programs. That is why the focus now is on 
operational performance that adds value to the port business,  
especially from a joint HSE and Security point of view. 
Finally, the above results confirm the fact that LNG Port SCs need to adopt an 
integrated risk assessment and management approach based on the principles 
of TQM.  Among the key principles of TQM is ‘prevention’ which should be 
applied in both safety and security RM in LNG ports to ensure resilient LNG port 
SCs.  
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Generally, risk can be managed by prevention or mitigation. Prevention seeks 
to avoid an accident or attack; mitigation reduces the effects of an accident or 
attack. In the LNG industry, combination of these two types of strategies can 
only improve both safety and security involving either accidental or intentional 
incidents. According to Sandia (2004, p: 55), RM should be based on 
developing or combining approaches that can be efficiently and effectively 
implemented to reduce hazards to acceptable levels in cost-effective manner.  
Although prevention should be the focus of any LNG RM strategy, mitigation 
strategies should always be in place to deal with uncontrolled LNG spill 
incidents whatever their source is.   
7.5  CONCLUSION 
From the above, it is clear that both safety and security disciplines within the 
LNG port SC have to work together collaboratively during all stages of risk 
assessment and management. This is for the benefit of a resilient and cost 
effective RM enabling smooth handling and storage of LNG through the port to 
serve the international energy markets without disruption.  
However such collaboration needs to be accommodated through the port 
community led by the port authority. Also, such collaborative work among safety 
and security departments within LNG ports needs to be qualitatively assured to 
ensure efficiency and cost effectiveness. By applying a quality system to both 
safety and security planning and operations, the outcome of risk assessment 
from both disciplines can be easily auditable to ensure efficiency and avoid 
redundant or contradictory actions. 
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It is paramount to ensure that mitigation measures from one discipline (either 
safety or security) have no negative impact on the other domain of risk. As a 
practical example of such possible impact, the security department at an LNG 
port may decide to install a security fence along the port perimeter to prevent 
unlawful access to the port. While this may be regarded as a legitimate action to 
strengthen security, it may negatively impact HSE strategy of having a safety 
emergency gate at that location. In this case, if no coordination is maintained 
between safety and security departments, implementing the security strategy at 
the port perimeter may be detrimental to the safety of port users in case of 
emergency. Furthermore, collaborative actions among safety and security 
departments within LNG ports will require clear procedures and protocols which 
need to be agreed upon by all port stakeholders, signed off and then applied 
and controlled during and after their planning and implementation stages. 
Having agreed on the principles which should govern the relationship between 
safety and security risks assessment and management in LNG ports, the next 
step in our analysis will be to draw a conceptual model depicting the flows of 
activities and relationships as well as methods of collaboration between the two 
professions of RM.  
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CHAPTER 8 
INTEGRATED LNG PORT SC RM 
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Extant RM in the LNG port SC system reveals a disintegrated management of 
risks, in which each type of risk is assessed and dealt with independently and 
without consideration of the interplays, interfaces as well as possible impacts 
between the other types of risks, for instance safety and security.  Such a 
disintegrated approach may not enable efficient nor cost effective RM which in 
turn may impact the overall level of risk controls and constitute an obstacle to 
the objective of achieving a resilient ports SC as a critical node of the global SC 
delivering LNG commodity to the world. The triangulation conducted so far 
enabled to confirm the findings from both the extensive literature review and the 
two rounds of Delphi surveys.  These findings confirmed a relationship between 
safety and security risks in LNG ports which requires high levels of collaboration 
and interface management within the framework of an all-hazard approach. This 
is to ensure a resilient and cost effective risk assessment and management to 
the interest of a resilient LNG Port SC.   
In order to show relationships and flows and present the proposed integrated 
port SC risk assessment and management system in contrast to the existing 
real-world system of RM, it is decided to build a conceptual model (CM) using a 
systems thinking approach (STA).  Selection of the STA, particularly the soft 
system methodology (SSM) is due to its attributes in representing the real world 
complex problems and its ease in depicting relationships, actions and flows of 
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such problems. All these will assist in proposing a CM for an integrated RM of 
LNG ports SC. 
8.1.1 Systems Thinking 
As defined by Marsiglia (2008, p.2), 
‘Systems thinking is a holistic approach to understanding reality and our 
interactions within it. This approach requires that we see beyond the bits 
and pieces of reality in order to understand systems.’  
Marsiglia (2008, p2) explained that such an approach is actually difficult for 
many people since ‘early in our lives, we are taught to break apart problems to 
make them more manageable. Consequently, we fail to see the entire effect of 
our activities’. 
Systems thinking has been defined as an approach to problem solving by 
looking at the problem as part of an overall system, in contrast with the 
reductive approach brought originally by Descartes, which recommends 
breaking down the problem into its component parts, addressing each part and 
then building the solution up again (Greswell, 1998). Also, Wilson (1984, p.10) 
asserted that the main objective of systems thinking is 'the attainment of public 
knowledge of the kind which science accumulates by means of a modified 
scientific approach in which a form of holism replaces reductionism'.  
Furthermore, Anderson, Britt & Favre (1997) characterising successful 
initiatives to improve SC management (SCM), stated that, among others, such 
initiatives reflect a holistic approach, viewing the SC from end to end and 
making sure that the whole improvement achieved in revenue, costs, and asset 
utilisation is greater than the sum of its parts.  
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Systems thinking has evolved into a conceptual framework that has been 
developed over the past fifty years to make the full pattern clearer and help us 
to figure out how we can change them effectively (Senge, 2006 p7). 
Furthermore, Checkland (1999, p.14) states,  
“…systems concepts are concerned with wholes and their hierarchical 
arrangement rather than with the whole”  
Edson (2008, p. 3) argued that much of the world today still persists in the 
‘machine-age thinking’, rather than the ‘system-age thinking’. For him, such an 
approach is no longer valid in a system-age where individual parts do not 
equate to the system and where the systems’ environment is just as important 
as its individual components. 
As a process, systems’ thinking is generally defined as an ordered and 
methodical approach to understanding problems and finding solutions to those 
problems (Edson 2011; Checkland 1999). As part of this process, the problem 
is assessed within its environment and in due consideration of its context 
(Senge, 2006).  Marsiglia (2008) further stressed that the core link between 
Checkland and Senge systems thinking is the importance of the learning 
process within a learning organisation. For them, 
‘Through learning we expand our capacity to create, to be part of the 
generative process of life’ Marsiglia (2008, p.14). 
8.1.2 The system in systems thinking 
According to Edson (2011), a system is a set of two or more elements which 
satisfy three conditions: 1. Each element of the system has an effect on the 
other elements; 2. Each element impacts the whole system and; 3. The 
elements of the system are so connected that subgroups of them cannot be 
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formed. Such a definition prescribes that the system is a whole that cannot be 
divided into independent parts. Checkland (1981) in Greswell (1998) stated that 
the system can be defined either from ontological or epistemological viewpoints.   
The ontological view of a system stresses that because the system exists in the 
real world, it is tangible and can be seen and smelt; whereas the 
epistemological view defines the world in system representation which is an 
abstract approach to a system used to explain and facilitate the understanding 
of the system (Greswell, 1998).  Edson (2011, p.7) asserted that the system can 
take the form of a problem as well as the process of assessment and the path 
used to gain understanding and analysis of the problem. All these aspects and 
perspectives of the system are critical to understanding systems thinking. 
Edson (2011) based on Checkland (1999) differentiates between two important 
parts of the body of systems knowledge; for instance, hard systems 
methodology (HSM) and SSM approaches. Hard systems correspond to a 
systems engineering approach while a soft systems approach is linked to the 
management approach. Engineers seek to understand and explain the problem 
through quantitative means defined as ‘hard’ methods while managers generally 
tend to use qualitative and collaborative ‘soft’ methods. 
Table 8.1 Checkland’s definition of hard and soft systems methodologies 
Hard system 
methodology 
Systems- based methodology also known as ‘system 
engineering’ for tacking real world problems in which an 
objective or end -to be-achieved can be taken as given. A 
system is then engineered to achieve the stated objectives. 
Soft system 
methodology 
Systems- based methodology for tackling real-world problems 
in which known to be desirable ends cannot be taken as 
given. SSM is based upon a phenomenological stance 
Source: Checkland (1999) 
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Hard systems thinking (HST) is usually concerned with a problem that is well 
defined with specific objectives, which assists the analyst in reaching an 
appropriate solution. Greswell (1998) stated that HST usually uses hard 
methods to solve such problems. He argued that hard methods are defined as 
being systemic (holistic) using systematic tools (step by step approach) in 
solving problems. Wilson (1984) describes such type of systems thinking as the 
‘optimisation paradigm’. However, Greswell (1998) argued that the above HST 
methodology is not suitable for human activity systems which are described by 
Checkland (1990) as ‘ill defined’ and less structured. Meanwhile, controversy 
still exist between adepts of soft and hard systems approaches which according 
to Edson (2011) leads to confusion on the value of HSM versus SSM. This led 
Checkland (1999) to try and provide an interesting perspective by asserting that 
hard methods are good in designing systems while soft methods provide ‘a 
systemic process of enquiry’ (See Checkland’s definition above). However 
Edson (2011) proposes an alternative solution to this dilema by asserting that 
an appropriate methodology to solving human activity problems lies in the 
‘applied systems thinking’ which is actually an overlap between soft and hard 
systems thinking.  
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Figure 8.1 Systems thinking synergistic activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Edson (2011) 
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8.1.3 Applied Systems thinking 
Traditional systems’ thinking relies either on HSM or SSM and uses tools 
exclusively and independently from either area. Applied systems thinking 
emphasises the integration of the two approaches.  Such an approach 
recognises that both systems thinking approaches fall within the systems 
thinking construct, but applied systems thinking focuses on the opportunities 
offered by the intersection and overlap between the two approaches Edson 
(2011).     
Figure 8.2 Systems thinking- Applied 
Source: Adapted from Edson (2011) 
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Considering the power and benefits of using hard and soft systems thinking, it is 
important for the applied systems thinker to leverage both methods in order to 
provide adequate explanation and solution to the problem situation under study. 
This combination provides the power in applied systems thinking. (Edson, 
Systems Thinking. Applied. A Primer, 2008) 
 
8.1.4 Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) 
SSM was developed by Peter Checkland and others in the late 60’s at the 
University of Lancaster in the UK. The method was originally conceived as a 
modelling tool, but later on, it has been increasingly seen as a framework for 
learning and problem solving. It allows the structuring of thinking about the real 
world through the use of models as a representation of the real world. Like other 
systems approaches, the core of SSM is a comparison between the world as it 
is, and some models of the world as it might be (Williams, 2005). The benefit 
from such comparison is a better understanding of the world and its problems 
("research"), which enables finding ways for improvement ("action"). According 
to Rose, (1997), SSM is variously characterised by  Checkland & Scholes 
(1990) as a 'system of enquiry', 'enquiry process', 'learning system', 'reflection in 
action', 'an organized version of doing purposeful thinking', and 'structured way 
of thinking'. SSM process is essentially participative and collaborative. Rose, 
(1997) stated that most successful modelling, in his experience, necessarily 
involves the negotiation of meanings between stakeholders. 
In classic SSM, the researcher begins with a real-world problem or situation. He 
studies the situation in a fairly unstructured way, develops some 
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representations of that problem or situation (models), proposes scenarios for 
solutions and finally tries to compare this with the real life (Williams, 2005). 
Checkland’s SSM (1993) as presented in Edson (2008) and Williams (2005) 
identified a seven stage process. Some of them address the real-world and the 
others represent the conceptual world. Edson (2008) stressed that the SSM 
process for assessment and improvement concerns mainly human activities 
systems but it can be applied to technology and hybrid systems as well.  
Figure 8.3 Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology 
 
 
Source: (Checkland 1993) 
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As shown in figure 8.3, Checkland’s soft methodology approach (Checkland, 
1999) is characterised by seven interconnected stages that form a learning 
loop. These stages are: 
Stage1 : Learn about the problem situation without intervening into its structure.  
Stage 2: Describe and explain the problem situation in a comprehensive way. 
Stages one and two correspond actually to the first step, which is, in the real 
world, to acknowledge, explore and define the situation in some way. Peter 
Checkland called it the “problem situation” since his original purpose of 
developing SSM was a problem solving one (Williams, 2005). So, the first task 
is to decide what it is actually to be explored. At this stage the problem is not to 
be explored, but the general area that interests us needs to be assessed. In 
Stage Two the issue is “expressed” in some way. Checkland calls this a rich 
picture for two reasons: Firstly the situation needs to be expressed in all its 
richness and second he suggests this situation to be expressed in a picture 
form. Checkland provides some guidelines as to what should be included, such 
as people, processes, structures, climate, issues expressed by people 
(Williams, 2005). 
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Figure 8.4 Rich picture of a typical LNG value chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:the author 
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That is why Checkland called this the “root definition” stage, and it is the unique 
and most challenging part of the methodology.  
Root definition should be a concise description of the problem situation or 
human activity system. This is expressed in Checkland (1999) in the form of a 
CATWOE mnemonic. The terms of this mnemonic include, Customers (C) who 
are the main actors carrying the principal activities of the system; Actors (A) 
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who facilitate the transformation to these customers; The transformation (T) 
process which trasforms inputs into outputs; Weltanschauung (W) which means 
world view that makes the root definition meaningful; Ownership (O) of the 
system that makes main actors having critical interest in the system; and finally, 
the environmental constraints (E) on the system. 
Stage4.  Construct conceptual models of the system and test them in the real 
world to confirm their validity and appropriateness to bring valid solutions to the 
problem situation. 
Stage5. Compare stage 4 with stage 2. 
Stage6. Develop the desirable changes. According to Checkland (1999), such 
change shall be sytematically desirable as derived from the root definition of the 
problem sitaution and the consceptual models built. 
Stage7. Suggest improvement to the problem situation. 
According to Marsiglia (2008), the key to successful use of SSM is to iterate the 
seven steps until successful results are achieved. For him each iteration 
generates new information about the system which in turn provides better 
learning enabling efficacy of the next system improvement or change.   
Commenting on Checkland‘s SSM, Edson (2008) summarised this approach in 
three basic phases: 
 
1. Develop an understanding of the problem situation. This includes problem 
constraints and goals. From Fig.8.3, this includes stages 1, 2 and 3.  
2. Use systems tools to determine possible alternative solutions to the problem 
situation. Such alternative solutions shall be compared to determine the best 
possible one. Stages 4 and 5 in Fig.8.3. 
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3. Contrast solutions with the real-world problem situation as is to determine its 
feasibility within the actual constraints and desired outcome. This includes 
stages 6 and 7 from Fig.8.3. 
SSM is a participative process which includes all stakeholders who have an 
interest in the system under analysis and who may have an impact on any 
solution intended to change the problem situation. As an example from the 
subject of this research, stakeholders mean the following: 
 The processes: storage, loading and unloading of LNG to tankers, receiving 
and dispatching the LNG vessel from the jetty…etc. 
 People: LNG Port operations, safety professionals, security specialists, port 
management, LNG shipping managers, LNG terminal operations and LNG 
shipping agents …etc. 
 Companies involved in the LNG SC: LNG producers and liquefaction firms, 
LNG shipping Companies, LNG receivers, Insurance companies…etc.  
Also, the principle of continuity encourages adopting an approach for continual 
learning process (Greswell, 1998). This involves considering overall RM as an 
integarted and collaborative BP. 
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Figure 8.5 SSM seven steps based on Checkland (1981) 
 
Source:(Kuhn, 2009) 
8.1.5 Business Process and Business Process Re-engineering 
(BPR) 
BPR is another method of approaching the issue under study. The concept of 
business process (BP) is not new. Adam Smith described processes back in the 
18th century in his famous 1776 example of a pin factory. Others such as 
Parnaby (1979) and Hammer (1990) documented the use of the concept. Also, 
Greswell (1998, p.123) based on Childe (1994) stated that one accepted 
definition of a BP is ‘a process which starts and ends with the customer’. Based 
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on Checkland (1981), Weaver (1995) summarised the BP as a process which 
‘can be used to represent a set of integrated activities and flows that as a whole 
produces outputs that fulfil a purpose with respect to an external customer'. 
According to Greswell (1998), the BPR concept was picked up by a number of 
authors such as Davenport and Short (1990), Hammer and Champy (1993), 
Kaplan and Murdoch (1991) who stressed the need for a radical organisational 
improvement by moving from a functional viewpoint to a BP approach. As a 
result, a number of organisations embarked on ambitious programmes of 
radical change and BP re-engineering in the 1990s, in order to achieve targets 
and objectives which could not be reached through incremental improvements 
(Greswell, 1998). 
Usually companies undertake re-engineering once their current business 
systems are no longer efficient, or are having difficulty to compete in the market. 
Corporations see value in streamlining their businesses by investing in 
technology instead of employees. Hammer and Champy (1993) stressed that 
the new development in the business environment requires a switch from a task 
orientation to a process orientation. As such, corporations shall focus on their 
main BPs instead of organisational business units.  ‘Reengineering is the 
fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of BPs to achieve dramatic 
improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, 
quality, service, and speed’ Hammer and Champy (1993). As a result of this 
movement, the re-engineering concept became synonymous with downsizing in 
the mid-nineties when corporations such as Pacific Bell, Apple and others 
announced the reduction of thousands of jobs as a result of "reengineering" in 
1995 (Neidhart, 2012). However, changing the structure of a business from 
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employees-based to technology-based business strategies can have a 
disadvantageous effect if implemented without proper systems approach to 
change (Brandenburg & Binder, 1999).  
Neidhart (2012) asserted that Hammer and Champy's approach to 
reengineering was misconceived and badly implemented by many companies. 
This approach could work well if implemented using systems approach as well 
as information technology to assess real needs and streamline processes.  
According to Neidhart (2012), ‘using information technology as a tool to enable 
a current system to operate more cost-effectively could, and does benefit 
companies in today's age of information’. Sheridan (1997) in Neidhart (2012) 
stated that ‘manufacturers who applied the basic concepts of reengineering 
sensibly to become leaner and more competitive will then shift gears from a 
cost-cutting mode into a growth mode’. In an attempt to revive the re-
engineering concept, Champy tried recently to introduce a revision of the re-
engineering concept. The new version of re-engineering, called X-engineering 
(or cross-engineering), focuses on transparency, standardisation of processes 
and technology, and harmonisation, or collaboration between companies 
(Neidhart, 2012). 
The introduction of the BPR concept in the context of this research is beneficial 
since the application of integrated RM in LNG ports will require some kind of re-
engineering of the processes through which safety and security risks are 
assessed and managed. In our opinion, the processes of risk identification and 
the implementation of risk control options (RCOs) as well as the relationship 
between safety and security disciplines within LNG ports should be re-
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engineered to enable better communication and exchange of information 
among specialists of the two disciplines, including the use of the right 
combination man/machine to enhance risk controls for the benefit of a resilient 
LNG SC. 
Greswell (1998) stated that the principles of re-engineering consist of organising 
around outcomes not tasks. This research intends to present the RM process in 
the areas of safety and security from a holistic perspective, integrating safety 
and security processes to achieve the best protection and resiliency of the LNG 
logistics and port system. Within such an approach, the focus shall move from 
tasks and activities of each discipline of risk towards the targeted outcome of 
safe and secure LNG ports SC. The current RMBP marked by a relative 
dichotomy between the two disciplines of risk needs to be streamlined towards 
achieving real integration through better information sharing and enhanced 
cooperation during all risk assessment and mitigation stages. It is imperative 
that this integrative and holistic approach to the RM domain evolves with an 
organisational change to enable the unified risk mitigation strategy to support or 
lead the outcome of safe, secured and resilient LNG Ports SC. 
8.2 FORMULATION OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO RM 
The evidence from our earlier analysis and findings during the three enquiry 
stages of this research, mainly the two rounds of Delphi as well as the 
quantitative analysis, suggests that safety and security RM within the LNG ports 
SC is a `fuzzy' ill structured process within some LNG ports organisations, 
whilst most individual safety and security RM models, taken separately, are 
generally well planned processes. The evidence also indicated that integrated 
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safety and security risk assessment and management is beneficial to the LNG 
ports SC, in ensuring a resilient and cost effective RM and enabling smooth 
handling and storage of LNG through the port to serve the international energy 
markets without disruption.  It may be useful to view the development of an 
integrated RM approach, as a problem situation, which can be improved by 
using alternative methodologies. Soft systems methodology is a useful tool in 
developing a conceptual model of safety and security RM in LNG ports which 
takes into consideration all the useful empirical work and experiences gathered 
in the RM domain and applies them while considering different worldviews. 
SSM has been identified as a suitable concept to tackle the `problem situation' 
under study and its use of integrated RM strategy as a concept to improve and 
add value to the resilience and efficiency of the LNG ports SC. Platt and 
Warwick (1995) evaluated the methodology and reiterated the usefulness of 
SSM for dealing with problems of fuzzy nature, with unclear objectives, where 
there may be several different perceptions of the problem. SSM is seen as 
being flexible and can be used in a variety of circumstances. Omerod (1992) 
has discussed the merits of combining HST and SST to enable a systematic, 
systemic approach which incorporates multiple viewpoints. The main reasons 
for using SSM and BPR in the context of this research are: 
1. Segregating safety and security risk assessment and management is 
actually reducing the issue of RM as a whole into subparts and trying to 
achieve resilience of each part separately without considering the interplays 
and impacts between safety and security in the LNG port system. Through 
SSM, an attempt is made to put the agenda of RM within a holistic systemic 
perspective. 
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2. The principles of participation, debate and coordination will be crucial in the 
LNG ports which have to deliver safe, secure and resilient logistics and ports 
SC within a BP environment. 
3. The need to revive the role of the port community which facilitates the 
participation of all concerned stakeholders in the implementation of the 
integrated RM approach with a shared understanding of how such an 
integrated and holistic approach can deliver safe, secure and resilient ports 
SCs, to the benefit of undisrupted delivery of LNG commodities to the world 
markets. 
Since the basis and characteristics of the integrated LNG ports SC RM system 
have been already investigated and defined as a result of the earlier research 
steps, the presentation of the conceptual model based on Checkland (1981) will 
be undertaken next.     
Table 8.2 Summary of SSM used to construct the RM conceptual model 
Steps Purpose 
Development of rich picture (RP) 
RP shows key relationships, issues, 
contents and influences surrounding 
the archetype.  
To provide a pictorial representation 
of the ‘problem situation’ and its 
linkages 
Development of root definition (RD) 
To provide a concise statement about 
the system under investigation 
To ensure focus and provide 
boundary of the system in question as 
well as CATWOE 
Identification of systems 
parameters 
To identify the sources, inputs, 
outputs, transformations, clients and 
receivers as well as feedback within 
the system  
To enable the development of 
conceptual models 
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Identification of systems concepts 
 
To identify the objective, worldview, 
boundaries and management. 
To enable the development of 
conceptual models 
Develop conceptual models 
 
To provide process models for 
integrated LNG Ports SC RM. 
Useful in the transfer of knowledge 
from researchers to practitioners 
Source: (Greswell, 1998) 
Before developing further the above steps leading towards the formulation of 
the conceptual model, it is important to provide a summary of the main findings 
of our earlier research. Such findings will form the guiding principles for the 
integrated RM approach and the type of relationships among the safety and 
security systems of the LNG port SCs.  
 
Security risks are now equally as important as safety risks in LNG ports and 
marine terminals. Security risks in general have gained importance after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and constitute a critical issue to hydrocarbon ports, 
including LNG.   
There is a need for a standard safety framework to address both LNG shipping 
and port networks which could assist in better addressing the ship/ port 
interface. In this regards, the IMO’s FSA, as a safety framework for shipping, 
should be extended to address port safety.     
Although safety and security risks in LNG port SCs are two disciplines that may 
have different requirements, their management should be coordinated within 
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the framework of a holistic RM approach. Operation wise, this will enable 
integrated and efficient RM in LNG ports SCs.  
An all-hazards approach provides a framework for coordinated RM, be they 
safety or security related risks.  The outcome of such coordination is a cost 
effective and timely RM during all stages of risk assessment and management, 
meaning better protection of the LNG port facilities and the port users, as well 
as reliable LNG supplies to international markets.  
An all-hazards approach needs to be qualitatively assured according to the 
principles of TQM. This means that underpinning any continual improvement 
culture, in terms of security provision, interaction with H&S and mitigation of 
both sets of risks cooperatively and effectively can only be based on the 
adoption of Quality Assurance systems by both parties, namely LNG port 
security and safety providers in full coordination with the port authority. 
Step1. Development of the LNG Ports SC Rich Picture (RP) 
The key issues and factors which make up the rich picture for an integrated 
safety and security RM in the LNG ports SC system are identified as follows: 
 Safety and security professionals should leave behind existing traditional 
beliefs whereby they assess and manage risks in isolation and without 
considering interplays and shared impacts between safety and security, for a 
new understanding through which safety and security risks and their RCOs 
are evaluated collaboratively to yield synergized and cost effective safety 
and security RCOs which shall be implemented in the LNG port system. This 
requires changing people’s attitudes by making them understand that RM 
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should be approached from a holistic perspective as a collaborative process 
which can work adequately if performed systematically and through 
coordinated action. 
 Integrate safety, security and environmental RA and mitigation to produce 
sustainable and resilient port operations through adequate evaluation of 
shared impacts between safety, security and environmental risks. 
 Safety and security RM systems shall be integrated within the overall port 
management system to produce an overall efficient, cost effective and 
resilient port operations delivering LNG commodity to the world market 
without disruption.       
The following rich pictures 1&2 show the existing RM approach characterized 
by dichotomy and absence of coordination between LNG port safety and 
security systems. The aim is to present the existing problem situation which 
shall be compared with the proposed system of integrated safety and security 
RM.  
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Figure 8.6 LNG ports safety and security- Rich Picture 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author 
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 Figure 8.7 LNG ports safety and security- Rich Picture 2 
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PROBLEM SITUATION 
 Absence of unified and integrated RM approach 
 Little to no coordination exists between safety and security 
 No institution exists within the port system to coordinate safety and 
security RM work. 
 RM in both safety and security is done in isolation 
 
   
272 
 
Step2. Development of root definition  
The root definition for an integrated LNG Ports SC RM is defined as the RM 
approach and method which enables the LNG port system to have a holistic 
and integrated system for both safety and security systems to produce a 
resilient, safe and secured LNG Ports SC. In order for the port system to 
achieve such an RM approach and achieve resiliency in the port SC, safety and 
security RM systems shall be transformed into more transparent and 
cooperative systems, working together collaboratively to achieve cost effective 
and resilient LNG port SC. CATWOE elements are used to expand upon such a 
definition in terms of the systems actors, transformations, and worldviews.  
1. Actors 
The actors of the LNG Ports SC RM system are the HSE and security 
managers from the liquefaction companies, port authority, the LNG terminal 
operations, the harbour master, the LNG storage tank farm and the LNG 
shipping companies. These are the parties responsible for developing and 
implementing the integrated LNG ports SC RM.   Usually, LNG production and 
liquefaction companies have an interest in the whole LNG SC, including storage 
and export of LNG through the port, therefore they shall be considered as part 
of the whole port community and actors within the LNG port system.  
2. Transformation 
The transformation of the safety and security overall RM system is the changing 
of such system into an integrated RM systems’ approach engaging the whole 
port community including the actors and stakeholders, and beneficiaries of the 
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output of such a system. This change should define the methods and 
procedures to be followed in order to persuade the whole port system to engage 
in an integrated RM approach. 
Changing people’s attitudes by making them understand that RM should be 
approached from a holistic perspective as a collaborative process. Therefore, 
safety and security professionals should abandon existing traditional beliefs that 
each profession of risk considers itself the most important within the overall 
LNG port system. Contrary to the systems approach, this attitude contemplates 
the segregated and segmented approach to RM. Such an attitude impacts the 
RM methodology which is usually done in isolation and without considering 
interplays and shared impacts between safety and security. It is believed that 
RM professionals from both disciplines should shift from the above traditional 
approach to a more integrative and holistic approach through which safety and 
security risks and their control options (RCOs) are evaluated collaboratively to 
yield synergized and cost effective safety and security RCOs which can be 
efficiently implemented in the LNG port system. 
 Integrate safety, security and environmental risks assessment and mitigation 
to produce sustainable and resilient port operations through adequate 
evaluation of shared impacts between safety, security and environmental 
risks. 
 Safety and security management systems shall be integrated within the 
overall port management system to produce an overall efficient, cost 
effective and resilient port operations delivering LNG commodity to the world 
market without disruption. 
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 The role of the port community within the port management system shall be 
revived and strengthened in order to participate actively in the 
implementation of the proposed integrated RM process.  
 
3. Weltanschuung/  Worldview 
The worldview is the belief that an integrated RM approach to the LNG port 
system is the optimal methodology in dealing with safety and security risks. As 
explained earlier both safety and security RM systems shall be changed and re-
considered from a holistic systems perspective. One of the findings of the 
quantitative survey is that, although safety and security are two disciplines that 
may have different requirements, their management should be coordinated 
within the framework of a holistic RM approach (research question 3). This 
means that each discipline shall undertake its RA process separately; however 
the outcome of such assessment (RCOs) shall be reviewed and approved, prior 
to implementation, by an independent RM committee to determine any negative 
impact, contradictions or redundancies that may arise between safety and 
security RCOs.    
Step3. Identification of systems parameters 
In this step, we shall build on the root definition to add to the systems concepts. 
The sources, inputs, transformations, outputs, and feedback elements are 
discussed in more details to enable the development of the integrated RM 
conceptual model. 
1. Sources  
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The sources of inputs will come from safety and security disciplines and their 
specialists who have the necessary knowledge and expertise about the RM 
processes. 
2. Inputs 
These are information on the core RM competencies existing within the 
safety and security systems in particular and the port management system 
in general. 
3. Process 
This is related to the activities undertaken to fulfil the integrated RM 
approach. These include: 
 Identification of current RM safety and security processes 
 RA and management skills and knowledge audit 
 Safety and security RM techniques/ approaches 
 Identification of gaps between existing and required RM competencies, 
skills and approaches. 
 Develop the strategy to enhance the core competencies required for an 
integrated RM approach. 
4. Outputs 
The output of the process is an action plan to develop the core 
competencies, skills, attitudes and approaches within the RM community 
which shall enable the implementation of an integrated RM approach in the 
LNG ports SC. 
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More importantly, the output shall be two-fold: 
 An integrated RM methodology for both safety and security systems; 
 An organisational change along with a procedure to implement such RM 
methodology.  
5. Feedback 
The feedback shall include performance measures as well as quality control 
system to identify and evaluate how the process is performing and any 
improvement actions required.  
Step4. Identification of systems concepts 
The main systems concepts of the integrated RM model of LNG Ports SC have 
been identified and some of them already presented. These concepts are: 
 An overall RM system composed of two systems, for instance the safety 
system and the security system. 
 The RM system versus the port management system. 
 The port community as an important component of the port management 
system. The port community is composed of representatives from the port 
authority, port users, port operators and port stakeholders from the private 
and public domains. 
 Holistic and integrated approach is the approach looking at the LNG port SC 
system as a whole composed of various ports subsystems fulfilling 
complementary and competing functions and produce shared impacts. Such 
subsystems act together to produce services and value added to port users 
and customers. 
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Step5. The Conceptual Model 
The above steps along with the results of the last quantitative survey form the 
basis for the proposed CM for integrated LNG Ports SCs RM. 
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Figure 8.8 Conceptual Model for Integrated LNG Port SC RM 
 
Source: The author 
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 Figure 8.9 Work Flow Diagram as per the Conceptual Model (FIG.8.8) 
 
Source: The author 
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The proposed model (Figure 8.8) provides a clear picture of the work flow, 
relationships and linkages to be established between the main LNG SC 
members active within the port system. These are LNG terminal operator (s), 
LNG Storage Company (ies), LNG shipping company (ies), navigation services 
providers, shipping agency (ies) as well as the LNG port authority. Only HSE 
and security departments’ roles are highlighted here as main actors of the 
proposed integrated LNG port SC RM system.    
The model emphasises the pivotal role of the port community which is formed 
by all port stakeholders. In commercial and multi-purpose ports, port community 
systems (PCSs) are holistic, geographically bounded information hubs in global 
SCs that primarily serve the interest of a heterogeneous collective of port 
related companies and port users. These heterogeneous companies often 
include terminal operators, ocean carriers, freight forwarders, enforcement 
agencies (i.e. customs), port authorities, and various lobby groups (including 
workers' unions, environmentalists, and other policy makers). Port community 
systems that bring these diverse parties together in transaction recordkeeping 
and information sharing can assist in improving port performance in general. 
In LNG Port setting, the port community, led by the port authority, is usually 
composed of representatives from the following LNG port organisations: 
  
   
 281  
 
Figure 8.10 LNG Port Community 
 
     Adapted from (Rodrigue, 2013) 
 
Fig.8.10 illustrates the composition of the LNG port community. Representatives 
of the above port stakeholders meet at regular time intervals to discuss 
coordinate and decide on issues of common interest to the normal functioning 
of the LNG port and which require cooperation and coordination among all 
parties for their swift and smooth implementation. 
The port community’s role is larger and encompasses all issues related to port 
activities which are of interest to port stakeholders. It is an important venue for 
the port community to discuss issues of common interest, provide port technical 
and business opinions and coordinate actions when required on matters which 
the port authority cannot handle alone. An important part of the port community 
mandate shall be the coordination of RM and emergency related actions in full 
cooperation with responsible parties from the port and government agencies.  
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In order to fulfil such a strategic mandate, the LNG port community shall create 
a risk and emergency management committee (REMC), composed of expert 
representatives from HSE and security departments representing each Member 
Company/ governmental agency of the port community. Such a committee shall 
play a central role in reviewing quantitative RAs (QRAs) and terminal/ facility 
security plans to identify any discrepancies, redundancies or negative impacts 
that any type of Risk Control Option (RCO) either safety or security related may 
have on the other. The REMC will have to coordinate closely with the port 
authority’s HSE and security departments which will be receiving RA and 
management reports from the port community members and forwarding them to 
REMC for review, discussion and advice. Therefore the REMC committee will 
play mainly a technical advisory role.  
Fig.8.9 explains further how the workflow will be carried out between the LNG 
Port Community members, the LNG port authority and the REMC. Each 
member of the port community shall carry out separate safety and security risk 
assessment and report to the port authority the RCOs recommended as per the 
RA. The port authority shall review and share the reports with the REMC for 
study and advice. The REMC shall formally inform back the port authority of its 
technical opinion which should further study and make decisions on the most 
appropriate RCOs to be applied. The port authority shall communicate its final 
decision to the concerned port community member for implementation and 
feedback. In this respect, the port authority is the responsible party for safety 
and security risk management within the LNG port area, while the LNG port 
community REMC will serve as an advisory body for review of safety and 
security risks assessments of all port community members and facilitate 
   
 283  
 
discussion among all port community risk management specialists, to ensure 
that redundant or conflicting safety and security RCOs are avoided and that 
implementation of safety and security RCOs are carried out in full coordination 
among port community members within a participative approach.  
As such, the conceptual model, as a vehicle to a holistic and integrative 
approach to risks, call for an implementation of safety and security RM in LNG 
ports integrating safety and security risks assessment and management, 
emergency response actions and the port business continuity within the 
framework of a participative approach. 
It should be further noted that the above LNG ports RM model is devised 
according to the particular situation and business model of LNG ports in the 
Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). Since the central objective of the 
model is to integrate the safety and security RM, emergency response and port 
business continuity of LNG ports from a holistic and comprehensive approach, it 
is believed that such model can fit any similar LNG port setting in other regions 
of the world which still lacks holistic and integrated approach to risks and 
vulnerabilities.   
8.3 VALIDATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The proposed conceptual model is the culmination of research into the existing 
safety and security risks assessment and management approaches and 
practices. This identifies the need for an integrated approach to RM due to 
several reasons detailed earlier, most importantly the requirement for an 
integrated and cost effective RM capable of delivering and ensuring a safe, 
secure resilient and cost effective LNG SC to international LNG markets.   
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To achieve this objective, a conceptual model (CM) has been proposed to 
articulate and materialise such an approach at both theoretical and practical 
levels. This model identified that port SC stakeholders shall work collaboratively 
within the port community risk and emergency management committee (REMC) 
led by the port authority to align their safety and security RM plans, 
programmes and processes with the objective of achieving an integrated and 
holistic approach to RM. Based on the Systems Thinking Approach (STA), the 
proposed model sets out a methodology and a process through which the 
objective of integrated safety and security RM can be applied.  
The testing and validation of the model is based on whether the approach is 
deemed practically useful from the port practitioner’s perspective, including port 
operations and logistics managers as well as safety and security specialists. 
Although the elaboration of the approach along with the conceptual model have 
gone hand in hand throughout the various stages of the research and in full 
interaction with LNG port and RM professionals, it is decided to convene a 
focus group discussion among a panel of LNG ports and RM professionals from 
two leading LNG and hydrocarbon ports in the State of Qatar, the world’s 
leading LNG producer and exporter. The objective is to test the theoretical and 
practical rigour of the model and validate its final construct.  
8.3.1 The focus group panel 
A focus group discussion is arranged among 6 LNG port professionals 
representing port operations and logistics as well as safety and security. This 
sample of experts is selected from two LNG and hydrocarbon ports: Port of 
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Ras-Laffan (World largest LNG exporting hub) and the port of Mesaieed, one of 
the leading hydrocarbon and multi- purpose ports of the Arabian Gulf region. 
Table 8.3 Composition of focus group participants 
Participants Position held Specialty Remarks 
Mr. A Assist. Manager 
Port operations 
Port operations Port authority 
Mr. B Head of HSE HSE RA HSE onshore 
(port and Industrial area) 
Mr. C Head of Logistics  Port Logistics Port logistics operations 
Mr. D Head of port  
regulations 
PSC (Safety & 
security) 
Maritime safety 
enforcement 
Mr. E Head of port 
security 
Port Security 
(Operations) 
PFSO - Security 
operations 
Mr. F Sr. security RA 
specialist 
Port Security 
(RA) 
Port security RA and 
security plans 
Total 6 --- --- 
Source: the author 
Table 8.3 presents the composition of the focus group panel while the group 
discussions prompt sheet is attached in Appendix 7. The panel is selected from 
the middle management of two leading LNG and hydrocarbon ports. These are 
experts in their fields having significant experience in LNG operations and 
related safety and security requirements and practices.  
8.3.2 Methodology 
Prior to the discussion session, the participants were invited through email and 
informed about the subject of the meeting and provided with the prompt sheet 
outlining the main discussion points. At the meeting the interviewer provided 
introductory remarks and the session proceeded by asking each participant to 
introduce themselves to the rest of the group before opening the floor for free 
responses to the stimulus shown below.  
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Content analysis is used to analyse data generated as a result of this focus 
group session.  
8.3.3 Results 
The material available for analysis is limited to the discussion recorded and 
transcribed and notes taken during discussions.  
What type of management should govern safety and security risks in LNG 
ports? 
Chapter 6 revealed that safety and security risks in LNG ports SCs need to be 
managed in full coordination between port SC stakeholders, including the port 
authority.  A number of reasons, including the constantly changing nature of risk 
both in scope and scale and the importance of LNG as a strategic energy 
source for importing economies, make this coordination a must. 
Most participants agreed to the requirement for applying a coordinated 
approach to risk, including one respondent who added the need for ‘such 
coordination to be institutionalised in order to be effective’. It was noticed from 
their body language that all participants agreed with the later statement 
meaning that the way in which such coordination is carried out is a determinant 
of the efficiency of the overall RM.       
With regards to the level of coordination among LNG ports safety and security, 
one participant estimated that this stands only at the level of ‘50 to 60% from 
what is required as coordination to achieve full synergy’. The rest of the 
participants declared that ‘some coordination exists’, but this is ‘not sufficient’ to 
yield cost effective and integrated RM. This opinion on the existing level of 
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coordination and cooperation among LNG port risk safety and security 
disciplines is consistent with earlier findings reported from both the Delphi 
exercise and the quantitative survey study. 
Does coordination and cooperation among safety and security constitute 
the panacea for integrated RM in LNG ports? 
Although all participants agreed to the requirement for coordination among 
safety and security as a pre-requisite for efficient RM, most of them linked the 
success of such coordination with other accompanying measures.   One 
participant requires ‘clear definition of responsibilities…and then clear interface 
management procedures’. Another attached the success of coordination among 
LNG port safety and security to a balanced allocation of resources among 
safety and security services, since those services are competing among each 
other to get the largest part of resources allocation. For him ‘in some cases, 
coordination is the last issue to be considered within such competitive context’. 
For a third participant ‘it is the silo mentality which prevents coordination and 
cooperation among safety and security professionals, therefore, more education 
and awareness is needed to change mind-set’. 
In this regards, participants were unanimous regarding the need for further 
coordination among port safety and security disciplines, however each one 
suggested accompanying measures for such coordination to be effective. These 
views are in line with our earlier recommendations as part of the CM to have 
each party’s role well defined in the process. Participants also mentioned the 
need for professionals of both risk disciplines to leave the silo mentality and 
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prepare the ground for fruitful cooperation within the port community to achieve 
a safe, secure and resilient LNG SC. 
Does the ‘all-hazard approach’ to risk enable efficient safety and security 
RM?    
Five out of six participants responded positively to this question by asserting 
that an all-hazard approach is actually a cost effective RM approach. One 
participant further explained that such an approach embodies a ‘holistic 
perspective’ which provides an effective framework to resolve interfaces and 
shared impacts among safety and security risks and enable coordinated risk 
mitigation. Another expert recognized the virtue of such an approach but 
questioned how this ‘can be practically applied’, while a third participant further 
explained how this approach enables efficient incident reporting, be it intentional 
or unintentional, since ‘the reporting of any suspicious event is done by any 
safety or security agent’, therefore achieving enhanced overall protection.  
What practical benefits could be expected from the implementation of an 
all-hazard approach to risks in LNG ports? 
Five out of six responses agreed that such approach, if implemented properly, 
could lead to practical benefits, such as early detection and reporting of risks 
and hazards that would lead to timely preventive actions, which in turn enables 
enhanced resilience of port SCs. However, three fifths of participants warned 
that on the contrary, if such an approach is not applied correctly, it may lead to 
severe protection gaps. In explaining such gaps, one participant argued about 
the possibility that each party at the port, be it safety or security organisation, 
‘may try to take advantage of this approach to rely on one another and widen 
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the interface and grey areas between the two disciplines of risk’. In the same 
way, another expert further explained that in the current context of constantly 
changing risks, these are ‘usually addressed through a collaborative process’. 
Another participant also emphasised that ‘protection from risks is the business 
of all and this requires change in mind set’  
What role could the port community play in the coordination of safety and 
security risks management? 
Four sixths of participants welcomed the idea that the port community should 
have a role in the coordination of safety and security risks management. Most of 
them, however, advised that the port community role should be limited to an 
advisory one, since legally; the port authority is responsible for ensuring a safe 
and secured port environment. One participant stated that, in many ports, the 
port community has experience of being an effective venue which assisted in 
the implementation of many regulations and standards in the past such as the 
ISPS code and other port legislation. He added that the proposed involvement 
of the port community in the coordination of safety and security risks 
management ‘may turn into a specialist RM forum which can play an important 
role not only in the coordination of risk mitigation activities but in all aspects of 
RM such as information sharing, training and awareness’.  Although all agreed 
on the need for the port community to play a role in coordinating RM activities, 
two participants stressed the necessity for accompanying measures if such role 
is to produce an added value to the existing RM system. One argued the need 
for a streamlined process and clear work procedures between the port authority 
and the port community and the other warned about confusion that may arise 
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regarding the roles and responsibilities of the port authority and the port 
community and called for clear demarcation between each party’s involvements 
in the process. 
Do you have any comments on the proposed RM model (CM)? 
All participants expressed their agreement on the work flow process proposed 
through the CM, since it includes the main port stakeholders involved in RM and 
emergency response and depicts the main relationships governing their work. 
Most participants welcomed also the involvement of the port community-REMC 
in emergency coordination but requested this particular involvement to be 
further clarified. They agreed that such a role should even be extended to 
include the port business continuity, since, in their view; this will assist in 
applying an all-hazards approach to risks and provide further protection and 
resilience to the LNG port system. 
With regards to the involvement of the port community in emergency planning 
and response, respondents were unanimously positive about such involvement. 
They qualified this role as important in supporting the port authority and 
emergency agencies which have the primary responsibility for emergency 
response. Moreover, all agreed in wanting to see the port community-REMC 
also involved in the port business continuity during a post-disaster period due to 
the wealth of expertise and resources the port community may provide and 
which can play a decisive role in bringing the port to normal operations in 
minimum time. One participant stated that the REMC can play ‘important roles 
in pre-incident and post-incident phases, as a pre-incident role, REMC can 
assist in awareness and practical continuing training in safety and security risks 
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and emergency response’. It has also a role to play in post-incident phase 
through ‘assistance to the port authority emergency and response committees 
in getting the necessary resources in case of large disaster’ requiring additional 
rescue, evacuation effort or urgent medical assistance. 
Port communities can have an important role in planning and conducting 
emergency drills, organising continuing trainings and assisting in the provision 
of technical, medical and rescue/ evacuation resources and assets during 
emergency evacuation and response. For this collaborative process to succeed, 
most participants required the port authority to take the lead according to its 
mandate which is prescribed by international maritime standards. Also 
procedures should be put in place to define clear roles and responsibilities for 
all stakeholders within such a collaborative process of coordinated RM, 
emergency response and port business continuity.        
8.4 CONCLUSION 
The usefulness and necessity of applying a holistic approach to RM has been 
discussed earlier by integrating safety and security systems together to allow 
efficient and cost effective assessment and management of risks within LNG 
port SCs. In the U.S. the Coast Guards have recently started applying the so 
called ‘all-hazards approach’ to risk through integration of safety, security and 
natural disasters sources of risk.  Most probably, one of the reasons for being 
successful in introducing such an approach is a comprehensive mandate in 
dealing with all sources of risks within the onshore and offshore areas of the 
port system. This allowed them to develop and apply this approach with 
relatively less hassle, although, it may be still early to evaluate the experience. 
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The process suggested by the proposed RM model for the review and validation 
of security risk plans and HSE QRAs provides an adequate means of synergy 
between safety and security risk control measures which can allow cost 
effective, non-contradictory measures to be implemented. It is believed that 
numerous benefits can be drawn from such an approach, most importantly 
assurance of the cost- effectiveness of the RM process which shall enable 
resilient, robust and uninterrupted LNG port SC.  
The model calls for a collaborative process led by the port authority within a 
participative approach. In such a process, all LNG port stakeholders, members 
of the port community, have to report their HSE and security RA and 
management plans, respectively to the port HSE and security departments. 
They have also to defend it in front of the port community REMC. Such RM 
plans will receive first review from the ports’ specialised departments and then 
be discussed within the Risk and Emergency Management Committee (REMC) 
of the LNG port community. The RM plans are discussed collectively within the 
REMC and commented on or approved prior to implementation. Official 
approval or commentary is communicated back to concerned parties through 
the port authority.          
 For the sake of efficiency, this process needs to be planned adequately 
through change management and BP re-engineering. Below are the main pre-
requisites for such a process to be successful: 
 First, changing the traditional attitudes of the port safety and security risk 
professionals. They have to be convinced that the management of all 
sources of risks needs to be approached holistically from a systems 
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perspective and that such an approach is an effective way to address the 
permanently changing nature of risks both in scope and scale. 
 Adopting new procedures which make the port community enjoy an advisory 
role towards the port authority in reviewing and commenting on RA and 
management plans received initially from port SC members. It should also 
act as the main venue for HSE and security risk managers from port SC 
members to debate and exchange information and agree on the best way to 
synergise the implementation of risk mitigation measures avoiding disruption 
to port operations. 
 The port community in general and the REMC in particular shall adopt and 
use an electronic port community system which can allow smooth and cost 
effective management of the process as well as efficient exchange of 
information among REMC members. This port community system must be 
implemented as part of an overall BP re-engineering in LNG ports SC RM, 
emergency response and port business continuity.   
 The port authority shall play an active leadership role within the port 
community’s REMC. Its safety and security departments have to lead and 
coordinate the work of the REMC and ensure that a recognised quality 
management system is in place and adequately applied throughout the 
review and validation process of RM plans.         
The above remarks are generated as a result of the testing phase of the 
conceptual model performed through a focus group discussion among a panel 
of LNG port experts. As discussed in the section above, the panel of 
professionals selected from two leading LNG and hydrocarbon ports of the 
Middle East attested to the validity of the model and its practical applicability in 
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the context of LNG ports SCs, subject to the existence of the accompanying 
measures listed above.     
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CHAPTER 9  DISCUSSION 
 
The previous chapter introduced a CM embodying an integrated approach to 
the three main components of risk and emergency management, namely the 
unified safety and security RM, integrated emergency planning and response 
and port business continuity.  
These three domains, although having different requirements in terms of 
planning and management, are interconnected and share common concepts, 
information and resources. They belong to the same broad area of 
emergencies/ disaster planning and management.   So, in the port and logistics 
business, they usually share information and resources, since they require 
specialists in RA, management and emergency planning, preparedness and 
response which in most cases require either safety or security backgrounds or 
both.   
This chapter will briefly review the methodology used to address the research 
problem. It will then identify and discuss the main research findings and analyse 
the impact of the proposed approach on the RM and emergency planning and 
response in LNG ports SCs.  Further analysis of the implications of the research 
results on a practical level will be made to qualify the new LNG port 
management system in light of the changes proposed to the RM and 
emergency response systems. Finally, a critique of the research will follow to 
explain and evaluate the difficulties encountered during the administration of 
both quantitative and qualitative surveys.  
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research work has provided a modified approach to the issues of RM, 
emergency response and port business continuity within the LNG port SCs 
system which should pave the way and lead the development of an integrated 
and holistic strategy to prevent, mitigate and recover from safety and security 
accidents/ incidents impacting the LNG ports SCs.  
The proposed approach calls for an integrated and unified management among 
safety and security risks within each domain of intervention, such as safety and 
security RM, emergency planning and response as well as port business 
continuity. The same integration is also needed among these three areas of 
emergencies management.  This approach is proposed instead of the prevailing 
approach of isolated and segregated management of emergencies. The 
approach takes a high level systemic view that incorporates both theoretical and 
practical knowledge and draws on the experience of world leading LNG ports 
and marine terminals. The proposed approach is largely crafted, checked and 
validated with involvement of the LNG ports RM industry during all stages of 
both theoretical and empirical enquiry. 
Risk and emergency management in LNG ports SCs is described as a messy 
situation which needs to be thoroughly understood, appropriately organized and 
effectively managed in an integrative and holistic manner.  Due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of the research problem, a mixed methods strategy was 
chosen to explain the current situation and explore ways to resolve and further 
enhance the problem situation. This research has benefited from such a 
methodology due to the particularity of the research questions which require 
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both qualitative and quantitative research techniques for data collection and 
analysis. A thorough extensive literature review, including regulatory and 
methodological RM frameworks, was undertaken which helped to formulate the 
research problem and related research questions; a qualitative empirical two 
round Delphi study has assisted to explore and delineate the scope of the topic, 
for which results are confirmed and validated through a quantitative factor 
analysis coupled with hypotheses testing using SPSS package tests. These 
research steps provided useful insight and served as a foundation to the 
formulation of an integrated CM for RM, emergency response and port business 
continuity. The CM has been developed using SSM which is indeed regarded 
as a systemic approach to complex problem solving. 
Since one of the main aims of this research is to provide an enhanced empirical 
framework which can be of practical use to solve the disintegrated nature of RM 
for current LNG port systems, the approach as well as the CM were tested and 
validated for usefulness using an in-depth focus group discussion with experts 
from relevant disciplines of risk, emergency planning and response as well as 
LNG port logistics operation and management. The validation process was 
extremely beneficial in developing the approach and confirming the practicality 
of the CM. The feedback was predominantly positive. 
 
9.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The research problem originated from a practical observation of the status of 
safety and security risks and emergencies management in the context of LNG 
ports and marine terminals. Those observations identified issues in the RM 
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system, especially the approach to the relationship between safety and security 
disciplines which impact the overall risk and emergency management system 
and may have a detrimental effect on the port recovery and port business 
continuity in the aftermath of an emergency. Critical review of relevant literature 
as well as discussions with safety, security and port professionals revealed that 
safety and security RM within LNG ports system is a `fuzzy' ill structured 
process whilst most individual safety and security RM models, taken separately, 
are generally well planned processes. The evidence also indicates that 
integrated safety and security RA and management is beneficial to LNG port 
SCs, in ensuring resilient and cost effective RM and enabling smooth handling 
and storage of LNG through the port to serve international energy markets 
without disruption.  
Therefore, the research problem involves mainly the management of safety and 
security risks but extends to the emergencies/ disaster management system 
such as emergency planning, preparedness and response and port recovery 
and business continuity in the aftermath of accidents or attacks. 
This research proposed to analyse the current status of RM in LNG Port SCs 
and investigate ways in which RM can be integrated and looked at holistically to 
yield a comprehensive integrated RM process which takes into consideration 
specificities and requirements of both safety and security risks in addressing 
their interfaces and shared impacts in the areas of assessment and 
management. It aimed to formulate an integrated ‘all hazards’ approach to RM, 
emergency planning and response and port business continuity, which can 
prove theoretically sound and practically applicable.  
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9.3  THE METHODOLOGY ADOPTED 
As stated earlier, this research adopted a multi- methods approach as ‘a mean 
of mutual confirmation of measures and validation of findings’ (Berg, 2001). It 
should be noted that both multi-methods within a single paradigm as well as 
mixing methods from different paradigms were used as appropriate. The aim is 
to take advantage of the multiple virtues offered by mixing methods in an 
attempt to address the research problem and provide answers to the research 
questions as accurately as possible. Also, an inductive approach is adopted 
throughout the exploratory and conceptual part of the research while deduction 
is employed during the testing and confirmatory phases of the enquiry. 
In the first part of the research, qualitative methods of data collection and 
analysis is predominantly used, for instance, critical review of literature and two 
rounds of qualitative Delphi surveys. Since the literature discussing the 
relationships and interfaces between safety and security in general and within 
the LNG ports context in particular has been scarce, a Delphi consultation 
among safety and security professionals was necessary to examine the 
assumptions made during the literature review and get some consensus among 
LNG port and RM professionals on some key ideas around the research 
problem. The first round of the Delphi exercise was followed by a second round 
after which consensus was achieved. This has laid the foundation for further 
research around the conclusions of the Delphi exercise.   
During the second part, mixed quantitative and qualitative methods are 
deployed, namely a quantitative survey analysed through statistical techniques 
as well as a qualitative SSM analysis and focus group discussions. In an 
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attempt to triangulate the research findings from the in-depth literature and the 
two rounds Delphi study, a quantitative survey has been undertaken. The 
adoption of a quantitative study through an online survey method is selected in 
the absence of reliable historical data, especially on security incidents involving 
LNG ports and marine terminals. The available security data is insufficient and 
reliable statistics on security incidents is difficult to obtain from LNG port 
terminals since these are generally considered sensitive and highly restricted 
statistics. 
Therefore, an online survey carried out among a sample of representative panel 
experts was chosen to achieve cost effective research in terms of time and 
budget as well as higher data reliability.  Such data is then quantitatively 
analysed using factor analysis as well as reliability and validity tests and Chi-
squared likelihood ratio coupled with Gamma tests. The objective is to test and 
validate the hypothesis and results obtained from the two rounds of Delphi and 
to a lesser extent the insights and assumptions derived from the extensive 
literature review. The validated data obtained as a result of the quantitative 
study served as a foundation for the proposed safety and security RM 
conceptual model (CM).   
Soft systems methodology (SSM) is used in developing the conceptual model 
for safety and security RM in LNG ports which takes into consideration the 
useful empirical work and experiences gathered in the RM domain and applies 
them while considering different worldviews. The introduction of SSM and 
related concepts and methods such as BPR in the context of this research has 
been beneficial since in our perspective, the application of integrated RM in 
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LNG ports requires some kind of re-engineering of the processes through which 
safety and security risks are assessed and managed. The processes of RM, 
emergency planning, preparedness and response as well as port recovery and 
business continuity should be re-engineered to enable better communication 
and exchange of information among specialists of the two disciplines, including 
the use of the right procedures and technologies to enhance risk controls for the 
benefit of a resilient LNG SC. Based on SSM, a risk and emergency 
management conceptual model was proposed and validated through a focus 
group of experts from all relevant RM, disaster management and port 
operations experts from leading LNG and hydrocarbon ports of the Arabian 
Gulf.   
Figure 9.1 illustrates the sequence of various methods deployed along this 
research.  
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Figure 9.1 Sequence of the multi-methods approach adopted 
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9.4  DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The followings are the main findings of this research: 
 An ‘all-hazards approach’ to risks is more cost effective in addressing 
both safety and security risks in LNG port SCs. 
 This approach is represented in the form of a CM for integrated RM, 
emergency response and port business continuity, depicting the work 
flow, relationships and interfaces among various SC stakeholders from 
the port community. 
 The port community can play an effective role in assisting the port 
authority in coordinating RM, emergency response and port business 
continuity activities among LNG port SC members. 
 Safety and security risks management should be integrated with 
emergency preparedness and response as well as with port business 
recovery and continuity since those activities constitute a continuum 
within the port RM and emergency response domain. 
 RM and emergency response activities should be qualitatively assured 
according to the principles of TQM. 
 
9.4.1  Cost effectiveness of the ‘all-hazards’ approach to risks 
The practical evidence from some leading LNG ports shows that disintegrated 
and segregated management of safety and security risks create several 
difficulties in the day to day efforts of both disciplines to safeguard LNG port 
SCs and related infrastructure, facilities, people, information and financial flows 
from accidents and incidents. It also poses barriers to efficient implementation 
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of mitigation measures from both HSE and security organisations, due to the 
existence of interfaces and shared impacts between the two disciplines 
managing risks. Furthermore, absence of coordination and exchange of 
information among the two disciplines does not allow timely and appropriate 
response in case of emergency nor allow quick and timely port recovery from 
either accidental or incidental events. In our multiple discussions with experts of 
port RM, it was revealed that this deficiency in the safety and security interfaces 
reflects an underpinning lack of integrated and holistic approach to risks in the 
minds of many HSE and security professionals in LNG ports.         
The appropriate response to such a problem is the necessity of introducing the 
implementation of an all hazards approach to risk which allows effective 
coordination of RA and management at all levels, while still respecting the 
requirements and particularities of each RM discipline. Adequate coordination 
and information sharing among safety and security professionals regarding 
risks and threats within the onshore and offshore limits of LNG ports will 
undoubtedly allow accurate assessment of risks in the shortest time, since RM 
professionals will get the needed information readily available and in the 
required format without being required to waste time and effort in searching for 
such information. Also, information sharing on risks and threats will enable 
cross checking for data validity and updates which will result in high accuracy 
and quality of information used in RA. High quality information shared timely 
among relevant port RM stakeholders enables efficient and cost effective RA 
and management in the two areas of risk.  In this respect, an all-hazards 
approach provides a framework for coordinated RM, be they safety or security 
related risks.  The outcome of such coordination is a cost effective and timely 
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RM during all stages of RA and management, meaning better protection of the 
LNG port facilities and port users, as well as reliable LNG supplies to 
international markets.  
9.4.2 The conceptual model and the all-hazards approach 
The use of SSM facilitated the formulation of a CM representing the way in 
which an all-hazards approach to risk can be operationalized in the context of a 
generic LNG port SC system. The proposed CM is an attempt to put the RM 
agenda back to its normative set up from a holistic systemic perspective. 
The transformation of the overall safety and security RM system is the changing 
of the systems’ approach through engaging the whole port community and 
including the actors, stakeholders, and beneficiaries of the output of such 
integrated system. This change defines the methods and procedures to be 
followed in order to persuade and convince the RM stakeholders and engage 
the whole port system within the new modified approach. Also, for such change 
towards integrated and holistic RM approach to succeed, the following pre-
requisite conditions should be met: 
 Changing attitudes of HSE and security RM professionals by convincing 
them to abandon existing traditional beliefs favouring a segregated and 
segmented approach to risks. RM professionals from both disciplines should 
shift from the traditional approach to a more integrative and holistic 
approach to risks and emergencies assessment, management and 
response. To achieve such a compelling objective, it is necessary to adopt a 
gradual strategy for cultural change within the safety and security 
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disciplines. This strategy should be based on continual training and 
awareness programmes.   
 Safety and security management systems shall be integrated within the 
overall port management system to produce an overall efficient, cost 
effective and resilient port operations delivering LNG commodity to the world 
market without disruption. The RM and disaster management systems 
should understand the specificities of the LNG port business and act as an 
integral part of the port management system, to yield unified and informed 
risk- based port management decisions.     
 The role of the port community within the port management system shall be 
revived and strengthened in order to participate actively in the 
implementation of the proposed integrated RM process. If the port 
community has successfully participated until now in actions and initiatives 
related to some aspects of port activities, it is time for it to actively assist in 
integrating the RM processes within the framework of a unified and holistic 
management of risks and emergencies.    
 The proposed RM model confers a pivotal role to the port community in 
coordinating, resolving interfaces and serving as a professional advisory 
body to the port management. In order for such a role to successfully fit 
within the overall LNG port management system, an adequate use of 
information and communication technology (ICT) as well as clear 
procedures, protocols and standards should be established in order to 
integrate and synergise such a role within the three systems of RM, 
emergency management and port management.    
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9.4.3 Integration of RM, emergency response and port business 
continuity 
If safety and security need to be integrated and managed collaboratively within 
the framework of a holistic approach, a horizontal integration of the three areas 
of risks and emergencies need also to be coordinated and managed as a 
continuum; namely RM, emergency planning, preparedness and response as 
well as port business continuity. 
These three domains of risks and emergencies (also called disaster 
management) are interrelated and should be considered in a continuum. 
Generally, disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response are four 
elements that contribute to the sustainable development policies. As 
characterised by the UN Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer 
World (UN, 1994), these four elements along with environmental protection and 
sustainable development, are closely interrelated.    
Risk and disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response constitute 
an overall package which needs to be planned and implemented from a 
comprehensive and holistic perspective. Recent experience demonstrated that 
the focus on response alone is not cost effective since it yields only temporary 
results at a very high cost (Coppolla, 2007). Integration of RM and emergency 
preparedness and response is required for two main reasons: 
1- RA and management focuses mainly on prevention. As RM cannot 
prevent all risks and hazards, there is always a residual risk which 
organisations must accept. As discussed in earlier chapters, risk 
acceptance means that the RA and management system can only 
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prevent and mitigate risks to a certain level, risk above that level is very 
unlikely to happen (rare) which means that in the case it strikes, 
mitigation plans are available to offset or minimise their consequences. 
Therefore, RM and emergency planning, preparedness and response are 
closely linked in a way that emergency planning and preparedness 
needs to understand exactly the risk acceptance criteria as well as the 
level of risk and corresponding consequences which are out of the scope 
of RM. A thorough understanding of those aspects is a pre-requisite to 
adequate emergency planning and response, including the necessary 
resources and methods required for their effective implementation. 
 
2- In LNG ports, RM strategies, emergency response as well as port 
business continuity plans usually involve the same port risk organisations 
and emergency response agencies in their preparation. Therefore, 
sharing resources and expertise from those port organisations and 
agencies is required to enable efficient RM and emergency response 
plans and ensure their successful implementation at a later stage. It 
should be noted that RM, emergency management plans and strategies 
require collaborative processes in their planning and implementation.  
In the aftermath of a port disaster, usually both the emergency response 
and the port recovery and continuity plans are immediately activated and 
simultaneously put into implementation. Although the objectives and 
focus of the two plans are different, they are still interdependent as the 
actions under one plan have an effect on the other. It should be noted 
that emergency response actions have the priority over port recovery 
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actions but it is always preferred to have the objectives of the two plans 
simultaneously fulfilled, such as providing effective rescue, relief and 
salvage actions while making sure difficult and delayed port recovery is 
avoided. Therefore the objective of quick and efficient emergency 
response is not contradictory to the objective of swift port recovery and 
business continuity. Those two strategic objectives can still be achieved 
through proactive disaster planning and preparedness and effective 
coordination during all stages of execution. Ensuring swift decision at the 
on scene commandment level regarding priorities of emergency actions 
is an important step in this regards. In our proposed CM, the port 
community REMC shall play a pivotal role in the coordination and 
exchange of information as well as in assisting the port authority, 
emergency organisations and the law enforcement agencies, in getting 
the necessary resources for port emergency response and port recovery 
in full coordination and under the instructions from the port on scene 
commandment.  
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Figure 9.2 Integrated Pre-incident/ Post-incident RM and Response 
Source: The author 
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9.4.4 Quality assurance of RM and emergency response 
Our earlier findings concluded that the all-hazards approach needs to be 
qualitatively assured according to the principles of TQM. This means that 
activities and processes related to RA and mitigation as well as emergency 
planning, preparedness and response have to be certified for being planned 
and implemented according to updated quality standards. Also underpinning 
any continual improvement culture, in terms of safety and security, and the 
interaction among HSE and security to mitigate both sets of risks cooperatively 
and effectively can only be based on the adoption of quality assurance systems 
by both parties, namely LNG port security and safety providers in full 
coordination with the port authority. 
In this respect, each RM provider within the LNG port system, either HSE or 
security has to certify its RA and management processes and activities 
independently and work together with the port authority as part of a wider port 
community effort to identify interfaces and common processes among safety, 
security RM and emergency planning, preparedness and response in order to 
be qualitatively certified as well.  In this regards collaborative processes and 
procedures in the combined RM and emergency planning and response 
systems must conform to the principles of applicable quality standards and be 
auditable internally within the port community as well as from external 
recognised quality management organisations.   
  
   
312 
 
9.5  CRITIQUE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This research attempts to explore an area of research which has not been 
widely explored and thoroughly analysed, therefore, this attempt can be 
regarded as a pioneer work in this regards. Due to its pioneering character, this 
study has encountered several difficulties which can be listed below:   
1. The first difficulty is the limited specialist literature on the subject. Most 
literature discusses in details either safety or security RM but discussed 
little the relationships and shared impacts between the two disciplines 
and almost nothing on the impact of segregated management of risks on 
the overall RM, on the port industry or on the international SC. This 
scarcity of literature resources obliged the author to undertake a full 
Delphi study in order to explore the research problem and related 
research questions. 
2. One of the issues confronted during the Delphi study is the reluctance of 
security professionals in participating to the survey consultations which 
resulted in a relatively low response rate from security specialists, 
compared to other discipline specialists consulted.  Although the general 
response rate was encouraging during the first and second Delphi 
rounds (100% and 70% respectively), from 4 security specialists 
consulted, only 1 responded (1/4) during respectively the first and 
second rounds of Delphi surveys. It is noticed that ports and terminal 
security managers consulted were reluctant to provide opinions on 
surveys addressing security issues, probably because, from their 
perspective, such information is considered security sensitive. To 
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overcome this limitation, it was necessary to adopt a strategy of mutual 
confirmation of survey results during the successive stages of research 
enquiry and required further testing of the Delphi results through a 
quantitative empirical study. 
3. Although the survey samples were selected randomly from the 
population, they are considered non probability samples since the 
probability of each case being selected from the total population is not 
known (Saunders et al. 2009).   Thus stratified random sampling was the 
technique used as part of the quantitative study.  
From a total of 150 questionnaires emailed, 62 responses were received; a 
response rate of 41.33% is achieved. This response rate can be explained 
by the following factors: 
 First, it is noticed that the consultation period coincided with the 
summer holidays (July & August). Since most participants were 
invited through their business emails, many did not respond back, 
most probably because they were busy or they usually don’t check 
their business emails during their leave period. Late responses were 
received a month later of the consultation period and were not 
considered. 
 Second, out of 20 port security professionals initially consulted, only 5 
have responded. Similar reluctance of security professionals to 
participate in surveys was experienced during the Delphi survey. 
Some security participants clearly declared by return email that they 
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are unable to participate to the survey without providing specific 
reasons for their decision.  
The relatively low response rate obtained coupled with the lack of precise 
parametric requirements observed in the vast majority of distributions 
associated with this quantitative survey, oriented the choice for non-
parametric tests. Therefore, it was decided to further test the quantitative 
results obtained, both on theoretical and practical levels, through a focus 
group discussion undertaken with a panel of multi-disciplinary expert 
practitioners, including security experts from world leading LNG ports. The 
results from such group discussion were beneficial and confirmed the 
empirical results obtained earlier from both qualitative and quantitative 
survey consultations.         
It is worth mentioning that the relatively low participation of security 
professionals to both qualitative and quantitative surveys has forced the 
adoption of a conservative approach through which several testing studies 
were undertaken for mutual confirmation of results. This research strategy, 
although demanding in terms of time and effort, has proven to be beneficial 
in strengthening the study results.   
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CHAPTER 10  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research attempted to study and analyse the relationships and shared 
impacts among safety and security in the context of LNG ports SCs and 
investigates ways in which integrated safety and security RM can be applied in 
all areas of RM, emergencies planning, preparedness and response and port 
recovery and business continuity. As far as we are aware, this research is, so 
far, one of the few studies that attempted to investigate safety and security RM 
interfaces and their mutual impacts and how the approach of integrated safety 
and security RM can be applied in the context of LNG ports, both on theoretical 
and practical levels. 
This concluding chapter brings together the various discussions and analytical 
results from previous chapters with a view to providing a comprehensive 
summary of research results and limitations and concludes with suggestions for 
further research.   
10.2 RESEARCH SUMMARY AND SPECIFIC RESULTS 
The present research aimed to model LNG ports safety and security RM, 
emergency response and port business continuity from a SC perspective and 
within the framework of an integrated and holistic RM approach. This approach 
took advantage of the strategic leadership role played by the port authority to 
coordinate and integrate the role the LNG port community can play within a 
participative approach.       
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In this respect, the research has achieved the following specific results: 
 
 An analysis of the LNG SC, its main components and flows is made with 
particular emphasis on the strategic role of ports and marine terminals in the 
LNG SC. The research highlighted the pivotal role of the LNG port authority 
in the RM and emergency management processes, as defined by the main 
safety and security regulations such as SOLAS and the ISPS code. 
Furthermore, the research identified the port community as a strategic actor 
whose role has to be integrated within the overall port management system 
to assist in the coordination of integrated safety and security RM, emergency 
preparedness and response and port business continuity. The port 
community’s role should be regarded as complementary but critical in 
assisting in the coordination, in risk communication and in the 
implementation process of the proposed port BP Re-engineering (BPR). 
According to Hammer and Champy (1993) ‘Reengineering is the 
fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of BPs to achieve dramatic 
improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as 
cost, quality, service, and speed.’ As such, undertaking a BPR in the context 
of LNG ports RM is necessary in order to apply a radical change to the way 
combined safety and security RM and emergency response processes are 
conceived, planned and conducted.  
It should be noted that the passage from an existing disintegrated and 
fragmented safety and security RM approach to an integrated and holistic 
approach will require a re-engineering of the processes related to RM and 
emergency response.  These radical changes must be introduced with 
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participation of relevant stakeholders from the port community, in full 
coordination with the port authority.    
 
 The relationships and interfaces between port SC safety and security, 
mainly in terms of assessment and management methodologies and 
approaches were analysed. This research revealed that although safety and 
security risks have different requirements in terms of their respective risk 
factors and related RA methods, they are still interrelated, interfaced and 
have shared impacts. A cost effective assessment and management of 
those risks should be approached holistically, integrated and coordinated 
within the framework of an all-hazard approach. The research revealed also 
a deficiency in the coordination among safety and security disciplines which 
reflects an underpinning lack of integrated and holistic approach to risks in 
the minds of many LNG ports HSE and security professionals. During all 
stages of this research, consultation with HSE and security professionals 
also proved the existence of RM gaps due mainly to the silo mentality still 
prevailing in both disciplines.  In this respect, RA should be conducted 
separately by each discipline and then presented to the port authority as a 
detailed RM plans. The port authority must share individual safety and 
security RA reports with the port community’s REMC to be collaboratively 
discussed and evaluated. This way, interfaced, redundant or contradictory 
risk control measures will be detected and addressed. However, in order for 
such a process to be applied efficiently, the following conditions need to be 
fulfilled: 
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o A change in the RM culture among both safety and security 
disciplines is necessary. HSE and security professionals need to 
abandon their respective silo mentalities and agree to act with the 
minimum required synergy which can allow integrated RM in the LNG 
ports context.  This cultural change must be implemented gradually 
and involve both disciplines of RM. In our opinion, this concerns not 
only the port industry and but also must be conceived at a 
government level. A strategic plan for synergising HSE and security 
disciplines needs to be put in place at the governmental level and use 
existing means, including regulations, formal training, workshops and 
other medians. The aim of such a strategic plan shall be the 
dissemination of an integrated vision about HSE and security risks 
which shall assist in applying integrated and holistic approach to 
safety and security risks in all maritime activities, including LNG ports. 
o Definition of clear roles and responsibilities followed by a clear RM 
work process. Such process shall be documented and linked to a Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) system which shall ensure efficiency 
and quality of the work flow. In order to achieve efficiency of such 
work flow, a port community electronic system is necessary to ease 
communication and reduce work lead time. Port community systems 
are now common in several ports around the world which assisted in 
enhancing the productivity of the port community’s involvement in 
several port related processes. It was highlighted before that the 
involvement of the port community in the RM and emergency 
response system of LNG ports has been very limited. This research 
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proposes such involvement to be further expanded to the extent that 
the port community shall be considered an essential partner of the 
port authority in the implementation of integrated RM, emergency 
response and port business continuity.   
 The proposed CM identified the main port stakeholders with direct 
involvement in RM and emergency response. It also captured the LNG port 
SC processes and flows. From a thorough understanding of LNG ports’ main 
stakeholders and their relationships regulated by international and industry 
legislation, the conceptual model has proposed a methodology for integrated 
and coordinated RM, emergency response and port business continuity 
within the framework of a collaborative and participative approach. Such an 
approach allows for the design of an integrated and holistic RM and 
emergency response strategies within the framework of a holistic approach. 
 
10.3 CHARACTERISATION OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
The approach used in this research can be characterised by:  
 Theoretically, the adopted approach enabled critical evaluation of the 
relationship, interfaces and shared impacts among safety and security risks 
and highlighted their critical importance to the resiliency of the whole LNG 
SC, and how their management could be detrimental to the LNG ports if not 
fully understood and properly addressed in a timely and cost effective 
manner. Therefore, the approach was comprehensive and holistic in 
identifying safety and security management gaps and their underpinning 
drawbacks. 
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 This research attempted to adopt a high level conceptual approach with an 
objective of providing empirical solutions to the research problem. A 
drawback of such an approach may be its high level analytical framework 
which would not be disposed to capture the full details of the RM processes. 
However, by doing so, this approach enabled a focused analysis on the 
hallmarks of RM and emergency planning and response from organisational 
and management perspective. It should be noted that adopting the right 
approach is a pre-requisite to efficient and cost effective RM and emergency 
response.  If the approach enables adequate management of the interfaces 
among safety and security, then individual RM methods and techniques are 
well advanced to identify individual and societal risks and their mitigation 
options. The outcome of the process is ultimately a unified RM strategy free 
from contradictory or redundant actions or gaps as a result of integrated RM 
process. Such an integrated process will have a positive impact on 
emergency management and port business continuity since emergency 
planning and response is based on the outcome of what may go wrong in 
case risk mitigation measures are not able to fully mitigate risks and 
hazards. In this respect, port emergency management agencies will have a 
clear picture on the risk acceptance criteria and will be in a position to 
estimate the possible consequences and magnitude of incidents when they 
strike. Therefore, integration of the whole RM and emergency management 
processes will be achieved to ensure resilient and robust LNG port SCs.    
 Also, the approach adopted can be defined as systemic, since it calls for a 
radical review of the existing systems in which the RM and emergency 
response are conceived, planned and applied. It also provides an advanced 
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methodology to re-engineer the BPs for LNG port RM, emergency response 
and port business continuity; and apply an integrated RM approach which 
narrows the gaps between safety and security RM.        
 Since a holistic view is necessary to address RM issues in the port and 
maritime systems, SSM was selected and used as an appropriate 
methodology in the presentation and analysis of the problem situation as 
well as in finding an optimal solution for the research problem. Integration, 
participation and worldview were the hallmarks of this approach and 
assisted significantly in orienting and proposing a practical solution to the ill- 
structured LNG ports RM system which was validated with the LNG port RM 
industry.  The soft systems approach fits in well with the all-hazards strategy 
as it is seen as a learning cycle, which enables port organisations to 
continually adapt to the changing nature of risk and risk profile and facilitates 
their mutual learning during their collaborative effort to address risks within a 
participative approach. RM Strategy should be a dynamic and iterative 
process which would benefit from the soft systems approach. 
10.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The research aimed to analyse the current approach to safety and security RM, 
emergency response and port business continuity in some LNG port SCs; and 
identify their issues and shortcomings. This has been done in an attempt to 
provide an enhanced approach and to model its processes and flows for an 
integrated and cost effective management of those risks and emergencies. The 
scope and findings of the research were limited in the following ways:  
   
322 
 
 In general the publications and research activities in the field under study 
are not abundant.  
  The research adopted a high level approach by focusing mainly on the 
general structure of the methods, processes and flows governing safety 
and security RM and their interfaces. The research did not discuss in 
detail the RM process for each discipline nor their respective 
requirements. 
 In the same way, the research highlighted more the organisational part of 
RM and emergency response in the LNG port System and did not fully 
analyse the technical side. This way, the research has a more 
management focus than purely technical RM orientation. 
 Although the study used mixed methods, qualitative techniques and 
methods are predominantly used which did not allow quantitative 
evaluation of the impact of the proposed RM and emergency response 
approach and methodology on the efficiency of LNG port performance 
and on the overall LNG SC.  
 Last but not least, the study did not include an evaluation of the ‘all-
hazards’ approach already implemented in the U.S (by the US. Coast 
Guard) and in other developed countries. As this has been introduced 
recently, no data is yet available on its application. Such evaluation 
would provide further insight on the proposed risk and emergency 
management model.      
Despite these limitations the empirical findings of this research are conclusive 
and reliable to the situation of the Middle Eastern LNG ports and similar ports 
and terminals around the world which have not yet applied an integrated 
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approach to RM and emergencies. This conclusion is based on the fact that the 
panel members consulted during this research are industry leaders and experts 
in the field of safety and security RM and LNG SCs, logistics and maritime 
transport. Their knowledge spans not only the situation of the Middle Eastern 
hydrocarbon ports but also other export/ import hydrocarbon ports worldwide. 
Also the methodology applied for the research appears to be a valid option from 
such a high level conceptual study. Undoubtedly, this methodology would be 
valid also for further research in the field but with a different focus as stipulated 
earlier. 
10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has the merit to uncover and highlight the issue of the 
disintegrated nature of the RM approach in LNG port SCs, future research may 
extend the scope of the research in the following directions: 
 Develop a generic model to test the efficiency of RM and emergencies in 
LNG ports and marine terminals. Such a model would set up criteria for 
optimal organisation of safety and security risk activities within LNG ports 
which would allow an optimal level of coordination and exchange of 
information. One of the criteria for the efficiency of the model shall be the 
number of risk cases dealt with collaboratively under the port 
management authority.     
 A quantitative model may be developed to assess and evaluate the 
impact of uncoordinated management of safety and security risks on the 
overall RM and emergencies planning, preparedness and response. The 
model shall be able to evaluate the cost of RM and emergencies 
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response as well as the consequences and impacts of port incidents and 
accidents.  
  Another direction of research in the same field and which is actually 
needed is a benchmark study of the RM and emergencies management 
between integrated management of risks and emergencies and 
segregated/ isolated RM. This study shall develop scenarios of incidents 
and accidents and show quantitatively and qualitatively what would be 
the RM results and costs in both cases. 
 Another study would be to evaluate the all-hazards approach recently 
introduced by the US. Coast Guard, to compare it with the former 
approach used by the same organisation.    
 
10.6 CONCLUSION 
 
LNG ports SCs are strategic to the global LNG SC. The management of their 
risks and emergencies is central to the resiliency and business continuity of the 
whole SC. Therefore, both the RM approach and its practice should be 
conceived and planned holistically within the framework of an all-hazards 
approach. The port SC should focus on prevention of all kinds of risks, 
meanwhile contingency plans should also be in place at all times to reduce and 
minimise the consequences of unwanted manmade events, from either 
intentional or accidental sources. Integration is required at all levels of plans, 
actions and processes both vertically (at the safety-security level) and 
horizontally (along the RM, emergency management and port recovery and 
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business continuity).  Integration of those plans and processes will ensure 
resilient, cost effective and robust LNG SCs. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix1 Brief History of LNG tankers  
In January 1959 Methane Pioneer, a converted World War II freighter 
containing five aluminium prismatic tanks, carried LNG cargo from Lake 
Charles-LA., to Canvey Island, UK. This demonstrated that the transportation of 
large quantities of LNG safely across the ocean was possible. By the turn of the 
century, the industry employed more than $200 billion in capital.  
The LNG industry started in 1964 with the first shipments from Algeria 
to the UK. By the late 1990s, international trade in LNG increased 50 
fold, production capacity has increased 10 fold and the transport 
capacity of individual ships has increased 5 fold. The first gas carrier 
tanks that were used in a continuous regular trade in the United States 
were of the membrane tank design. In 1965 Phillips Petroleum 
contacted the Coast Guard concerning a proposal it had made to Tokyo 
Gas for shipping LNG from Alaska. The shipments were to be made in 
tanks that were designed by Worms and Co., Paris, France. This design 
later became known as the Gas Transport design. At first, the LNG 
carriers were envisioned as being 34,000 m³, but eventually the design 
called for the 71,500 m³ vessels that became the Arctic Tokyo and Polar 
Alaska (Qatar Gas Operating Company Ltd, 2009). 
Höegh built the world's first LNG carrier with spherical tanks in 1973. 
Norman Lady was delivered in November 1973, from the Rosenberg 
shipyard in Norway. The vessel was the prototype of the Moss spherical 
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cargo containment system. Leif Höegh & Co took an active role in the 
development of this system (Qatar Gas Operating Company Ltd, 2009).  
Commencing with its first delivery of an LNG carrier in the early 1990s, 
Hyundai consecutively expanded its construction capacity for vessels 
up to 138,000 m³, making their shipyard the first in the world available 
for building both Moss-type and membrane-type LNG carriers, taking 
ever-increasing orders for high capacity vessels. These include the new 
membrane-type carrier measuring 280m in length, 43m in width and 
26m in depth, made up of four independent insulated tanks, which is the 
largest LNG carrier of this type ever made. Since the first delivery of 
LNG carriers back in the early 1990s, Hyundai has played a leading role 
in building LNG carriers.  
In 1999, Samsung (SHI) successfully constructed the world's largest 
New Membrane-type LNG carrier, which was the largest single hull-
form vessel in the world at that time. Lighter and faster than the existing 
LNG vessels, this vessel measures 278.8m in length, 42.6m in width 
and 26.0m in depth, and navigates at 20.7 knots. It is the largest single 
hull-form vessel in the world with a capacity up to 138,378 m³.  
On October 2, 2003, the Energy Frontier, an LNG carrier owned by 
Tokyo Gas delivered approximately 67,000 tons of LNG to Tokyo Gas' 
Sodegaura LNG Terminal from Malaysia. The Energy Frontier is a 
moss-type carrier, having four spherical-shaped tanks. This carrier was 
designed on the scale of a conventional LNG carrier, but with 10,000 m³ 
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greater load capacity, which at 145,000 m³ made it the world's largest 
LNG carrier.  
In the first five months of 2005 alone, there were five new LNG carriers 
added to the fleet with a combined carrying capacity of 699,000 m³. The 
addition of these five LNG carriers represented a 3% net increase in the 
LNG shipping capacity worldwide and is indicative of the expanding 
LNG market. The anticipated growth of the LNG market is well 
represented by the number of LNG carriers scheduled for construction. 
Throughout the world, as of 2006 shipbuilders had plans to build 115 
new LNG carriers, with a combined total carrying capacity of more than 
17 million m³. There are only nine shipyards in the world building LNG 
tankers: Three are in Japan, three are in Korea, two are in Europe, and 
one is in China (Qatar Gas Operating Company Ltd, 2009).  
As of 2006 there were approximately 180 LNG carriers in operation, 
with a total capacity of over 21 million m³. All of these were built in 
Japan, Korea, Europe, or the United States. Of these, 16 ships had a 
capacity of less than 50,000 m³; 15 ships have a capacity between 
50,001 to 100,000 m³; and 150 ships have a capacity between 100,001 
m³ and 150,000 m³. Most of the smaller LNG carriers have been in 
service for several decades, and it is likely that they will be replaced by 
much larger ships.  
Mitsubishi (MHI), Japan; as well as Daewoo and Samsung Shipbuilding, 
both in Korea, have focused on the construction of membrane tank LNG 
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vessels. Meanwhile, Hyundai Heavy Industries has developed a 
spherical tank design, along with its mobile offshore drilling unit 
construction program. Other builders in Asia with a proven LNG carrier 
construction program include Kawasaki (KHI) and Mitsui Shipbuilding. 
Since 2006, plans in Qatar, with its reserve of 14 trillion m³ of natural gas, have 
included construction of as many as 46 additional LNG carriers. 
 Figure 2.11- LNG Tanker Fleet 1965-2006 
 
The graph above shows the number of new ships commissioned each year 
which become two digits since year 2000. In 2010, the world LNG fleet 
accounted for 360 tankers with a capacity in excess of 53 million m³. The 
largest LNG tankers (Q-Max) are mainly operated from Qatar, the single largest 
LNG exporter with a market share of 27% in 2011 (PFC Energy, 2010).  
Qatar not only had reserves in abundance, its geographic location meant that 
markets in Europe and even North America were potentially available as were 
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those in the Far East. The economics of profitably doing business in these 
markets would require serious consideration given the size of the existing plant 
and vessels currently in service. It was clear that only the benefits of increased 
economies of scale available from bigger production plants and vessels would 
make these markets competitively feasible. 
In June 2002, a Heads of Agreement (HOA) document was signed between 
Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil to supply LNG to the UK by the winter of 
2007/2008. The project and venture agreements were signed in late 2004 and 
called for the development of two LNG trains to supply 15.6 MTPA of LNG to 
the UK and North Europe for 25 years. Known as the Qatar gas 2 project (QGII) 
it was at that time, at almost US$ 13 billion, the biggest deal in the history of the 
hydrocarbon industry. This triggered the start of feasibility studies by the QGII 
teams which soon resulted in the conceptual designs for the large capacity 
trains and new large ships (Qatar Gas Operating Company Ltd, 2009). 
Later, in July 2003, QP and ConocoPhillips signed an agreement for Qatar gas 
3, a development that called for delivery of LNG to primarily the USA. The 
partners decided to base this US$ 5 billion scheme on the QGII train and ship 
designs, with a single new train to be built at Ras-Laffan, additional shipping 
capacity and a receiving terminal in America. This was followed in 2005 when 
QP and Royal Dutch Shell signed an agreement for the development of yet 
another 7.8 MTPA project called Qatar gas 4 that would also primarily supply 
the growing North American gas market, and which would also be based on the 
same designs (Qatar Gas Operating Company Ltd, 2009). 
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With the signing of the QG 2 HOA, the catalyst to rethink the LNG tanker status 
quo had arrived. The new production trains would be almost four times the size 
of the original capacity of the first three QG trains. The new voyages were now 
to more distant western markets and the customers were no longer solely 
power companies with predictable demand. The time for a new breed of ships 
had dawned (Qatar Gas Operating Company Ltd, 2011). 
In order to take advantage of the new market opportunities and demands, Qatar 
gas realised that the ships needed to become bigger and more efficient to 
dramatically lower transport costs.  
In mid-2002, a team of marine experts from ExxonMobil and Qatar gas was 
formed within the QGII project to deliver this step change. Radical thinking was 
employed by this Team. The target was to design the largest size of ship that 
could be accommodated safely at its home loading port of Ras-Laffan. Thus the 
target physical dimensions of the ship were derived as being 345 meters long 
by 55 meters wide with a draft of 12 meters. 
It was also suspected that cargo volume should be maximized by using 
membrane containment technology instead of spherical aluminium containers. 
The result was the “plan” for a ship with a capacity of 250 - 266,000 m³, almost 
80% more than the largest LNG tankers built at that date and a swathe of 
technical and commercial challenges to be met. These are the specifications for 
the ‘Q-Max’, the largest LNG tanker ever built to date (Qatar Gas Operating 
Company Ltd, 2011).   
In order to maintain economies of scale but allow access to other discharge 
terminals unable to accommodate Q-Max vessel, a smaller version of the Q-
Max has been developed. 30m shorter at 315m and 5m narrower at 50 m with 
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the same draft of 12m, the ‘Q-Flex’ has a capacity around 215,000 m³. Both Q-
Max and Q-Flex have set high standards in LNG ship design; they have 
changed the industry and reduced the transport cost by over 30% (Dubois-
Denis, 2004) 
 
 
 
   
354 
 
Appendix2 Amendments to the STCW- 1978 
S/N Amendment 
date 
Entry into 
Force 
Content of the amendment 
01 22-05- 1991 
 
1 -12- 1992 These amendments concerned mostly 
additional requirements made necessary by 
the implementation of the Global Maritime 
Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). 
 
02 25-05-1994 
 
01-01-1996 The amendments replaced Chapter V on 
special training for crews on tankers, including 
LNG carriers. This Chapter was designed to 
ensure that officers and ratings who are to 
have specific duties related to the cargo and 
cargo equipment of tankers shall have 
completed an appropriate shore-based fire-
fighting course and have completed either an 
appropriate period of shipboard service or an 
approved familiarisation course. 
Requirements are more stringent for masters 
and senior officers. Attention is paid not only 
to the safety aspects but also to pollution 
prevention. The Chapter contains three 
regulations dealing with oil tankers, chemical 
tankers and liquefied gas tankers, 
respectively. For instance, resolution 12 
concerns specifically the training and 
qualifications of masters, officers and ratings 
of liquefied gas tankers. 
 
03 07-07-1995 
 
1-02-1997 It is considered a major revision of the 
convention in response to a recognised need 
to bring the Convention up to date and to 
respond to critics who pointed out the many 
vague phrases which resulted in different 
interpretations. 
One of the major features of the revision was 
the division of the technical annex into 
regulations, divided into Chapters as before, 
and a new STCW Code, to which many 
technical regulations have been transferred. 
Part A of the Code is mandatory while Part B 
is recommended. Dividing the regulations up 
in this way makes administration easier and it 
also makes the task of revising and updating 
them simpler: for procedural and legal 
reasons, there is no need to call a full 
conference to make changes to Codes. 
 
04 June 1997 
 
1 -01-1999 These amendments concern training for 
personnel on passenger ships. The 
amendments include an additional Regulation 
V/3 in Chapter V on Mandatory minimum 
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requirements for the training and qualifications 
of masters, officers, ratings and other 
personnel on passenger ships other than Ro-
Ro passenger ships. Related additions are 
also made to the STCW Code, covering 
Crowd management training; Familiarisation 
training; Safety training for personnel providing 
direct service to passengers in passenger 
spaces; Passenger safety; and Crisis 
management and human behaviour training. 
05 9-12- 1998 
 
01-01- 2003 Amendments to the STCW Code are aimed at 
improving minimum standards of competence 
of crews, in particular relating to cargo 
securing, loading and unloading on bulk 
carriers, since these procedures have the 
potential to put undue stresses on the ship's 
structure. The amendments concern sections 
A-II/1 and A-II/2 under "Cargo handling and 
stowage at the operational and management 
levels. 
06 May 2006 
 
 
01-01- 2008 Addition of new minimum mandatory training 
and certification requirements for ship security 
officers (SSOs). The amendments to the 
STCW Convention and to parts A and B of the 
STCW Code include Requirements for the 
issue of certificates of proficiency for Ship 
Security Officers; Specifications of minimum 
standards of proficiency for ship security 
officers; and Guidance regarding training for 
Ship Security Officers. 
Further amendments to part A of the STCW 
Code added additional training requirements 
for the launching and recovery of fast rescue 
boats. The amendments have been prepared 
in response to reports of injuries to seafarers 
in numerous incidents involving the launching 
and recovery of fast rescue boats in adverse 
weather conditions 
07 25 -06-2010 01-01-2012 These amendments are called the Manila 
amendments to the STCW Convention. They 
are aimed at bringing the Convention and 
Code up to date with developments since they 
were initially adopted and to enable them to 
address issues that are anticipated to emerge 
in the foreseeable future.  
Among the amendments adopted, there are a 
number of important changes to each chapter 
of the Convention and Code, including:  
 Improved measures to prevent fraudulent 
practices associated with certificates of 
competency and strengthen the evaluation 
process (monitoring of Parties' compliance 
with the Convention);  
 Revised requirements on hours of work 
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and rest and new requirements for the 
prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, as 
well as updated standards relating to 
medical fitness standards for seafarers;  
 New certification requirements for able 
seafarers;  
 New requirements relating to training in 
modern technology such as electronic 
charts and information systems (ECDIS);  
 New requirements for marine environment 
awareness training and training in 
leadership and teamwork;  
 New training and certification 
requirements for electro-technical officers;  
 Updating of competence requirements for 
personnel serving on board all types of 
tankers, including new requirements for 
personnel serving on liquefied gas 
tankers;  
 New requirements for security training, as 
well as provisions to ensure that seafarers 
are properly trained to cope if their ship 
comes under attack by pirates;  
 Introduction of modern training 
methodology including distance learning 
and web-based learning;  
 New training guidance for personnel 
serving on board ships operating in polar 
waters; and  
New training guidance for personnel 
operating Dynamic Positioning Systems 
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Appendix3 Maximum Credible Accidental and non-accidental 
Releases 
  
Table 1 Accidental release case-750mm hole 
Scenario Hole size = 
750mm 
Collision event with another vessel at 90º angle 
or serious grounding at sufficient speed so that 
the double hull is penetrated and additional 
barriers also breached causing the LNG tank to 
be deformed to such an extent that it leaks. 
Above and below waterline holes were 
considered. 
Modelling LNG discharge, 
pool formation, 
dispersion, 
ignition and flash 
fire back to 
source, pool fire. 
This event is a worst case event in terms of 
hazard distance as the accidental event may not 
ignite the LNG immediately, allowing a vapor 
cloud to form and disperse downwind. The cloud 
is then assumed to ignite at its maximum 
flammable extent and flash back to the source 
where the LNG spill will burn as a pool fire. The 
sustained pool fire diameter and hence hazard 
distance will be substantially smaller than would 
be the case if the un-ignited pool diameter were 
used. 
Most likely 
Hazard 
distances 
(measured 
from 
point of 
release) 
Dispersion and 
flash fire hazard 
range = 920m 
Pool fire hazard 
range = 440m 
Dispersion distance is based on neutral stability 
5m/s Weather case (D5) and provides the 
distance to maximum flammable extent. The F 
2m/s case is less likely and the duration of event 
would be so long that buoyancy effects of 
methane could be expected to cause plume lift 
off as is observed with other buoyant gases. 
Anyone caught within the flammable cloud would 
be very seriously burned, but flammable impacts 
beyond the cloud are likely to be small. 
The pool fire case is based on 5kw/m2 which is 
sufficient to cause serious burns if shelter cannot 
be found within 40 seconds – this is as 
recommended in safety regulations. 
Source Pitblado et al. (2004, pages 18 &19) 
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Table 2 Non- accidental Release case-1500mm 
Scenario Hole size = 1500mm This event could be caused by terrorist 
attack. In order to generate a hole of 
this dimension, and without disclosing 
the attack scenario, the energy 
involved would be so large that 
immediate ignition would be by far the 
most likely outcome. 
Modelling Discharge, pool 
formation, pool fire. 
Discharge and pool formation are as 
before, but in this case immediate 
ignition of the pool is almost certain 
and no dispersion of flammable vapors 
would occur 
Most likely 
hazard 
distance 
Pool fire hazard range 
= 750mm 
The pool fire case is based on 5kw/m2 
which is sufficient to cause serious 
burns if shelter cannot be found within 
40 seconds – this is as recommended 
in safety regulations. 
 
Source Pitblado et al. (2004, pages 18 &19) 
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Appendix4 Delphi survey round one questionnaire and results 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
 
I am undertaking doctoral research at the University of Plymouth, United 
Kingdom on LNG port supply chain risk management. Port supply chain refers 
to the set of organisations and firms fulfilling different port and logistics 
operations which are highly integrated and reliant on each other to deliver port 
and maritime services. A panel of LNG port experts including port managers, 
terminal operators, LNG shippers, maritime agencies, and LNG storage facilities 
managers, managers of LNG shipping companies, LNG marketing managers, 
specialists in port safety and security as well as consultants are all being 
consulted in this research.  
As part of the research, I am conducting a survey using the Delphi Technique. 
The questionnaire used in the survey is shown below. The Delphi Technique 
typically consists of two rounds of questionnaires. In each round you are asked 
to make judgement about a specific subject, by marking (X) at the left of one of 
the three options for each statement, labelled as ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’ and ‘Unable 
to Comment’. In the case of ‘Disagree’ you are requested to give further 
comments. Such comments form the second round survey. 
Your reply will be treated in strict confidence, and names of individual 
respondents or organisations will not be used in published material or given to 
third parties.  The general findings of the survey may, however, be published.  If 
you participate in the survey, a copy of the general findings will be emailed to 
you upon your request. 
I look forward to hearing from you within two weeks. If you require any further 
details please do not hesitate to contact me at the address below. 
 
Mohamed Briouig 
P.O.BOX 200215 
Doha, State of Qatar 
Mobile : +974 55090636 
Landline : +974 44773218  
Fax   : +974 44554198  
Emails : (1) mohamed.briouig@plymouth.ac.uk 
                 (2) Briouig@gmail.com 
NB:  
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 All the following statements relate to port Supply Chains pertaining to 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 
 Risks referred to in this questionnaire are related only to safety, security 
and quality risk types. 
 
 
 
PART ONE: LNG PORT SECURITY 
 
1. Security risks are now equally important as safety risks in LNG ports 
and marine terminals. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
 
2. LNG ports are sufficiently protected against terrorist risks 
 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
 
3. Current security legal frameworks (ISPS & non ISPS security 
frameworks) are sufficient to ensure efficient security protection for 
LNG ports SCs. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
4. The multitude of existing security frameworks (ISPS and non ISPS 
initiatives) may lead to difficulty and high costs in the implementation 
of security protection which may adversely affect the level of 
protection in LNG ports SC. 
    Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
................ 
5. There are already adequate collaborative security and safety risk 
arrangements in place among LNG port supply chain members. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
................ 
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6. There are currently adequate coordinated risk management 
procedures in place in LNG port SCs. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
7. In the LNG industry, the methodology for evaluating risks is 
insufficient to integrate the nature of post 9/11 risk profiles involving 
global terrorism. 
 Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
8. Ports are strategically located within the LNG SC and 
represent the only node within the maritime SC bringing 
together multiple logistics, port and maritime related 
organisations and stakeholders, functions, roles, processes 
and flows. As such, the port organization should be leading 
coordination efforts towards security risk assessment and 
response. 
 
Agree?    Disagree?   Unable to 
comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
9. Generally port authorities are leading collaborative measures to 
overcome and mitigate security risks among port SC members.  This 
leadership is running adequately in the case of LNG ports 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
 
PART TWO: LNG PORT SAFETY 
 
10. LNG Port Safety is generally the business of each individual facility 
inside the port, as each one is required to contain risks within its 
boundary. 
Agree ?   Disagree  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
11. If safety is ensured by each individual member of the LNG Port SC, 
we can assume that the entire LNG SC will be safe  
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Agree   Disagree  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
12. The IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for shipping should be 
extended to address port safety. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
13. A standard safety framework is necessary to address both LNG 
shipping and port safety networks. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
14. A Standard safety framework is needed to address the ship-port 
interface more efficiently. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
 
PART THREE: LNG PORT SAFETY & SECURITY 
 
15. Safety and Security in LNG ports SCs are closely related issues and 
may yield better outcomes if managed together within a unified risk 
management entity. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
16. Safety measures (safeguards) are the first line of defence for security 
in LNG port SCs. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
17. There is a need for a standard safety and security risk assessment 
and management methodology capable of capturing LNG Port SC 
processes and flows. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
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....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
18. Generally in practice, risk assessment in safety and security uses the 
same methodology. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
19. Mitigation strategies are efficiently applied within the framework of a 
comprehensive risk management strategy in LNG Port SCs 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
20. Contingency measures are planned more with reference to the 
outcome of possible events rather than to the outcome of risk. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
21. A unified risk management methodology for assessing both safety 
and security risks and hazards can be more cost effective than a risk 
management methodology in which security and safety risks are 
managed separately and with less coordination. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
 
PART FOUR: LNG PORT RISK MANAGMENT AND QUALITY 
 
22. There is a similitude between Port SC safety, security and quality; 
mainly in terms of assessment and management methodologies and 
approaches. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree, please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
23. Safety and security risk assessment and management need to take 
advantage of the quality revolution, especially the Total Quality 
Management (TQM) Principle. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If your disagree, please comment as to why 
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....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
24. Prevention is the key principle in Total Quality Management (TQM) 
and should also be for the case of safety and security management. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
............. 
....................................................................................................................
............. 
25. Based on the principles of TQM, LNG port SCs should adopt an 
integrated Risk assessment and management approach capable of 
dealing with the three types of risks, Safety, Security and Quality.  
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If you disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
26. Adopting such an integrative approach will lead to efficient and cost 
effective risk management in LNG Ports SCs. 
Agree?   Disagree?  Unable to comment? 
If your disagree please comment as to why 
....................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................
.......................... 
Thank you for completing the survey at the Web link below:  
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2HLP96P 
 
Survey Results Round 1 
No Statements of First Round Delphi A DA UC n % 
Q1 Security risks are now equally important as 
safety risks in LNG ports and marine terminals 
17 1 2 20 85.0A 
Q2 LNG ports are sufficiently protected against 
terrorist risks 
5 6 9 20 25.0A 
30.0D 
Q3 Current security legal frameworks(ISPS & non 
ISPS security frameworks) are sufficient to 
ensure efficient security protection for LNG 
Ports SCs. 
7 6 7 20 35.0A 
30.0D 
Q4 The multitude of existing security frameworks 
(ISPS & non ISPS initiatives) may lead to 
difficulty and high costs in the implementation 
of security protection which may adversely 
affect the level of protection in LNG ports. 
8 5 7 20 
 
40.0A 
25.0D 
Q5 There are already adequate collaborative 
security and safety risk arrangements in place 
among LNG port Supply Chain members. 
10 4 6 20 50A 
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Q6 There are currently adequate coordinated risk 
management procedures in place in LNG port 
SCs  
8 4 8 20 40.0A 
20.0D 
Q7 In the LNG industry, the methodology for 
evaluating risks is insufficient to integrate the 
nature of post 9/11 risk profiles involving global 
terrorism 
10 3 7 20 50.0A 
Q8 Ports are strategically located within the LNG 
SC and represent the only node within the 
maritime SC bringing together multiple 
logistics, port and maritime related 
organisations and stakeholders, functions, 
roles and flows. As such, the port organization 
should be leading coordination efforts towards 
security risk assessment and response. 
18 1 1 20 90.0A 
Q9 Generally port authorities are leading 
collaborative measures to overcome and 
mitigate security risks among port SC 
members. This leadership is running 
adequately in the case of LNG ports 
8 4 8 20 40.0A 
20.0D 
Q10 LNG port safety is generally the business of 
each individual facility inside the port, as each 
one is required to contain risks within its 
boundary 
10 7 3 20 50.0A 
Q11 If safety is ensured by each individual member 
of the LNG port SC, we can assume that the 
entire LNG SC is safe 
11 7 2 20 55.0A 
Q12 The IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
for shipping should be extended to address 
port safety 
13 1 6 20 65.0A 
Q13 A standard safety framework  is necessary to 
address both LNG shipping and port safety 
networks 
16 1 3 20 80.0A 
Q14 A standard safety framework is needed to 
address the ship-port interface more efficiently 
16 1 3 20 80.0A 
Q15 Safety and Security in LNG ports SCs are 
closely related issues and may yield better 
outcome if managed together within a unified 
risk management entity 
13 5 2 20 
 
65.0A 
Q16 Safety measures(Safeguards) are the first line 
of defence for security in LNG ports SCs  
13 5 2 20 65.0A 
Q17 There is a need for a standard safety and 
security risk assessment and management 
methodology capable of capturing LNG port 
SC processes and flows 
15 1 3 19 77.0A 
Q18 Generally in practice, risk assessment in safety 
and security uses the same methodology 
8 9 3 20 45.0D 
40.0A 
Q19 Mitigation strategies are efficiently applied 
within the framework of a comprehensive risk 
management strategy in LNG Port SCs 
7 3 9 19 36.8A 
15.7D 
Q20 Contingency measures are planned more with 
reference to the outcome of possible events 
than to the outcome of risk 
13 4 3 20 65.0A 
Q21 A unified risk management methodology for 14 4 2 20 70.0A 
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assessing both safety and security risks and 
hazards can be more cost effective than a risk 
management methodology in which security 
and safety risks are managed separately and 
with less coordination 
Q22 There is a similitude between port SC safety, 
security and quality; mainly in terms of 
assessment and management methodologies 
and approaches 
14 2 4 20 70.0A 
Q23 Safety and security risk assessment and 
management need to take advantage of the 
quality revolution, especially the Total Quality 
management (TQM) principle   
17 3 0 20 85.0A 
Q24 Prevention is the key principle in Total Quality 
management (TQM) and should also be for the 
case of safety and security management 
14 5 1 20 70.0A 
Q25 Based on the principles of TQM, LNG port SCs 
should adopt an integrated risk assessment 
and management approach capable of dealing 
with the three(3) types of risks 
16 3 1 20 80.0A 
Q26 Adopting such an integrative approach will 
lead to efficient and cost effective risk 
management in LNG ports SCs 
15 4 1 20 75.0A 
Total Total Opinion Expressed - % of total opinion 314 99 103 516  
 
 
First Round Comments for Statements having less than 51% consensus 
Q # STATEMENT % DA RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS 
2 LNG ports are sufficiently 
protected against terrorist 
risks 
30% 1) It is very difficult to generalize this 
statement across world ports 
2) The sheer size and accessibility of 
these facilities makes them very 
difficult to protect against terrorist 
threats. Much more work and 
international cooperation will be 
required to improve controls. 
3) I believe we are still short of the 
mark. 
4) A determined terrorist could enter 
port secured areas. It is also feasible 
that port facilities could be attacked 
from a distance, by air or from 
seaside. 
5) Ports tend to gravitate towards a 
complete port security model, rather 
than a specialized LNG security 
cover, especially in multi-cargo 
ports. 
6) Will always be vulnerable from see 
side 
7) I cannot comment for all the ports 
worldwide but the ports of Nakilat 
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involvement have been accessed as 
secured. 
3 Current security legal 
framework (ISPS & non 
ISPS security frameworks) 
are sufficient to ensure 
efficient security 
protection for LNG Ports 
SCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30% 1) ISPS and similar codes such as CT-
PAT only require minimum level of 
protection. In certain environments 
these may not be sufficient to 
adequately protect against security 
threats. 
2) Depending on the extent of the 
security framework! 
3) ISPS only offers the basic 
framework. Vulnerability still exists 
from sea ward side of the vessels 
4) Current frameworks are still treating 
individual facilities in relative 
isolation. Efficiency of security 
protection would be greatly 
enhanced by integration of 
processes and systems on local if 
not regional/ global basis. 
5) ISPS is a recommended policy and 
specific country legislation is 
required to enforce in any port. This 
legislation is the document that will 
decide on the adequacy of the 
security framework.  
6) To me, ISPS is merely a paper 
exercise. Security has been in place 
since the port opened, but I do 
believe it could be improved. 
7) Only if these are enforced properly 
4 The multitude of existing 
security frameworks (ISPS 
and non ISPS initiatives) 
may lead to difficulty and 
high costs in the 
implementation of security 
protection which may 
adversely affect the level 
of protection in LNG ports. 
25% 1) ISPS only states that certain 
requirements are in place, they do 
not state how these requirements 
are achieved.  
2) If integrated system for all the 
different frameworks is followed, this 
might enhance the system. 
3) Cost should always be in proportion 
to the risk. The ISPS code does not 
prescribe the physical measures but 
expect the port to do a RA and 
based on this put an effective 
protection in place. 
4) In fact, I see ISPS and non ISPS 
initiatives as an advantage, however 
some areas might need to be 
reviewed, but I don’t see it as having 
adversary effect on the level of 
protection in LNG ports. 
5 There are already 
adequate collaborative 
security and safety risk 
arrangements in place 
20% 1) Especially private stakeholders 
2) All port and SC members have 
specific requirements which are 
sometimes contradictory. 
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among LNG port SC 
members. 
3) Some arrangements are in place, 
but they are far from adequate in 
controlling/ combating today’s- let 
alone tomorrow’s- threats. 
4) There is still a disconnection 
between the various parties in the 
LNG SC. 
5) Piracy risk has not yet been 
mitigated sufficiently 
 
6 There are currently 
adequate coordinated RM 
procedures in place in 
LNG port SCs 
20% 1) From experience, RM activities 
across the various disciplines take 
place in isolation. 
2) There is no joint forum to undertake 
and review coordination for RM 
3) These are adequate at the tier-1 and 
tier-2 (locally controllable risks) 
levels - NOT at the tier-3 (beyond 
local control) level. 
4) Adequate coordinated RM 
procedures do not involve all parties 
in the LNG SC 
5) This requires more coordination and 
communication to ensure total 
alignment 
 
7 In the LNG industry, the 
methodology for 
evaluating risks is 
insufficient to integrate the 
nature of post 9/11 risk 
profiles involving global 
terrorism. 
15% 1) This depends on the methodology. 
APRA- SVA methodology* was 
developed precisely for this reason 
2) Depending on the type and level of 
risk involved 
3) Nothing wrong with the 
methodology; the limiting factor is 
our competencies/experiences in 
putting together credible single or 
combined event scenarios and 
imagining the possible 
consequences & their mitigating 
actions. (Think about the Japan 
quake and tsunami!) 
4) Surely from a safety perspective as 
anti-terrorism is not included. 
5) The risk models available are 
adequate again must ensure that 
these are commonly applied. 
6) ISPS covers this aspect. 
 
9 Generally port authorities 
are leading collaborative 
measures to overcome 
and mitigate security risks 
among port SC members. 
This leadership is running 
adequately in the case of 
20% 1) I think it's terminal operators who 
lead such efforts 
2) Some security apparatus are not 
within the jurisdiction of port 
authorities 
3) Intentions are there, but 
collaboration/progress is slow and 
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LNG ports not necessarily addressing the right 
issues. Good work is being done in 
this domain by Organizations such 
as IMO, OCIMF, etc. 
4) The local legislation dictates 
responsibility. 
5) SIGTTO has been leading this 
10 LNG Port Safety is 
generally the business of 
each individual facility 
inside the port, as each 
one is required to contain 
risks within its boundary. 
35% 1) Depending on the ports involved 
2) Individual facilities should coordinate 
and cooperate with the port authority 
3) No disagreement with statement that 
each facility needs to manage its 
own risks, however there will be a 
number of (major) risks inherent to 
the operation of one facility or 
combined activity risks of two/more 
facilities that will affect one, several 
or all of the other facilities. 
Therefore, the Port Authority needs 
to see to it that the overall combined 
risk is being managed as well, which 
means that they need to establish 
an overall RM approach. 
4) Port authority is ultimately 
responsible so they must ensure the 
LNG facilities are properly risk 
managed 
5) RLIC provides guidelines and 
regulations and follow up on the 
implementation. Each End user use 
this as the minimum requirement of 
their system 
6) HSE regulations should be applied 
consistently throughout the Port 
7) It is a joint responsibility; however, it 
begins with individual entities. 
 
18 Generally in practice, RA 
in safety and security uses 
the same methodology. 
45% 1) Methodologies need to be different 
as threat environment is entirely 
different between these two 
disciplines. 
2) safety is a different concept, in both 
theory and practice, than security 
3) security and safety risks have 
different definitions and as such 
different components to consider 
4) The same methodology can be 
followed but the scenarios need to 
be updated to include Security 
systems as well. 
5) Requirements for safety RAs can be 
very different from those for security 
RAs. 
6) The threat and the requirement are 
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different. 
7) The methodology is different in the 
way that the calculations and 
modelling used for HSE and QRA is 
different than that the ones used by 
security 
8) Security may have other local 
concerns including political 
interference 
9) Both throw up different challenges 
 
19 Mitigation strategies are 
efficiently applied within 
the framework of a 
comprehensive RM 
strategy in LNG Port SCs 
15.8% 1) Not the case mostly. 
2) Needs more alignment as in most 
LNG ports various different parties 
operate in the Port area 
3) It depends on the safety 
management system in place and 
the kind of support received from the 
management. 
 
NB: *APRA-SVA: American Petrochemical & Refiners Association- Security 
Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries 
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First Round Results- Distilled comments 
Q # STATEMENT % DA RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS 
2 LNG ports are sufficiently 
protected against terrorist 
risks 
30% 1. This statement cannot be 
generalised across world ports, 
much more work and 
international cooperation will be 
required to improve controls. 
2. The Sheer size and accessibility 
of these facilities makes them 
very difficult to protect against 
terrorist threats. A determined 
terrorist could access port 
secured areas and could attack 
port facilities from a distance by 
air or from the sea. 
3. Ports tend to gravitate towards a 
complete general port security 
model, rather than a specialized 
LNG security cover, especially in 
multi-cargo ports. 
 
3 Current security legal 
framework (ISPS & non 
ISPS security frameworks) 
are sufficient to ensure 
efficient security 
protection for LNG Ports 
SCs. 
 
30% 1) ISPS and similar codes such as 
CT-PAT only require minimum 
level of protection. In certain 
environments these may not be 
sufficient for adequate protection 
against security threats. 
2) Current frameworks are still 
treating individual facilities in 
relative isolation. Efficiency of 
security protection would be 
greatly enhanced by integrating 
processes and systems on local 
if not regional and global basis. 
3) Only if these security frameworks 
are enforced properly 
 
4 The multitude of existing 
security frameworks (ISPS 
and non ISPS initiatives) 
may lead to difficulty and 
high costs in the 
implementation of 
security protection which 
may adversely affect the 
level of protection in LNG 
25% 1) ISPS only states that certain 
requirements are in place, they 
do not state how these 
requirements are achieved.  
2) If one follows an integrated 
system for all the different 
frameworks, it might enhance the 
system. 
3) Cost should always be in 
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ports. proportion to the risk. The ISPS 
code does not prescribe the 
physical measures but expect the 
port to do a RA and based on this 
put an effective protection in 
place. 
4) In fact, I see ISPS and non ISPS 
initiatives as an advantage, 
however some areas might need 
to be reviewed, but I don’t see it 
as having adverse effect on the 
level of protection in LNG ports. 
5 There are already 
adequate collaborative 
security and safety risk 
arrangements in place 
among LNG port SC 
members. 
20% 1) All port and SC members have 
specific requirements which are 
sometimes contradictory. 
2) Some arrangements are in place, 
but they are far from adequate in 
controlling/ combating today’s- let 
alone tomorrow’s- threats. 
3) There is still a disconnection 
between the various parties in 
the LNG SC. 
 
6 There are currently 
adequate coordinated RM 
procedures in place in 
LNG Port SCs. 
19% 1) From experience RM activities 
across various disciplines take 
place in isolation and do not 
involve all parties in the LNG SC. 
2) There is no joint forum to 
undertake and review 
coordination for RM. This 
requires more coordination and 
communication to ensure total 
alignment 
3) These are adequate at the tier-1 
and tier-2 (locally controllable 
risk) levels - NOT at the tier-3 
(beyond local control) level. 
4) Adequate coordinated RM 
procedures do not involve all 
parties in the LNG SC 
 
7 In the LNG industry, the 
methodology for 
evaluating risks is 
insufficient to integrate 
the nature of post 9/11 
risk profiles involving 
15% 1) Depends on the methodology. 
APRA- SVA methodology* was 
developed precisely for this 
reason 
2) Depending on the type and level 
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global terrorism. of risk involved 
3) Nothing wrong with the 
methodology; the limiting factor 
is our competencies/experience 
in putting together credible single 
or combined event scenarios and 
imagining the possible 
consequences & their mitigating 
actions... 
4) Agree that the risk models 
available are adequate again 
must ensure that this is 
commonly applied. 
 
9 Generally port authorities 
are leading collaborative 
measures to overcome 
and mitigate security risks 
among port SC members. 
This leadership is running 
adequately in the case of 
LNG ports 
20% 1) I think it's terminal operators who 
lead such efforts 
2) Some security apparatus are not 
within the jurisdiction of port 
authorities 
3) Intentions are there, but 
collaboration/progress is slow 
and not necessarily addressing 
the right issues. Good work is 
being done in this domain by 
Organizations/Fora such as IMO, 
OCIMF, etc. 
 
10 LNG Port Safety is 
generally the business of 
each individual facility 
inside the port, as each 
one is required to contain 
risks within its boundary. 
35% 1) Individual facilities should 
coordinate and cooperate with 
the port authority 
2) No disagreement with statement 
that each facility needs to 
manage its own risks, however 
there will be a number of (major) 
risks inherent to the operation of 
one facility or combined risks of 
two/more facilities that may affect 
the other facilities. Therefore, the 
Port Authority needs to make 
sure that the overall combined 
risk is being managed as well, 
which means that they need to 
establish an overall RM 
approach. 
3) HSE regulations should be 
applied consistently throughout 
the Port 
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4) It is a joint responsibility; 
however, it begins with individual 
entities. 
 
18 Generally in practice, RA 
in safety and security 
uses the same 
methodology. 
45% 1) Methodologies need to be 
different as threat environment is 
entirely different between these 
two disciplines. 
2) The same methodology can be 
followed but the scenarios need 
to be updated to include Security 
systems as well 
3) Requirements for safety RAs can 
be very different from those for 
security RAs 
4) The methodology is different in 
the way that the calculations and 
modelling used for HSE and 
QRA is different than that used 
by security 
 
19 Mitigation strategies are 
efficiently applied within 
the framework of a 
comprehensive RM 
strategy in LNG Port SCs 
15.8% 1) This needs more alignment as in 
most LNG ports various different 
parties operate in the Port area 
2) That depends on the safety 
management systems in place 
and the kind of support received 
from the management. 
 
 
  
   
375 
 
Appendix5 Second round Delphi survey questionnaire and results 
 
Dear Sir/ Mme; 
 
Thank you for taking part in the first round survey of the study. There were 
twenty-six (26) statements in the first round survey questionnaire and 20 
panellists participated. The panellists have supplied valuable comments along 
with agreements or disagreements with the statements. There were twenty-six 
(26) statements in the first round survey questionnaire and 20 panellists, 
including you, participated in this round. The panellists have supplied valuable 
comments, which have enriched this research, along with agreements or 
disagreements with the statements. There was general consensus on sixteen 
(16) statements. The remaining ten (10) did not achieve consensus and are 
used in this second round survey questionnaire. The second round survey 
questionnaire is formed from the comments of the panellists along with the 
original ten statements of first round. 
 
The Delphi Technique used for this research consists of two rounds of 
questionnaires.  In this round, please consider the original statement and the 
comments of the panellists and make a judgement by marking (X) against one 
of the three options for each statement, labelled as ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’ and 
‘Unable to Comment’. In the case of ‘Disagree’ you are requested to give further 
comments. The questionnaire used in this round is accessible online through 
the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/QZNLYFD 
 
As promised in the first round, your reply will be treated in strict confidence and 
names of individual respondents or organisations will not be used in published 
material or given to third parties.  Only the general findings of the survey will be 
published.   
Please read all statements before making your judgement. If you participate in 
this survey; a copy of the general findings will be emailed to you.  
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I look forward to receiving your response within one week. If you require any 
further details please do not hesitate to contact me at the address below. 
 
Mohamed Briouig 
PhD Candidate- University of Plymouth-UK 
P.O.BOX 200215 
Doha, State of Qatar 
Mobile: +974 55090636 
Landline: +974 44773218  
Fax        : +974 44554198  
Emails: (1) mohamed.briouig@plymouth.ac.uk 
             (2) Briouig@gmail.com 
             (3) briouig@qp.com.qa 
 
NB:  
 All the following statements relate to port Supply Chains pertaining to 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 
 Risks referred to in this questionnaire are related only to safety, security 
and quality risk types. 
 
 
 
1. Original statement: LNG ports are sufficiently protected against 
terrorist risks 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement.  
 
1.1 It is very difficult to generalize this statement across world ports 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
1.2 The Sheer size and accessibility of these facilities makes them very 
difficult to protect against terrorist threats. Much more work and 
international cooperation will be required to improve controls. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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1.3 A determined terrorist could enter port secured areas. It is also 
feasible that port facilities could be attacked from a distance, by air or 
from seaside. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
2. Original statement: Current security legal framework (ISPS & non 
ISPS security frameworks) are sufficient to ensure efficient security 
protection for LNG Ports SCs. 
 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement.  
 
2.1 ISPS and similar codes such as CT-PAT only require minimum level 
of protection. In certain environments these may not be sufficient to 
adequately protect against security threats. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.2 Current frameworks are still treating individual facilities in relative 
isolation. Efficiency of security protection would be greatly enhanced by 
integrating processes and systems on local if not regional/ global basis. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
2.3 ISPS is a recommended policy and specific country legislation is 
required to enforce in any port. This legislation is the document that will 
decide on the adequacy of the security framework. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
3. Original statement: The multitude of existing security frameworks 
(ISPS and non ISPS initiatives) may lead to difficulty and high costs 
in the implementation of security protection which may adversely 
affect the level of protection in LNG ports. 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
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3.1 ISPS only states that certain requirements are in place, they do not 
state how these requirements are achieved.  
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree--- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.2 If integrated system for all the different frameworks is followed, this 
might enhance the protection system. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.3 Cost should always be in proportion to the risk. The ISPS code does 
not prescribe the physical measures but expect the port to do a risk 
assessment and based on this put an effective protection in place. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.4 ISPS and non ISPS initiatives as an advantage and some areas 
might need to be reviewed, but it does not have an adverse effect on the 
level of protection in LNG ports. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. Original statement: There are already adequate collaborative 
security and safety risk arrangements in place among LNG port 
supply chain members. 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
 
4.1 All port and SC members have specific requirements which are 
sometimes contradictory. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Some arrangements are in place, but they are far from adequate in 
controlling/ combating today’s- let alone tomorrow’s- threats. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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4.3 There is still a disconnection between the various parties in the LNG 
SC. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
5. Original statement: There are currently adequate coordinated risk 
management procedures in place in LNG port SCs 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
 
5.1 From experience, risk management activities across the various 
disciplines take place in isolation. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.2 These are adequate at the tier-1 and tier-2 (locally controllable risks) 
levels - NOT at the tier-3 (beyond local control) level. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.3 Adequate coordinated risk management procedures do not involve 
all parties in the LNG supply chain 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
6. Original statement: In the LNG industry, the methodology for 
evaluating risks is insufficient to integrate the nature of post 9/11 
risk profiles involving global terrorism. 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
 
6.1 This depends on the methodology. APRA- SVA methodology 
(American Petroleum and Refiners Association-Security Vulnerability 
Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical 
Industries) was developed precisely for this reason. 
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Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------- 
 
6.2 There is nothing wrong with the methodology; the limiting factor is 
our competencies/experiences in putting together credible single or 
combined event scenarios and imagining the possible consequences 
and their mitigating actions. (Think about the example of the Japan 
quake and tsunami!) 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
6.3 The risk models available are adequate; again it must be ensured 
that these are commonly applied. 
 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
7. Original statement: Generally port authorities are leading 
collaborative measures to overcome and mitigate security risks 
among port SC members. This leadership is running adequately in 
the case of LNG ports 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
 
7.1 I think it is the terminal operators who lead such effort. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
7.2 Some security apparatus is not within the jurisdiction of port 
authorities. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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7.3 Intentions are there, but collaboration/progress is slow and not 
necessarily addressing the right issues. Good work is being done in this 
domain by organizations such as IMO, OCIMF, etc. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
8. Original statement: LNG Port Safety is generally the business of 
each individual facility inside the port, as each one is required to 
contain risks within its boundary. 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
 
8.1 Individual facilities should coordinate and cooperate with the port 
authority 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
8.2 There will be a number of (major) risks inherent to the operation of 
one facility or combined activity risks of two or more facilities. The Port 
Authority needs to see to it that the overall combined risk is being 
managed as well, which means that they need to establish an overall 
Risk Management approach. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
8.3 Port authority is ultimately responsible so they must ensure the LNG 
facilities are properly risk managed 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
8.4 It is a joint responsibility; however, it begins with individual entities. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
 
 
9. Original statement: Generally in practice, risk assessment in safety 
and security uses the same methodology. 
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The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
 
9.1 Methodologies need to be different as threat environment is entirely 
different between these two disciplines. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
9.2 Safety is a different concept, in both theory and practice, to security 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
9.3 The same methodology can be followed but the scenarios need to be 
updated to include Security systems as well. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
Please comment if you disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
9.4 Requirements for safety risk assessments can be very different from 
those for security risk assessments. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
9.5 The methodology is different in the way that the calculations and 
modelling 
used for HSE and QRA is different from the ones used by security 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
10. Original statement: Mitigation strategies are efficiently applied 
within the framework of a comprehensive risk management strategy 
in LNG Port SCs 
 
The panellists have expressed the following opinions disagreeing with 
the above statement. 
 
10.1 Not the case mostly. 
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Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
10.2 Needs more alignment as in most LNG ports various different 
parties operate in the Port area. 
 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
10.3 It depends on the safety management system in place and the 
kind of 
support received from the management. 
Agree   Disagree  Unable to Comment 
 
Please comment if you disagree 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Second Round Delphi results 
Q. 
No 
Statement A DA UC N % 
2 LNG ports are sufficiently protected 
against terrorist risks 
     
 1- It is very difficult to generalise this 
statement across world ports 
10 2 2 14 71.4 
 2- The sheer size and accessibility of 
these facilities makes them very difficult 
to protect against terrorist threats. 
Much more work and international 
cooperation will be required to improve 
controls 
11 2 1 14 78.6 
 3- A determined terrorist could enter 
port secured areas. It is also 
feasible that port facilities could be 
attacked from a distance, by air or 
from the sea. 
13 1 0 14 92.9 
3 Current security legal framework 
(ISPS & non ISPS security 
frameworks) are sufficient to ensure 
efficient security protection for LNG 
ports SCs 
     
 1- ISPS and similar codes such as 
CT-PAT only require minimum level 
of protection. In certain 
environments these may not be 
sufficient to adequately protect 
against security threats. 
6 4 4 14 42.9 
 2- Current frameworks are still treating 
individual facilities in relative 
isolation. Efficiency of security 
protection would be greatly 
enhanced by integrating processes 
and systems on local if not regional 
and global basis 
11 0 3 14 78.6 
 3- ISPS is a recommended policy 
and country-specific legislation 
is required to enforce in any 
port. This legislation is the 
document that will decide on the 
adequacy of the security 
framework. 
 
10 1 3 14 71.4 
4 The multitude of existing security 
frameworks (ISPS and non ISPS 
initiatives) may lead to difficulty and 
high costs in the implementation of 
security protection which may 
adversely affect the level of 
protection in LNG ports. 
     
 1- ISPS only states that certain 
requirements are in place, they do 
6 4 3 14 46.2 
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not state how these requirements 
are achieved 
 2- If an integrated system for all the 
different frameworks is followed, it 
might enhance the system. 
 
10 0 3 13 76.9 
 3- Cost should always be in proportion 
to the risk. The ISPS code does not 
prescribe the physical measures 
but expect the port to do a risk 
assessment and based on this put 
an effective protection in place. 
10 1 2 13 76.9 
 4- ISPS and non ISPS initiatives are 
an advantage, and some areas 
might need to be reviewed, but it 
does not have an adverse effect on 
the level of protection in LNG ports. 
8 2 3 13 61.5 
5 There are already adequate 
collaborative security and safety risk 
arrangements in place among LNG 
port supply chain members. 
     
 1- All port and SC members have 
specific requirements which are 
sometimes contradictory. 
9 1 3 13 69.2 
 2- Some arrangements are in place, 
but they are far from adequate in 
controlling/ combating today’s- let 
alone tomorrow’s- threats. 
6 1 6 13 46.2 
 3- There is still a disconnection 
between the various parties in the 
LNG SC. 
 
7 1 4 12 53.8 
6 There are currently adequate 
coordinated risk management 
procedures in place in LNG Port 
SCs. 
     
 1- From experience risk 
management activities across 
various disciplines take place in 
isolation and do not involve all 
parties in the LNG supply chain. 
9 3 0 12 75.0 
 2- These are adequate at the tier-
1 and tier-2 (locally controllable 
risk) levels - NOT at the tier-3 
(beyond local control) level. 
6 2 4 12 50.0 
 3- Adequate coordinated risk 
management procedures do not 
involve all parties in the LNG 
supply chain. 
7 1 4 12 58.3 
7 In the LNG industry, the 
methodology for evaluating risks is 
insufficient to integrate the nature of 
post 9/11 risk profiles involving 
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global terrorism. 
 1- This depends on the 
methodology. APRA- SVA 
methodology* was developed 
precisely for this reason 
 
7 0 6 13 53.8 
 2- Nothing wrong with the 
methodology; the limiting factor 
is our competencies/ 
experience in putting together 
credible single or combined 
event scenarios and imagining 
the possible consequences & 
their mitigating actions. 
6 1 6 13 46.2 
 3- The risk models available are 
adequate; again it must be 
ensured that these are 
commonly applied. 
9 1 3 13 69.2 
9 Generally port authorities are 
leading collaborative measures to 
overcome and mitigate security 
risks among port SC members. This 
leadership is running adequately in 
the case of LNG ports. 
     
 1- I think it is terminal operators who 
lead such efforts. 
8 2 3 13 61.5 
 2- Some security apparatus is not 
within the jurisdiction of port 
authorities. 
7 4 2 13 53.8 
 3- Intentions are there, but 
collaboration/progress is slow and 
not necessarily addressing the right 
issues. Good work is being done in 
this domain by Organizations/ Fora 
such as IMO, OCIMF, etc. 
8 1 4 13 61.5 
10 LNG Port Safety is generally the 
business of each individual facility 
inside the port, as each one is 
required to contain risks within its 
boundary. 
     
 1- Individual facilities should 
coordinate and cooperate with the 
port authority 
12 1 0 13 92.3 
 2- There will be a number of (major) 
risks inherent to the operation of 
one facility or combined activity 
risks of two or more facilities. The 
Port Authority needs to see to it 
that the overall combined risk is 
being managed as well, which 
means that they need to establish 
an overall Risk Management 
approach. 
12 0 1 13 92.3 
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 3- Port authority is ultimately 
responsible so they must ensure 
the LNG facilities are properly risk 
managed. 
11 1 1 13 84.6 
 4- It is a joint responsibility; however, 
it begins with individual entities 
12 0 1 13 92.3 
18 Generally in practice, risk 
assessment in safety and security 
uses the same methodology. 
     
 1- Methodologies need to be 
different as threat environment 
is entirely different between 
these two disciplines. 
9 3 1 13 69.2 
 2- Safety is a different concept, in 
both theory and practice, to 
security. 
10 2 1 13 76.9 
 3- The same methodology can be 
followed but the scenarios need 
to be updated to include 
Security systems as well. 
6 5 2 13 46.2 
 4- Requirements for safety risk 
assessments can be very 
different from those for security 
risk assessments. 
12 0 1 13 92.3 
 5- The methodology is different in 
the way that the calculations 
and modelling used for HSE 
and QRA is different than that 
used by security. 
7 2 4 13 53.8 
19 Mitigation strategies are efficiently 
applied within the framework of a 
comprehensive risk management 
strategy in LNG Port SCs 
 
     
 1- Not the case mostly 9 0 4 13 69.2 
 2- This needs more alignment as in 
most LNG ports various different 
parties operate in the Port area. 
10 0 3 13 76.9 
 3- It depends on the safety 
management systems in place and 
the kind of support received from 
the management. 
9 2 2 13 69.2 
 
Source: The author 
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Appendix6 Quantitative Survey questionnaire and results 
 
Dear Sir/ Mme; 
I am undertaking doctoral research at Plymouth University, United Kingdom on 
LNG Port Supply Chain Risk Management. Port supply chain refers to the set of 
organisations and firms fulfilling different port and logistics operations which are 
highly integrated and reliant on each other to deliver port and maritime services 
for the LNG industry. A panel of LNG port experts including port managers, 
terminal operators, LNG shippers, maritime agencies, and LNG storage facilities 
managers, managers of LNG shipping companies, LNG terminals risk 
specialists and LNG marketing managers as well as specialist consultants are 
all being consulted in this research.  
The survey is posted on Survey Monkey website, which you can access through 
the following web link: ………… The survey should take about 10-15 minutes of 
your busy time, but your expert response will make the survey successful. 
In order to gain a good understanding of LNG Port SC Risk Management, both 
in terms of safety, security and quality controls, we welcome opinions from a 
wide range of experts from different related disciplines. Please answer the 
questionnaire, even if you are not directly involved in safety or security of the 
LNG port SC, or even if you feel you cannot give an opinion on all the 
questions. Your views are valued as an informed professional in your particular 
specialty. 
Your reply will be treated in strict confidence, and names of individual 
respondents or organisations will not be used in published material or given to 
third parties. The general findings of the survey may, be published, and should 
be of value to the LNG ports and maritime industry.  If you participate in the 
survey, a copy of the general findings will be emailed to you. 
I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible. If you require any further 
details please do not hesitate to contact me at the address below. 
Mohamed Briouig 
PhD researcher 
P.O.BOX 200215 
Doha, State of Qatar 
Mobile: +974 55090636 
Landline: +974 44773218  
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Emails: (1) mohamed.briouig@plymouth.ac.uk 
            (2) Briouig@gmail.com 
The questionnaire is easy to complete. Please make a judgement about a 
specific issue/ statement in your area of expertise, which will be measured on a 
scale, by marking (X) on the left of one of the six options. 5 = Strongly Agree, 
4= Agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 2= Disagree, 1= strongly disagree, 
and 0= don’t know/ not applicable.  
 
 
PART ONE: LNG PORT SECURITY 
 
1. Position or area of specialty 
2. LNG ports and marine terminals are strategically located within the LNG 
Supply Chain. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
3. Security risks are now equally as important as safety risks in LNG ports and 
marine terminals. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
1. The size and accessibility of LNG ports and marine terminal facilities makes 
them very difficult to protect against terrorist threats. Much more work and 
international cooperation is required to improve security controls. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
2. The ISPS code and similar frameworks are an advantage; however they 
only require minimum levels of protection. In certain environments these 
may not be sufficient to adequately protect against security threats. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
3. Current security frameworks are still treating individual terminal facilities in 
relative isolation. Enhanced security protection requires a coordinated 
approach by integrating processes and systems at a local level if not on a 
regional and global basis. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
 
PART TWO: LNG PORT SAFETY 
4. LNG port safety is generally the business of each individual facility inside the 
port, as each one is required to ensure safety of its own operations within 
the limit of its boundaries. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
8. Although safety of each individual member of the LNG Port Supply Chain is 
the responsibility of each individual member, safety of the whole LNG port 
Supply Chain is a joint responsibility which has to be coordinated and ensured 
by the port authority. 
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5  4  3  2  1  0 
9. The IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for shipping should be extended 
to address port safety as well (onshore port operations). 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
10. A standard safety framework is necessary to address both LNG port 
offshore and onshore safety operations as well as the ship/ port interface. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
PART THREE: LNG PORT SAFETY & SECURITY 
11. Safety measures (safeguards) are the first line of defence for security in 
LNG port Supply Chains. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
4 Safety and security in LNG ports Supply Chains are closely related issues 
and may yield better outcome if managed in an integrative manner within the 
framework of a unified risk management approach and through a single port 
supply chain entity. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
5 Generally in practice, risk assessment in safety and security follow similar 
risk assessment and management steps.  
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
6 Risk management across various disciplines such as safety and security 
takes place in isolation and little or no coordination exists between security 
and safety assessment and management in the LNG port Supply Chain. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
7 In general, no official structure within LNG Ports supply chains exists to 
enable coordination among safety and security assessment and 
management.  
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
8 LNG safety and security are two different disciplines which have different 
requirements in terms of risk assessment. Therefore, their risk assessment 
methodologies need to be different to cope with their respective specificities 
and requirements. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
9 Although safety and security risks in LNG port Supply Chains are two 
disciplines that may have different requirements, their management should 
be coordinated within the framework of a holistic approach to achieve 
resilient and cost effective risk management in LNG port Supply Chains.  
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
10 Mitigation strategies are efficiently applied within the framework of a 
comprehensive risk management strategy in LNG Port Supply Chains. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
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11 A unified risk management methodology for assessing both safety and 
security risks and hazards can be more cost effective than a risk 
management methodology in which security and safety risks are managed 
separately and with less coordination. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
12 An all-hazards approach in which safety security, natural disasters risks are 
assessed and managed is needed in LNG Ports supply chains to develop a 
cost effective and efficient risk management strategy. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
13 Implementation and coordination of such all-hazards approach should be 
coordinated by the LNG port authority. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
PART FOUR: LNG PORT RISK MANAGEMENT AND QUALITY 
 
14 There is a similarity between Port SC safety, security and quality; mainly in 
terms of assessment and management methodologies and approaches. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
15 Safety and security risk assessment and management need to take 
advantage of the Total Quality Management (TQM) Principles. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
16 Prevention is the key principle in Total Quality Management (TQM) and 
should also be for the case of safety and security management. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
17 Based on the principles of TQM, LNG port supply chains should adopt an 
integrated risk assessment and management approach capable of dealing 
with the three types of risks, safety, security and quality.  
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
18 Adopting such an integrative approach will lead to efficient and cost effective 
risk management in LNG Ports SCs. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
 
19 Integrated LNG Port Supply chain risk management should be assured 
through a quality assurance system based on the TQM. 
 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
28. Within an all-hazard approach, the principles of TQM should be applied 
during each step of risk assessment rather than the final result of the risk 
assessment being controlled according to quality principles. 
5  4  3  2  1  0 
Thank you for responding to this survey; if you wish to get copy of the findings 
of this research, copy will be emailed to you. Please indicate here; 
Yes 
No 
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Quantitative Survey Results, Technical details using SPSS 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS 
 
Results: 150 Questionnaires sent out- 62 returned responses: 
Response rate: 41.33% 
Frequency Tables 
 
Q1- Position/ Area of specialty 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid LNG Terminal 
Managers 
13 21.0 21.0 21.0 
LNG Shipping 
Managers 
8 12.9 12.9 33.9 
LNG Port Security 
Specialists 
5 8.1 8.1 41.9 
LNG HSE Specialists 6 9.7 9.7 51.6 
LNG Quality Specialists 4 6.5 6.5 58.1 
Academia and LNG 
Consultants 
26 41.9 41.9 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q2 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Neutral 9 14.5 14.5 17.7 
Agree 25 40.3 40.3 58.1 
Strongly 
agree 
26 41.9 41.9 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
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Q3 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 4 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Neutral 4 6.5 6.5 12.9 
Agree 34 54.8 54.8 67.7 
Strongly 
agree 
20 32.3 32.3 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q4 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Disagree 4 6.5 6.5 8.1 
Neutral 22 35.5 35.5 43.5 
Agree 31 50.0 50.0 93.5 
Strongly agree 4 6.5 6.5 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q5 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Disagree 3 4.8 4.8 8.1 
Neutral 12 19.4 19.4 27.4 
Agree 30 48.4 48.4 75.8 
Strongly agree 15 24.2 24.2 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
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Q6 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Neutral 17 27.4 27.4 29.0 
Agree 36 58.1 58.1 87.1 
Strongly 
agree 
8 12.9 12.9 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q7 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
3 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Disagree 13 21.0 21.0 25.8 
Neutral 12 19.4 19.4 45.2 
Agree 22 35.5 35.5 80.6 
Strongly agree 12 19.4 19.4 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q8 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 6 9.7 9.7 9.7 
Neutral 18 29.0 29.0 38.7 
Agree 34 54.8 54.8 93.5 
Strongly 
agree 
4 6.5 6.5 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q9 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Disagree 2 3.2 3.2 6.5 
Neutral 20 32.3 32.3 38.7 
Agree 23 37.1 37.1 75.8 
Strongly agree 15 24.2 24.2 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
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Q10 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Disagree 4 6.5 6.5 9.7 
Neutral 6 9.7 9.7 19.4 
Agree 34 54.8 54.8 74.2 
Strongly agree 16 25.8 25.8 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q11 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Disagree 4 6.5 6.5 9.7 
Neutral 15 24.2 24.2 33.9 
Agree 33 53.2 53.2 87.1 
Strongly agree 8 12.9 12.9 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q12 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Neutral 18 29.0 29.0 32.3 
Agree 36 58.1 58.1 90.3 
Strongly 
agree 
6 9.7 9.7 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
Q13 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Neutral 4 6.5 6.5 8.1 
Agree 29 46.8 46.8 54.8 
Strongly 
agree 
28 45.2 45.2 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
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Q14 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
3 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Disagree 14 22.6 22.6 27.4 
Neutral 23 37.1 37.1 64.5 
Agree 16 25.8 25.8 90.3 
Strongly agree 6 9.7 9.7 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q15 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Disagree 10 16.1 16.1 19.4 
Neutral 33 53.2 53.2 72.6 
Agree 16 25.8 25.8 98.4 
Strongly agree 1 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q16 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Disagree 12 19.4 19.4 22.6 
Neutral 18 29.0 29.0 51.6 
Agree 23 37.1 37.1 88.7 
Strongly agree 7 11.3 11.3 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
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Q17 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Neutral 14 22.6 22.6 22.6 
Agree 33 53.2 53.2 75.8 
Strongly 
agree 
15 24.2 24.2 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
Q18 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 5 8.1 8.1 8.1 
Neutral 35 56.5 56.5 64.5 
Agree 15 24.2 24.2 88.7 
Strongly 
agree 
7 11.3 11.3 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
Q19 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Neutral 12 19.4 19.4 22.6 
Agree 34 54.8 54.8 77.4 
Strongly 
agree 
14 22.6 22.6 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q20 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Neutral 9 14.5 14.5 14.5 
Agree 40 64.5 64.5 79.0 
Strongly 
agree 
13 21.0 21.0 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
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Q21 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Disagree 5 8.1 8.1 9.7 
Neutral 20 32.3 32.3 41.9 
Agree 26 41.9 41.9 83.9 
Strongly agree 10 16.1 16.1 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q22 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
3 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Disagree 8 12.9 12.9 17.7 
Neutral 13 21.0 21.0 38.7 
Agree 22 35.5 35.5 74.2 
Strongly agree 16 25.8 25.8 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q23 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly 
disagree 
1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Disagree 1 1.6 1.6 3.2 
Neutral 13 21.0 21.0 24.2 
Agree 41 66.1 66.1 90.3 
Strongly agree 6 9.7 9.7 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
Q24 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Neutral 10 16.1 16.1 17.7 
Agree 38 61.3 61.3 79.0 
Strongly 
agree 
13 21.0 21.0 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
   
399 
 
 
Q25 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Neutral 11 17.7 17.7 21.0 
Agree 40 64.5 64.5 85.5 
Strongly 
agree 
9 14.5 14.5 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q26 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 4 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Neutral 16 25.8 25.8 32.3 
Agree 33 53.2 53.2 85.5 
Strongly 
agree 
9 14.5 14.5 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q27 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Neutral 9 14.5 14.5 17.7 
Agree 35 56.5 56.5 74.2 
Strongly 
agree 
16 25.8 25.8 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Q28 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disagree 2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Neutral 10 16.1 16.1 19.4 
Agree 35 56.5 56.5 75.8 
Strongly 
agree 
15 24.2 24.2 100.0 
Total 62 100.0 100.0  
 
Source: The author 
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Appendix7 Focus group prompt sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: The author 
Focus Group prompt sheet. 
Opening statements 
 
I am researching RM in LNG port SCs with a focus on the optimal way of management safety 
and security risks in LNG ports and how such management of risks can be best approached 
from a holistic and integrative perspective to address the interfaces and shared impacts of 
safety and security within the LNG ports domain. 
 
All details are confidential but I may need to reproduce a transcript of some or all of your 
replies anonymously in an Appendix to a publication. 
The main question is: 
As LNG port experts, I would like to discuss with you the issue of safety and security RM and 
how it can be best streamlined, coordinated and integrated from a holistic perspective, so RM 
within the LNG port domain is performed efficiently and cost effectively following a 
participative approach. 
Please provide your expert opinion in relation to the following prompts and in the context of 
LNG ports and marine terminals. 
1. Interfaces between safety and security. 
2. Current RM approach privileges safety and security RM be done in isolation  
3. An all-hazards approach is a more cost effective and efficient RM approach 
4. A change management process is necessary to assist in the implementation of an all-
hazard approach to RM. 
5. This change management should be implemented by all LNG ports organisations, 
including the port authority. 
6. The port authority should lead the implementation of unified and integrated RM in LNG 
ports. 
7. The port authority shall structure the port community and use it as an important tool in 
the coordination of safety and security RM.  
8. The port community shall create a specialised risk and emergency management 
committee (REMC) to review and discuss RCOs for both safety and security. 
9. The port community shall enjoy an advisory role to the port authority with regards to 
RM issues. 
10. The port community-REMC shall play a coordination role between safety and security.  
11. Safety and security departments of main port organisations shall be represented 
within the port community- REMC. 
12. What is your impression about the proposed RM conceptual model? 
13. Do you think the proposed RM conceptual model can be practical in the context of 
LNG ports?   
14. What are the main factors for the proposed CM to be successfully implemented? 
15. How can cooperation within the port community- REMC be best enhanced? 
16. Do you think representation within REMC should be limited only to the main LNG port 
organisations or should this membership be open to all port users and public 
agencies? 
